Why the U.S. Feels It Must Contain Russia
August 23, 2015.-
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The strategy Washington used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War is still useful as the United States works to keep Russia from becoming a regional hegemon.
Analysis
At
the outset of the Cold War, in 1946, U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan
sent what became popularly known as the "long telegram" from the embassy
in Moscow outlining a policy of containment in dealing with the Soviet
Union. The policy was made public in 1947 in an anonymous article in
Foreign Affairs. It would go on to serve as the principal U.S. strategy
for dealing with the Soviet Union until the eventual Soviet collapse in
1991. At its heart, the policy of containment was about blocking and
countering the Soviet Union and its communist allies "whenever and
wherever they posed a risk of gaining influence."
Many
things have changed since Kennan outlined his containment policy nearly
70 years ago. The Soviet Union is no more, the global competition
between the capitalist and communist superpowers is over and Russia no
longer adheres to communist ideology. Then again, some things have not
changed. The United States and Russia are once again in a tense diplomatic standoff over
the European borderlands and beyond. Both countries are once again
leading rival military blocs that are becoming increasingly active in security exercises and weapons buildups. The question, "Are we in a new Cold War?" has been asked repeatedly.
The
containment policy never really ended. Washington gave it a rest during
the 1990s and early 2000s, when Russia was too weak to necessitate
active and overt containment. But the geopolitical imperative behind the
policy — preventing the rise of regional hegemons with the potential to
challenge the United States — never disappeared, as the continued
expansion of NATO and the European Union illustrated. Now, with Russia
having re-emerged as a regional power over the past decade, Washington
appears to be brushing off the dust that accumulated on the long
telegram. A close examination of the current crisis in Ukraine and the
ripple effects it has had throughout Russia's periphery reveals that
crucial aspects of Kennan's containment policy are still very much
alive.
Containment Strategy in Europe
Ukraine
is the obvious place to start when looking at the United States'
current containment strategy for Russia. The euromaidan revolution of
February 2014, in which then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was overthrown and replaced with a pro-West government,
originated from concerns that Russia was becoming too powerful in
Ukraine. These concerns emerged not only among some segments of the
Ukrainian public but also among Western powers, including the United
States.
In
November 2013, Yanukovich's last-minute decision to suspend free-trade
talks with the European Union and move closer with Russia sparked
demonstrations in Kiev that, three months later, led to a violent
uprising against Yanukovich's government. Although the euromaidan
protests involved a great deal of grassroots participation, U.S. backing
and influence were a notable force in shaping the demonstrations. U.S.
officials, including Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland,
visited the demonstrations and supported the protest leaders, and U.S.
nongovernmental organizations actively supported the demonstrations,
just as they did during the Orange Revolution nearly a decade earlier.
Russia
made no secret of its frustration with the United States and Europe
over euromaidan, calling the uprising a Western-backed and illegitimate
coup. Russia responded by annexing Crimea and supporting a separatist
rebellion in eastern Ukraine, saying that the rebellion was no different
from the protests in Kiev. These actions spurred the United States to
more aggressively contain Russia, starting with the passage of sanctions
against the country. As Moscow made clear that it would not back down
in either Crimea or eastern Ukraine, the United States approved more
sanctions against Russia while increasing economic support for the
Ukrainian government and military assistance for Ukraine's security
forces. Therefore, what started as the United States containing Russia
politically in Ukraine by supporting the overthrow of a pro-Russia
government in favor of a pro-West one has expanded to entail economic
and security components of containment.
Of
course, in keeping with the principles of containment (acting "whenever
and wherever" the target could gain influence), the United States has
applied the strategy outside of Ukraine as well. In Central and Eastern
Europe, the United States has spearheaded NATO efforts to increase troop
levels and the frequency of military exercises in Poland, Romania and
the Baltic states to deter Russia from considering any further military
action in the European borderlands. Moreover, the Pentagon has increased
its "semi-permanent" rotation of forces in the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These states are particularly concerned
about Russian aggression given their small size, close proximity to
Russia and large ethnic Russian populations.
The United States has had a more subtle containment strategy in Ukraine's two neighboring states of Moldova and Belarus.
In Moldova, Washington has supported the government's Western
integration efforts. Chisinau, like Kiev, has attempted to increase
political and economic ties with the European Union. However, Moldova's
political system is deeply divided between pro-West and pro-Russia
parties, and this split has made Chisinau more difficult to work with
than Kiev. Nevertheless, the United States has increased cooperation
with Moldova via joint military exercises and has boosted political
backing for the fragile EU-oriented government in a bid to keep Russia
from holding a dominant position in the country.
