miércoles, 23 de noviembre de 2016

HOW IDENTITY COMMUNITARISM IS KILLING LIBERALISM ALL AROUND DE WORLD NOT ONLY IN USA

THE NEW YORK TIMES
SUNDAY REVIEW




The End of Identity Liberalism

Credit Dan Gluibizzi
It is a truism that America has become a more diverse country. It is also a beautiful thing to watch. Visitors from other countries, particularly those having trouble incorporating different ethnic groups and faiths, are amazed that we manage to pull it off. Not perfectly, of course, but certainly better than any European or Asian nation today. It’s an extraordinary success story.

But how should this diversity shape our politics? The standard liberal answer for nearly a generation now has been that we should become aware of and “celebrate” our differences. Which is a splendid principle of moral pedagogy — but disastrous as a foundation for democratic politics in our ideological age. In recent years American liberalism has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing.

One of the many lessons of the recent presidential election campaign and its repugnant outcome is that the age of identity liberalism must be brought to an end. Hillary Clinton was at her best and most uplifting when she spoke about American interests in world affairs and how they relate to our understanding of democracy. But when it came to life at home, she tended on the campaign trail to lose that large vision and slip into the rhetoric of diversity, calling out explicitly to African-American, Latino, L.G.B.T. and women voters at every stop. This was a strategic mistake. If you are going to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. If you don’t, those left out will notice and feel excluded. Which, as the data show, was exactly what happened with the white working class and those with strong religious convictions. Fully two-thirds of white voters without college degrees voted for Donald Trump, as did over 80 percent of white evangelicals.

The moral energy surrounding identity has, of course, had many good effects. Affirmative action has reshaped and improved corporate life. Black Lives Matter has delivered a wake-up call to every American with a conscience. Hollywood’s efforts to normalize homosexuality in our popular culture helped to normalize it in American families and public life.

martes, 22 de noviembre de 2016

Entre la realidad y lo “politically correct”



La Gran Revuelta norteamericana



Hace poco más de un año los estudiantes de la Universidad de Yale se preparaban para disfrazarse para el Halloween. Sin embargo, el campus estaba convulsionado porque la administración universitaria había pedido en una circular a los alumnos que por favor no se disfrazasen de personajes de grupos minoritarios, históricamente oprimidos: nada de indios piel rojas, por favor. Una profesora, tutora de uno de los dormitorios, sintió excesiva esa prohibición y protestó, alegando que mejor dejaran a los muchachos disfrazarse como les pareciera. Un grupo de alumnos montó en cólera y a gritos le reclamó al marido de la osada profesora el derecho de los jóvenes a sentirse “seguros” en la universidad.


El 8 de noviembre de 2016 los norteamericanos hicieron lo impensable: eligieron como su presidente a un hombre notoriamente inepto para el cargo. El primer presidente negro de los Estados Unidos le entregará el poder a Donald Trump, quien fue apoyado en su campaña por el Ku Klux Klan. Su agenda política hizo presentables y exitosos la xenofobia, el racismo y el sentimiento anti inmigrante. ¿Están relacionados estos dos sucesos?





estados-unidos



En 1991 el crítico cultural Christopher Lash trataba de dar cuenta de la rebelión derechista de Ronald Reagan que barrió el horizonte político norteamericano en los ochenta. Lasch, un hombre de izquierda, pero conservador cultural, tenía una explicación que incomodaba a las élites progresistas. “La tenaz creencia en el progreso”, pensaba Lasch, “hacía que fuera muy difícil para la izquierda el escuchar a quienes decían que las cosas se caían a pedazos.” 

Este segmento había perdido contacto con quienes habitaban en esa vasta franja de territorio que se extendía entre las dos costa del país; la zona sobre la cual las élites globales “volaban”, pero en donde casi nunca aterrizaban. La izquierda confundía el profundo malestar social –económico y cultural– experimentado en la América profunda con los dolores temporales ocasionados por el imparable, y necesario, proceso de modernización. 

Esta era, pensaba Lasch, la reyerta de la izquierda con los Estados Unidos. “Si la gente en la izquierda se sentía alienada de los Estados Unidos era porque a sus ojos la mayoría de norteamericanos se rehusaba a aceptar el futuro. En lugar de ello se aferraba a hábitos de pensamiento atrasados, estrechos, que le impedían cambiar con los tiempos”. (The True and Ony Heaven). Veinticinco años después los rezagados, los deplorables, quienes no creían en el progreso globalizado, interracial y multicultural se levantaron una vez más en insurgencia electoral para mostrarse impúdicos ante las élites formadas en Yale y Harvard, esas que regulan los disfraces de los estudiantes. La violencia de esta revuelta es inaudita.


La insurgencia de la América profunda de los ochenta fue contenida y canalizada por el partido republicano. Nunca amenazó con romper el esquema bipartidista tradicional. Reagan podía ser un actor de Hollywood, pero no era un hombre anti sistema, como sí lo es Donald Trump. La Gran Revuelta actual tiene como su blanco el establishment de Washington. Son las políticas tomadas en esa distante ciudad de nadie las que supuestamente les han fallado a los votantes de Trump. 

El problema es que Washington significa, simultáneamente, muchas cosas: la profunda transformación del trabajo y la economía global, la diversificación étnica del país, la desigualdad social y el fin de la movilidad para un segmento que durante tres generaciones había visto sus destinos mejorar. Si algo, el fenómeno es sólo parcialmente económico. 

Por más de veinte años el abismo que Lasch describió en los noventa entre las élites ilustradas y la América profunda creció y se profundizó al grado de hacerse, literalmente, insalvable. En realidad, al paso de los años dos naciones bien distintas han cuajado en el gran macizo continental. Dos naciones que se recelan mutuamente y que se aborrecen como resentimiento. Sólo ha quedado el Pluribus

Ese sentimiento de agravio fue el que Trump capitalizó y por ello su vulgaridad fue un activo desde el comienzo de la contienda. Mientras que las élites se entretienen normando los disfraces de sus privilegiados estudiantes, los blancos de clase media baja, en el campo y en los páramos postindustriales, ven sus trabajos desvanecerse en el aire, sus creencias ridiculizadas, su sensibilidad anti intelectual denigrada por los cosmopolitas habitantes de las metrópolis y los campus universitarios. Y ese es el caldo de cultivo propicio para el populismo antiliberal que encuentra chivos expiatorios por doquier. 


La revuelta de las masas que tiene lugar en Estados Unidos podría tener como resultado la destrucción del sistema político norteamericano como lo conocemos. Desde las primeras décadas de la República ese país no había experimentado nada como esto. El fenómeno de democracias que se suicidan no es desconocido, pero la democracia liberal más antigua de la historia nunca había estado en una situación donde un quiebre democrático fuese posible. Ahora lo está y ello tiene insondeables consecuencias para el mundo.


REVISTA “NEXOS”. 
México D.F. 
9 noviembre, 2016
José Antonio Aguilar Rivera


José Antonio Aguilar Rivera
Investigador del CIDE. Autor de La geometría y el mito. Un ensayo sobre la libertad y el liberalismo en México, 1821-1970 y Cartas mexicanas de Alexis de Tocqueville, entre otros títulos.

lunes, 21 de noviembre de 2016

SOBRE LA DEMAGOGIA




De Aristóteles a Trump; por Fernando Mires

PRODAVINCI




donald-trump640
Fotografía de Martin Schoeller para Time


Aristóteles era escéptico con respecto a la posibilidad de que la democracia pudiera ser la forma de gobierno más apropiada para regir los destinos de la polis. Para el filósofo la forma ideal de gobierno era la república, entendiendo por ella un Estado sometido al imperio de la ley.

La democracia —deducimos de la lectura del capítulo lV de La Política— puede llegar a ser una forma adecuada de gobierno si se mantienen los principios del ideal republicano, vale decir, la hegemonía de la ley por sobre los intereses de grupos particulares. Posibilidad remota, pensó Aristóteles.

Los problemas para la democracia provienen, según Aristóteles, de dos vertientes. La primera, de la mayoría. Al estar el pueblo formado por muchos, sus intereses no son homogéneos sino diferentes e incluso contrapuestos. Hecho que conspira contra toda forma de gobernabilidad.

La segunda reside en el hecho de que las aspiraciones de los muchos son de índole económico, y la economía para los griegos era una actividad no solo diferente sino antagónica a la política. Los políticos de la polis debían ser hombres liberados de los intereses y pasiones que provienen de la ausencia de bienes.

Para decirlo en términos modernos: Aristóteles sentía temor frente a la sociedad de masas. Muchos siglos después ese temor sería compartido por diferentes pensadores. Desde el aristocratismo intelectual de Nietzsche, el republicanismo de Ortega y Gasset, el psicoanálisis de Freud, la sociedad de masas nunca contó con las simpatías de los grandes filósofos de la modernidad temprana.

Hannah Arendt iría más lejos: siguiendo el dictamen aristotélico se pronunció a favor de la sociedad de clases en contra de la sociedad de masas (El Origen del Totalitarismo). Según Arendt, las clases daban forma contractual a la sociedad mientras las masas la desorganizaban en una no-sociedad a la que Emile Durkheim denominaría con el concepto de anomia, hoy usado como sinónimo de desintegración social.

Para Arendt el fin de las clases no llevaba a la igualdad social sino a la desaparición de la sociedad. Por lo mismo constituía la condición apropiada para el ascenso de los demagogos y sus consecuentes dictaduras apoyadas por las grandes masas. La —decía Aristóteles— lleva a la demagogia y la demagogia a la tiranía.

¿Es entonces la democracia una forma de gobierno destinada a destruirse a sí misma? En el caso ateniense, al menos, lo fue. Los temores de Aristóteles fueron cumplidos. La luz de la democracia griega permaneció apagada durante siglos. Bárbaros y demagogos unidos comenzaron a reinar en medio de la oscuridad de la no-política.

Pero Hannah Arendt pensó ese tema en una dirección diferente a Aristóteles. El problema no lo vio en la democracia en cuanto tal sino en los ideales de los griegos. En efecto, si uno lee con atención a Aristóteles, podrá comprobar que todos sus pensamientos apuntaban hacia la búsqueda de la armonía. Esa armonía, según Arendt, no puede ser encontrada en la política (¿Qué es Política?) Para eso están las religiones, el arte, el amor. La democracia —así creo interpretar a Arendt— solo existe como lucha por la democracia, incluyendo la lucha en contra de demagogos y tiranos, cuenten o no con el apoyo de la mayoría. Podríamos también decirlo de otro modo: los antagonismos son la fuerza energética que impide a la democracia derrumbarse sobre sí misma.

Cuando Donald Trump fue elegido presidente de los EE. UU. supimos otra vez más que una mayoría democrática había parido a un gran demagogo. Pero también supimos que muchos ciudadanos han comenzado a alinear fuerzas para cerrar su avance. Eso es precisamente la democracia: un campo de lucha. Nunca el lugar de la armonía. La democracia es, para decirlo con Chantal Mouffe, una realidad agónica (On the Political). Allí, como en otros espacios, incluyendo los personales, tiene lugar en ella una lucha entre el principio de la muerte y el de la vida.

A diferencia de Aristóteles, hoy sabemos que las leyes no han sido hechas para impedir sino para proteger la lucha entre contrarios. Eso significa que la democracia no está al final de la lucha sino en la lucha misma. Y esa lucha no tiene final.