Belarus
is even more challenging for the U.S. containment strategy, given that
Minsk is closely aligned with Moscow economically and militarily as a
member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and Collective
Security Treaty Organization. But the United States has been taking part
in a low-level economic courtship of Belarus. At the same time, it has
been supporting pro-West opposition groups in the country to pressure
longtime President Aleksandr Lukashenko. Lukashenko's fear of suffering
the same fate as Yanukovich is clear, and Minsk has taken on a key
mediating role in negotiations over the Ukraine crisis. Lukashenko wants
to show that his government can be a useful bridge between Russia and
the West rather than a blindly loyal ally of Moscow.
The Strategy at Work Throughout Russia's Periphery
The
U.S. containment strategy is not limited to Russia's western flank in
Europe; it extends to the south and the east in the Caucasus and Central
Asia as well. Georgia is a key component of the strategy and has been
even more aggressive than Ukraine and Moldova in pursuing integration
with the West. Georgia has made EU and NATO accession its foreign policy
priorities, and though membership in these blocs is a distant prospect
for Tbilisi, Georgia has moved forward with an EU association agreement,
and a NATO training center will open in Georgia before the end of August.
The United States has worked to increase its support for Georgia since
the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, which — after a quick Russian military
victory and a muted response from NATO — was in many ways the defining
moment of Russia's resurgence.
Azerbaijan
is another focal point of the U.S. containment strategy, largely
because of the country's sizable energy resources and strategic location
in the Southern Corridor energy route. U.S. energy companies were key
in launching the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline
projects to send Azerbaijani oil and natural gas westward, and Europe is
once again courting Azerbaijan as an alternative energy supplier for
projects like the Trans-Caspian pipeline. Making inroads into Armenia,
which hosts a Russian military base and recently joined the Eurasian
Economic Union, has been challenging for the United States. However,
Washington has pushed for advancements in long-standing negotiations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has become increasingly assertive in
challenging the way Armenia and Russia are managing the conflict, and
Washington has become more diplomatically involved in the negotiation
process.
In
Central Asia, the U.S. containment strategy is more difficult, because
there are no overtly pro-West countries in the region and several
Central Asian states host a Russian military presence. However, the
United States frequently holds joint counternarcotics and
counterterrorism training and exercises in countries such as Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, giving it a useful security presence in the region. The
United States has also been lobbying for the traditionally isolationist
Turkmenistan to participate in the Trans-Caspian natural gas project, which
could significantly help Europe diversify away from Russian energy
supplies. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also been considered as
potential participants in such energy projects.
The Future of the Containment Strategy
Although
the U.S. containment strategy differs widely in each country and
sub-region of the former Soviet Union, the underlying principle is the
same: to limit Russia's political, economic and military influence
throughout its periphery. The intensity of the containment policy also
differs based on how powerful or assertive Russia is at the time, as the
relative lull in the early post-Cold War period showed. Right now, the
United States is very actively applying the containment strategy.
This
is useful to consider in looking ahead at the standoff between Russia
and the West over Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet periphery.
There are currently no signs of a de-escalation to the standoff. In
fact, there have even been indications that Russia is considering
intensifying the conflict in Ukraine or perhaps in other areas in the
near future. In the event that Russia does risk an escalation, the
United States can choose from a wide range of economic and military
options in line with its containment strategy.
One
would be an increase of support to the most sensitive theater of the
Russia-West standoff: Ukraine. The United States has publicly floated
the possibility of providing lethal weapons to the Ukrainian security
forces but has so far held off. The threat alone has been a part of the
containment policy and a major factor in dissuading Russia from an overt
military incursion into Ukraine, but a Russian escalation could turn
the threat into a reality.
Another
option would be increasing the size and intensity of military exercises
in areas such as the Baltic states or Georgia — both vulnerable points
abutting the Russian heartland. Greater political and economic backing
for Southern Corridor energy projects like the Trans-Caspian would also
serve as a potential threat to Russia's economic and political position.
The United States has already used sanctions to contain Russia's
actions in its near abroad, and there is still room to inflict much more
pain on an already weakened Russian economy
.
Of
course, the United States is no longer preoccupied with stopping the
spread of communism or containing Russia's power and political influence
on a global scale. But the geopolitical imperative that gave birth to
the U.S. containment policy — to limit Russia's ability to project power
beyond its borders — is still relevant and will remain so long into the
future.