Carlos Malamud: Colombia Paz




colombia paz






Colombia y el nuevo acuerdo de paz



Infolatam
Madrid, 20 noviembre 2016
Por Carlos Malamud
 
Tras el fracaso del plebiscito del 2 de octubre, el gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos inició febriles negociaciones a tres bandas con el ánimo de revivir el proceso de paz. Mientras en Bogotá se reunían los líderes de la campaña del NO con el presidente y sus asesores, de forma casi simultánea el equipo gubernamental encabezado por Humberto de la Calle mantenía en La Habana conversaciones con los máximos dirigentes de las FARC. De este modo se alcanzó un nuevo acuerdo que está pendiente de dos cuestiones fundamentales, por un lado la aprobación de quienes se habían opuesto al tratado anterior y, por el otro, la refrendación bien sea legislativa o bien popular de lo nuevamente acordado.
 
Según la revista Semana , los cambios producidos en los acuerdos son profundos y no meramente cosméticos, como se había podido pensar inicialmente. Las FARC cedieron en todos los puntos salvo en lo relativo a la elegibilidad política de sus integrantes, incluso aquellos condenados por la justicia. Desde la perspectiva de las FARC, restringir su acceso a la vía electoral habría supuesto considerarlos meros “criminales” y no “rebeldes con causa” como insiste repetidamente su “relato”.


Para el gobierno, los nuevos acuerdos han modificado 56 de los 57 ejes temáticos en los que se organizaron las 410 propuestas de los líderes del NO, lo que supuso incorporar el 80% de las observaciones recibidas. Los cambios introducidos abordan cuestiones muy diversas, como la justicia transicional, la propiedad de la tierra, el enfoque de género o el papel de las distintas administraciones del Estado. Inclusive se reglamenta de un modo más preciso el paso de las FARC a la vida política y se establecen mayores controles para hacer efectiva la transición de la lucha armada al enfrentamiento dialéctico.


En este sentido destacan las menores facilidades que tendrá el grupo guerrillero para obtener actas de diputados y senadores, su desvinculación de ciertas instancias de control que funcionarían durante el post conflicto, como la Comisión de Garantías de Seguridad, y la obligación de entregar un inventario detallado de sus bienes antes de que culmine la entrega de armas. Este último punto es fundamental ya que de otro modo no podrían acceder a los beneficios de la justicia transicional y se vería gravemente condicionada su participación política futura.


El gobierno tiene en sus manos tres mecanismos para sacar adelante el nuevo acuerdo: su aprobación por el Congreso, la realización de un nuevo plebiscito o la celebración de Cabildos Abiertos a lo largo del territorio nacional que discutan y aprueben lo acordado en La Habana. Muy probablemente, tras el susto impensado de la anterior consulta, se opte por la vía parlamentaria, que ofrece mayores garantías al Ejecutivo.


Por ello, el principal escollo para el cierre de este capítulo en la larga marcha hacia la paz en Colombia es la postura de los defensores del NO. Si bien se han recogido buena parte de las propuestas de los diversos grupos y se han dado mayores garantías a todos ellos de la legalidad del proceso, muchos de los cuestionamientos iniciales todavía siguen vigentes. Ninguno de los principales líderes opuestos al tratado anterior se han manifestado claramente sobre el nuevo, pero todo indica que tanto Álvaro Uribe, como Andrés Pastrana o Marta Lucía Ramírez seguirán manteniendo su oposición de partida. Incluso, Uribe dijo esperar que este acuerdo no fuera definitivo, como si lo que sobrara, precisamente, fuera tiempo.


Este es uno de los puntos de discordia entre los principales defensores del tratado (el gobierno y las FARC) y sus detractores. Para los primeros la situación de los guerrilleros camino de su desmovilización comienza a tornarse insostenible, lo que podría comprometer seriamente el futuro del proceso. De ahí la conveniencia de cerrar definitivamente esta etapa de negociación y ponerse a trabajar en la construcción de la paz.


Si quiere sacar adelante los acuerdos con la menor oposición posible, al gobierno del presidente Santos le queda mucha tarea por hacer. Es evidente que no podrá aglutinar a todos detrás de su postura y que la idea de un gran Acuerdo Nacional, como propone Uribe, hoy por hoy es bastante difícil de implementar. Hay grupos que se oponen radicalmente a cualquier acuerdo con las FARC y que siguen argumentando que todo es una estratagema para conquistar el poder por medios electorales, al haberse cerrado la vía de la lucha armada.


Pese a ello, sigo coincidiendo con Héctor Abad Faciolince en sus profundas reflexiones (dirigidas a su cuñado) sobre el proceso y su conveniencia y en las ventajas de la paz frente a la guerra: “¿No es mejor un país donde tus mismos secuestradores estén libres haciendo política, en vez de un país en que esos mismos tipos estén cerca de tu finca, amenazando a tus hijos, mis sobrinos, y a los hijos de tus hijos, a tus nietos? La paz no se hace para que haya una justicia plena y completa. La paz se hace para olvidar el dolor pasado, para disminuir el dolor presente y para prevenir el dolor futuro”.


jueves, 17 de noviembre de 2016

No todos somos iguales ante la ley.






Resultado de imagen de foto monseñor STURLA



 ...los sacerdotes son "protegidos" de las autoridades eclesiásticas que los sustraen a la intervenciön de la Justicia. ¿Será Uruguay una República Laica todavía ? ¿Porque deja prescribir la iglesia católica los crímenes de sus sacerdotes abusadores de niños y adultos?

Dos curas expulsados por abusos sexuales, pero la Iglesia no hará la denuncia

17.11.2016

MONTEVIDEO (Uypress) — La Iglesia Católica recibió 44 denuncias de abuso sexual, expulsó a dos sacerdotes y separó a otros dos, pero no dio intervención a la justicia.

En lo que va de 2016 la Iglesia Católica recibió 44 denuncias de abuso sexual cometidos por sacerdotes, correspondientes a 40 denunciados y que abarcan un período de 70 años.
Según informa El Observador, de los 40 denunciados, 20 son sacerdotes fallecidos y nueve están siendo todavía investigados. En tanto, en siete casos se comprobó que el denunciado era inocente y en otros cuatro casos, los presbíteros denunciados fueron separados de su ministerio y no podrán ejercer más el sacerdocio. De estos cuatro casos, dos de ellos corresponden a abusos a menores y dos a faltas al celibato. A su vez, en tres de estos casos el denunciado confesó el delito o falta.
El cardenal Sturla señaló que ninguna de las 44 denuncias recibidas fue derivada a la Justicia. Explicó que en muchos casos el delito tenía tantos años que ya había prescrito según el código uruguayo. En el caso de abuso a menores, al momento de la denuncia la persona ya era mayor de edad y si bien la Iglesia recomendó a la familia llevar el caso a la Justicia, el involucrado no lo quiso.
Sturla sostuvo que ningún caso involucraba en el momento a un menor de edad. Si esto hubiera sido así, el protocolo de la Iglesia establece ir directo a la Justicia.
"La mayoría de los casos son hechos desagradables, pero no son violaciones", dijo el cardenal y arzobispo de Montevideo, Daniel Sturla, en la conferencia de prensa en la que ayer se presentaron estos datos.
El cardenal agregó que "es obvio que hasta hace 10 años la Iglesia barría debajo de la alfombra".
"Esto lo vivimos con dolor y vergüenza. Si fuera una sola denuncia sentiríamos mucho dolor también. Ahora intentamos ver por qué pasó esto. Porque está todo bien con que la Iglesia exija a sus sacerdotes o consagrados un mayor nivel moral, pero acá hay un drama humano y ese drama humano hay que atenderlo. Hay que ver por qué hay personas que realizan una cosa que genera tanta herida y dolor", añadió Sturla.
El arzobispo explicó, además, que si se llega a recibir alguna denuncia de un caso actual de abuso contra un niño, este "se derivará de inmediato a la Justicia".
De acuerdo a El País, Sturla también dijo que los cuatro curas separados de sus ministerios "la Iglesia los acompaña, trata de que puedan rearmar su vida, de que haya un acompañamiento psicológico, espiritual y personal".
Sobre los sacerdotes suspendidos, señaló que el proceso sigue en pie y no está claro si podrán volver a sus cargos o serán expulsados de forma definitiva.

miércoles, 16 de noviembre de 2016

Canada´s Time in Latin America






Resultado de imagen de foto justin trudeau






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Canadas Time in Latin America 

Nov 11,  2016 
 Voces

The liberal values of free trade and multiculturalism might be in retreat in the United States after the election of Donald Trump, but they are alive and well in Canada. A year after taking office, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will visit Cuba and Argentina beginning on November 15, before attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru. This trip is an opportunity for Canada to increase its standing in Latin America, and for Trudeau to promote the principles and interests of his country the worlds 10th largest economy in the hemisphere.
Many of the central issues of Trudeaus foreign policy economic integration, renewable energy, and multilateral cooperationare also important in Latin America, especially after the emergence of reformist and pragmatic governments in many countries. Until now, however, the region has had a relatively minor role in the Prime Ministers international agenda, Mexico being the exception. That the first Latin American countries Trudeau will visit are Cuba and Argentina is not a coincidence. Both countries are reforming their economies and expanding opportunities for Canadian corporations, which already have a strong presence. 
Historically, Canadian engagement with the region has been based on two pillars: hemispheric integration and free trade. Ottawa joined the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990, and has been one of the main contributors to its budget (10% of the total, second only to the United States and much more than what Mexico and Brazil contribute.) In addition, Canada finances numerous programs on health, education and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has had a strong presence in Haiti for many years.
On the economic front, over the past decade Canada has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Honduras and Panama, in addition to the previously existing NAFTA with Mexico and the US and an FTA with Chile, signed in 1997. Promoting free trade is a long-term policy of Canada, common to Trudeaus administration and that of his conservative predecessor, Stephen Harper. In fact, as leader of the opposition Trudeau supported Canadas participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and once in office concluded a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union. The deal negotiated largely under Harper and signed by Trudeau on October 30will remove tariffs for 98% of Canada-EU trade, a rare piece of good news for global trade in the last few years.
Trudeaus government has, however, implemented changes in other aspects of Canadas foreign policy after a decade of conservative government. The prime minister withdrew Canadian fighter jets from the campaign against ISIS, signed international conventions against climate change, and reinforced Canada´s identity as an ally of multiculturalism and social development in the world.
Mexicos relations with Canada have improved significantly under Trudeau. In contrast to the rhetoric of the new US president-elect, last June Canada lifted the visa requirement for Mexican visitors, which had been imposed by the conservative government in 2009 as a reaction to a growing number of asylum requests by Mexican citizens. In exchange, the Mexican government removed restrictions to imports of Canadian beef. The double announcement was made during a state visit to Ottawa by Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto, before the summit of the three amigos”—Trudeau, Peña and Barack Obama.
By visiting Cuba, Trudeau will imitate his father, then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau, who in 1976 was warmly welcomed by Fidel Castro in Havana. Their relationship was so close that Castro flew to Ottawa in 2000 to attend Trudeaus funeral. But besides remembering his father and predecessor, the current Canadian prime minister will seek to reinforce the economic presence of his country in Cuba. Canada, together with Mexico, is the only country in the hemisphere that did not break relations with the island after the revolution, and has maintained a significant economic presence. In fact, Canada is the country that has the highest number of tourists visiting Cuba more than 35% of the totalrepresenting an important source of foreign currency. Further, Canadian companies are involved in Cuban energy and mining sectors, and bilateral trade totaled more than $1 billion in 2015. Amid the uncertainty of what a Trump administration would do with Obamas policy of rapprochement with Havana, Canada´s potential importance as an economic partner for Cuba has increased.
In Argentina, meanwhile, Trudeau will seek to strengthen relations with Mauricio Macri, another reform-minded leader who took office in late 2015. Canadas example of economic diversification and development based on natural resources and agriculture has been analyzed closely by Argentina for years. It is likely Macri and Trudeau will discuss Canadas recent deal with the EU, as the Argentine president wants Mercosur to sign a similar trade agreement with Europe in the near future. In addition, Canadian mining companies have a strong presence in Argentina, and benefited from Macris decision to lift retention taxes over their operations in the country. At the same time, some Canadian corporations especially Barrick Goldhave been accused of numerous regulatory violations and of harming the environment in Argentina, generating conflicts with local communities. It is not clear if both leaders will discuss this situation during their meeting.
Immediately after visiting Macri, Trudeau will go to Peru, where new president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski another example of the new leaders committed to free trade and pro-market policieswill host the APEC summit. This will also be Obamas farewell from the world stage, only weeks before leaving office.  The big question for Canadian foreign policy, of course, is what type of relationship the country will have with Donald Trump. If the new US president fulfills his campaign promise of renegotiating NAFTA which Trudeau said he is willing to discussand increase protectionism, Canadian economic interests could be affected. After all, a whopping 75% of all Canadian exports go to the United States.
But while the new US Republican administration gets ready to take office on January 20 which few anticipated only a few days ago the Canadian prime minister has a great opportunity to forge new partnerships and strengthen Canadian engagement in Latin America

Campeonato da Língua Paumari - 2015

domingo, 13 de noviembre de 2016

Project Syndicate Editors comments on What Will Trump Do ?




 Donald Trump looks at Barack Obama




Editors’ Insight: Fortnightly, Project Syndicate editors engage recent PS commentaries to

probe the broader significance of current events.
What Will Trump Do?

The global shock administered by Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency continues to reverberate. How will President-elect Trump represent those who put him in power – and how will his power affect America and the world?

NOV 13, 2016.-

All US presidents come to power – and exercise it – by assembling and sustaining a broad electoral coalition of voters with identifiable interests. Donald Trump is no exception. Trump’s stunning election victory, following a populist campaign that targeted US institutions, domestic and foreign policies, and especially elites, was powered by voters – overwhelmingly white, largely rural, and with only some or no postsecondary education – who feel alienated from a political establishment that has failed to address their interests.
So the question now, for the United States and the world, is how Trump intends to represent this electoral bloc. Part of the difficulty in answering it, as Project Syndicate’s contributors understand well, is Trump himself. “The US has never before had a president with no political or military experience, nor one who so routinely shirks the truth, embraces conspiracy theories, and contradicts himself,” notes Harvard’s Jeffrey Frankel. But, arguably more important, much of what Trump has promised – on trade, taxation, health care, and much else – either would not improve his voters’ economic wellbeing or would cause it to deteriorate further.
This paradox lies at the root of some unsettling scenarios. As Princeton University’s Jan-Werner Mueller points out, “[t]here is substantial evidence that low-income groups in the US have little to no influence on policy and go effectively unrepresented in Washington.” But Trump’s claim to represent his voters is not based on “demanding a fairer system.” Instead, says Mueller, Trump “tells the downtrodden that only they are the ‘real people,’” and that (as Trump put it during his campaign), “the other people don’t mean anything.” By persuading his supporters “to view themselves as part of a white nationalist movement,” Mueller argues, a “claim about identity is supposed to solve the problem that many people’s interests are neglected.”
In this respect, Trump is hardly unique. As Mueller points out, framing representation in terms of the “symbolic construction” of the “real people,” rather than in terms of a pluralist conception of equal citizenship under a shared constitution, is a hallmark of populism everywhere. In Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Venezuela, and elsewhere (even, to some extent, in the United Kingdom since June’s Brexit referendum), populist leaders have felt authorized by their claim to represent the “single authentic will” of a “single, homogeneous people” to erode constitutional and legal constraints on their power.
Can America avoid a similar fate? Project Syndicate contributors agree that the election’s outcome has badly tarnished America’s global image, and that Trump’s foreign policies are likely to imply serious risks for Asia, Europe, and Latin America. But there is reason to believe that his domestic policies will disappoint many of his supporters. That may tempt him to double down on identity politics, fueling division and possibly civil unrest. But it may also create an opportunity for his opponents to reshape the self-conception of those who voted for him.
Trump vs. the Constitution
Throughout their country’s history, most Americans have viewed the US Constitution as the ultimate guarantor of their freedoms. And, since the election, Trump’s opponents have indeed taken some comfort in the idea that the Constitution’s “checks and balances,” as well as other constraints built into the US political system, might inhibit Trump’s more wayward impulses. The US Constitution, after all, ostensibly places real boundaries on the president’s freedom to maneuver. This is particularly true for domestic policy, because it is the US Congress that must allocate the funds needed to pay for any presidential initiative.
But the idea that the US Constitution will protect the country from a fate similar to that of Hungary and Poland, where populist leaders have politicized state institutions, may not be as rock solid as many Americans believe. As Columbia University’s Alfred Stepan points out, the Republicans already control both houses of Congress, and “checks and balances generated by the judicial branch are certainly in danger.” This is partly because the Republicans “have a good chance of creating a conservative majority on the nine-member Supreme Court that could last for decades, especially if they win the presidency again in 2020.”
And the Court “may continue to erode democratic checks, such as the campaign-finance limits that were dealt a devastating blow by the 2010 Citizens United decision.” Likewise, with the Senate under Republican control, “Trump can now rapidly fill vacancies” on lower federal courts – which had risen to a half-century high during President Barack Obama’s second term, owing to Republican obstructionism – with “conservative judges who may well erode checks and balances further.”
Nor is Stepan optimistic that state governments will provide a check on overweening federal power. “Republicans now control an all-time high of 68 out of the 99 state legislative chambers and 33 of the 50 governorships” of America’s 50 states, he notes, and this has serious consequences for the ultimate checks on government: effective political competition and free and fair elections. The state legislatures, after all, create the US House of Representatives legislative districts, which have already been gerrymandered to reinforce the Republicans’ majority there.
Worse, the threat to America’s democracy is stalking its grassroots. As Stepan notes, “Since 2013, when another close Supreme Court decision gutted the Voting Rights Act, many, if not most, states with Republican majorities in both chambers have enacted laws and regulations that suppress voting” in non-white areas. A Republican Party that is almost entirely dependent on white voters – and increasingly dependent on white identity politics – is likely to continue on this path.
Goodbye to the West?
It is not only American democracy that is at risk, but also the geopolitical West constructed by the US in the years after World War II. And, as Oxford University Chancellor Chris Patten points out, that construction “long provided the foundation for the global order – probably the most successful such foundation ever created.” Under US leadership, “the West built, shaped, and championed international institutions, cooperative arrangements, and common approaches to common problems,” Patten says. And, by helping “to sustain peace and boost prosperity in much of the world, its approaches and principles attracted millions of followers.”
Trump’s election, “threatens this entire system,” Patten continues. If he “does in office what he promised to do during his crude and mendacious campaign, he could wreck a highly sophisticated creation, one that took several decades to develop and has benefited billions of people.” After all, as Harvard’s Joseph Nye notes, throughout his election campaign, “Trump challenged the alliances and institutions that undergird the liberal world order.” And, although, as Nye remarks, “he spelled out few specific policies,” concepts and loyalties that have long been taken for granted, both by America’s allies and by its foes, no longer can be.
For starters, says Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, “American guarantees are no longer reliable.” And that is true worldwide. “In Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, Trump has made it clear that America will no longer play the role of policeman; instead, it will be a private security company open for hire.” Not only has he “questioned whether he would defend Eastern European NATO members if they do not do more to defend themselves;” he has also suggested “that Saudi Arabia should pay for American security” and “has encouraged Japan and South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons.”
Moreover, says Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, given that he has “little or no hard knowledge of international affairs, Trump is relying on instincts that are all over the map.” As a result, his rhetoric “combines contradictory ‘America first’ isolationist rhetoric with muscular talk of ‘making America great again.’” And Trump’s incoherence, Evans suggests, will not be compensated by his supposed business acumen (which he touted during his campaign). On the contrary, “while staking out impossibly extreme positions that you can readily abandon may work in negotiating property deals, it is not a sound basis for conducting foreign policy.”
Evans is not optimistic. “Trump’s dangerous instincts may be bridled if he is capable of assembling an experienced and sophisticated team of foreign-policy advisers,” he notes. “But this remains to be seen.” In any case, the danger to global stability is compounded by the fact that, whatever remaining checks and balances Trump might face at home, in foreign affairs “the US Constitution grants him extraordinary personal power as Commander-in-Chief, if he chooses to exercise it.”
Of course, some will benefit from the confusion that Trump is likely to sow. As former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt puts it, “authoritarian rulers around the world” will no longer hear “harsh words from the US about their regimes’ contempt for democracy, freedom, or human rights.” On the contrary, the longstanding “goal of making the world safe for democracy will now be replaced by a policy of ‘America first,’ a sea-change in US foreign policy that is already likely arousing jubilation in Russian and Chinese halls of power.”
Trumping the Global Order
So just what form will an “America First” foreign policy take? How Trump deals with Russia, Nye suggests, will be a telltale early sign of the seriousness of his foreign policy. “On the one hand, it is important to resist [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s game-changing challenge to the post-1945 liberal order’s prohibition on the use of force by states to seize territory from their neighbors,” as he has done in Georgia and Ukraine. “On the other hand,” Nye says, “it is important to avoid completely isolating a country with which the US has overlapping interests in many areas: nuclear security, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, the Arctic, and regional issues like Iran and Afghanistan.”
Likewise, effective US leadership in Asia, which has become both the center of the world economy and the scene of growing friction between the world’s two most powerful countries – China and the US – requires a capacity for nuance that Trump has yet to reveal. America, says Evans, “undermines itself when it noisily asserts its regional primacy, while ignoring China’s legitimate demand for recognition as a joint leader in the current world order.” At the same time, “when China overreaches, as it has done with its territorial assertions in the South China Sea, there does need to be pushback.” And here, Evans notes, “a quiet but firm US role remains necessary and welcome.”
Like Evans, the Vietnamese geostrategist Le Hong Hiep has little confidence in the US president-elect. As a result of Trump’s election, the “strategic rebalancing toward Asia that [US President Barack] Obama worked so hard to advance may be thrown into reverse, dealing a heavy blow to Asia and the US alike.” Success depends largely on regional countries’ participation in and support of the US-led regional security architecture. But, given that Trump may “focus overwhelmingly on domestic issues,” he could well ignore “strategic engagement with ASEAN and its members,” Hiep says, thereby “causing their relationships with the US to deteriorate.”
And, like Bildt, Hiep believes that “China may welcome the election’s outcome.” To be sure, Trump has accused China of “stealing American jobs – and even blamed it for creating the ‘hoax’ of climate change.” Nonetheless, “he may take a softer stance on China’s strategic expansionism in the region, especially in the South China Sea, than Obama did.”
Others, too, appear to have glimpsed – at least initially – something positive in Trump’s victory. “Trump,” says Palestinian analyst Daoud Kuttab, “attracted the support of the enraged and frustrated, and Palestinians feel even angrier and more hopeless than the working-class white Americans who supported him.” More important, because “Trump is a political outsider, with few ties to [America’s] foreign-policy tradition or the interest groups that have shaped it,” many Palestinians believe that “he could upend conventions that have often been damaging to Palestine, transforming the rules of the game.”
But Kuttab pours cold water on this hope. “Israelis,” he points out, “seem at least as hopeful that Trump’s presidency will tip the scales further in their favor.” Trump has already strongly hinted that he will move the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – something all US presidents have refused to do for 49 years. And, given that “inciting hatred against Muslims was a staple of his campaign,” there should be no “illusions that Trump will be the arbiter of fairness, much less a peacemaker, in the Israel-Palestine conflict.”
Latin Americans haven’t the slightest expectation of fair, or even civil, treatment from Trump. In fact, says former Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, “Trump’s election is an unmitigated disaster for the region.” Indeed, Castañeda calls Latin America the “one world region that cannot possibly adopt a forward-looking attitude.”
Mexico has more reasons than most countries to distrust Trump, given his promise to “deport all six million undocumented Mexicans living and working in the US, and to force Mexico to pay for the construction of a wall on the US-Mexican border.” Moreover, Trump has vowed to “renegotiate the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), scrap the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and discourage US companies from investing or creating jobs in Mexico.”
But Trump’s proposals would adversely impact much of the region. “Every Central American country is a source of migration to the US, as are many Caribbean and South American countries,” Castañeda notes. Likewise, “Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru all have large populations of documented or undocumented nationals in the US, and they will all feel the effects of Trump’s policies, if they are enacted.” Then there are “countries such as Chile, which negotiated the TPP in good faith with the US, Mexico, Peru, and Asian-Pacific countries,” all of which “will now suffer the consequences of Trump’s protectionist stance.” And NAFTA is not the only bilateral free-trade agreement – the US has some ten FTAs with Latin America countries – which Trump might target.
Trading Down
Such deals are particularly vulnerable because trade is the area where Trump’s “America first” foreign policy instincts meet his promise to bring high-paying manufacturing jobs back to America. Here he is likely to meet stiff resistance, not only from an increasingly self-confident China, but also from Mexico, whose leaders would not survive politically were they to cave in to an American president who has, says Castañeda, “dismissed Mexico’s national interests and maligned its people’s character.”
But NYU’s Nouriel Roubini thinks that Trump, having “lived his entire life among other rich businessmen,” will end up being more pragmatic. His “choice to run as a populist was tactical, and does not necessarily reflect deep-seated beliefs.” Whereas a “radical populist Trump would scrap the TPP, repeal NAFTA, and impose high tariffs on Chinese imports,” a pragmatic Trump will probably “try to tweak [NAFTA] as a nod to American blue-collar workers.” Moreover, those who “bash China during their election campaigns” often “quickly realize once in office that cooperation is in their own interest.” In fact, “even if a pragmatic Trump wanted to limit imports from China, his options would be constrained by a recent World Trade Organization ruling against ‘targeted dumping’ tariffs on Chinese goods.”
If Trump did press ahead with a protectionist agenda, he would meet resistance not only from America’s trade partners, but also from economic reality. The “case for tearing up free-trade agreements and aborting negotiations for new ones,” Patten notes, “is premised on the belief that globalization is the reason for rising income inequality, which has left the American working class economically marooned.” In reality, trade is no longer the culprit in displacing manufacturing jobs from the US.
Instead, Patten notes, the “sources of American workers’ economic pain are technological innovation and tax-and-spend policies that favor the rich.” And, unlike free trade, which has increased American households’ purchasing power, “the current wave of technological innovation is not lifting all boats,” notes Alex Friedman, CEO of GAM notes. “Even as the likes of Uber and Amazon, and, more fundamentally, robotics, add convenience, they do so by displacing working-class jobs and/or driving down wages.”
But what today’s protectionists fail to acknowledge is that America is no longer competitive in industries like coal and steel – and shouldn’t try to be. For policymakers, Friedman notes, “the problem is that it may take a decade or longer before robotics and the like” diffuse sufficiently to “feed a broader rising tide that lifts all boats.” But repealing free trade certainly would not help. Were Trump to do so, the jobs would not return, and import prices would rise, thereby reducing Americans’ purchasing power – and thus, in Patten’s words, harming “the very people who voted for him.”
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz agrees. “Technology,” he says, “has been advancing so fast that the number of jobs globally in manufacturing is declining.” As a result, “there is no way that Trump can bring significant numbers of well-paying manufacturing jobs back to the US.”
Where the Jobs Are
How, then, is Trump to satisfy his supporters? One possibility, of course, is an option that Obama had embraced – clean tech and green energy. What are needed, says Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs, are “massive investments in low-carbon energy systems, and an end to the construction of new coal-fired power plants.” It needs similarly sized “investments in electric vehicles (and advanced batteries), together with a sharp reduction in internal combustion engine vehicles.” Moreover, a “carbon tax,” says Stiglitz, “would provide a welfare trifecta: higher growth as firms retrofit to reflect the increased costs of carbon dioxide emissions; a cleaner environment; and revenue that could be used to finance infrastructure and direct efforts to narrow America’s economic divide.”
But as Stiglitz notes, “given Trump’s position as a climate change denier, he is unlikely to take advantage of this opportunity.” Indeed, he is already staffing his transition team with similarly minded officials, and the Republican congressional caucus has deep ties to traditional oil and gas firms.
This implies that Trump is more likely to embrace large-scale infrastructure investment. British economic historian Robert Skidelsky notes that Trump has “promised an $800 billion-$1 trillion program of infrastructure investment, to be financed by bonds, as well as a massive corporate-tax cut, both aimed at creating 25 million new jobs and boosting growth.”
Jim O’Neill, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and former British Treasury minister, sees little alternative to what Skidelsky calls “a modern form of Keynesian fiscal policy.” As O’Neill puts it, “[w]ith monetary activism past its sell-by date, an active fiscal policy that includes stronger infrastructure spending is one of the only remaining options.” At the same time, as eager as the Republicans are to slash taxes for the few, “policymakers cannot ignore the high levels of government debt across much of the developed world.”
The same argument that is made for spending on infrastructure can be made for technology. “Shockingly for a country whose economic success is based on technological innovation,” Stiglitz notes, “the GDP share of investment in basic research is lower today than it was a half-century ago.” But it is hard to imagine Trump becoming the kind of technology cheerleader that Obama became during his presidency. His estrangement from the US technology sector, whose leaders overwhelmingly opposed his candidacy, is one factor. Nor does his stance on immigration bode well. As Roubini points out, one of Trump’s proposals would “limit visas for high-skill workers, which would deplete some of the tech sector’s dynamism.”
Although Republicans have not favored large-scale government infrastructure spending since Dwight Eisenhower was president, they will most likely go along with it in exchange for tax cuts. This will undoubtedly result in some job creation. But, as Frankel points out, “income inequality will likely start widening again, despite striking improvements in median family income and the poverty rate last year.” Moreover, “budget deficits will grow.”
That presents a problem for Trump, given that he plans to finance infrastructure investment by issuing bonds. “Market participants,” says Harvard’s Martin Feldstein, “are watching the [US Federal Reserve] to judge if and when the process of interest-rate normalization will begin.” And “historical experience,” says Feldstein, “implies that normalization would raise long-term interest rates by about two percentage points, precipitating substantial corrections in the prices of bonds, stocks, and commercial real estate.”
This suggests an early clash between Trump and the Fed. Trump may try to bend the Fed to his will; but, as Roubini points out, there is one independent force that he will find impossible to control. “If he tries to pursue radical populist policies,” building up massive debt without any plans to pay for it, the response from international markets “will be swift and punishing: stocks will plummet, the dollar will fall, investors will flee to US Treasury bonds, gold prices will spike, and so forth.”
What Should the World Do?
Back in May, Bill Emmott, a former editor of The Economist, contemplating the prospect of a Trump presidency, argued that countries “must hope for the best but prepare for the worst.” Above all, they must bolster “their alliances and friendships with one another, in anticipation of an ‘America First’ rupture with old partnerships and the liberal international order that has prevailed since the 1940s.”
That moment, Leonard argues, has now arrived. Europeans must “try to increase leverage over the US,” whose new leader “is likely to resemble other strongmen presidents and treat weakness as an invitation to aggression.” And, whereas “a divided Europe has little ability to influence the US,” when “Europe has worked together – on privacy, competition policy, and taxation – it has dealt with the US from a position of strength.” Guy Verhofstadt, a former Belgium prime minister who currently heads the Liberals in the European Parliament, goes further. “The EU can no longer wait to build its own European Defense Community and develop its own security strategy,” he says. “Anything less will be insufficient to secure its territory.”
With liberal democracy, as Verhofstadt puts it, “quickly becoming a resistance movement,” his is a refrain now heard around the world. Australia, says Evans, “should have learned by now that the US, under administrations with far more prima facie credibility than Trump’s, is perfectly capable of making terrible mistakes, such as the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.” Facing the prospect of “American blunders as bad as, or worse than, in the past,” he says, “[w]e will have to make our own judgments about how to react to events, based on our own national interests.”
Patten calls for a more robust diplomatic response as well, praising German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response to Trump’s election, in which she upheld bilateral cooperation on the basis of shared “values of democracy, freedom, and respect for the law and the dignity of man, independent of origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or political views.” That “eloquent and powerful” statement, says Patten, makes Merkel “one leader who seems to recognize how quickly the collapse of US leadership could bring about the end of the post-1945 global order.” And, he adds, it “is precisely how all of America’s allies and friends should be responding.”
What Should America Do?
All is not lost. Stepan is right that the traditional checks and balances of American politics are under severe threat. But, as Roubini reminds us, markets are not the only barrier if policies go off the rails. The executive branch of the US government that Trump commands “adheres to a decision-making process whereby relevant departments and agencies determine the risks and rewards of given scenarios, and then furnish the president with a limited menu of policy options from which to choose.” Indeed, “given Trump’s inexperience, he will be all the more dependent on his advisers, just as former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were.”
In addition, says Roubini, “Trump will also be pushed more to the center by Congress, with which he will have to work to pass any legislation.” Trump’s election, after all, culminates his hostile takeover of the Republican Party, and now he will have to bring about a rapprochement with House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Republican leaders, who, Roubini notes, “have more mainstream GOP views than Trump on trade, migration, and budget deficits.” Moreover, “the Democratic minority in the Senate will be able to filibuster any radical reforms that Trump proposes, especially if they touch the third rail of American politics: Social Security and Medicare.”
Likewise, notwithstanding Stepan’s well-founded fears, institutions can fight back against populist subversion, as we have seen in the British High Court’s recent decision upholding the authority of Parliament to scrutinize and vote on the government’s decision to trigger the UK’s exit from the European Union. No one can be certain – least of all Trump – that all of the conservative members of the Supreme Court will march in lock step with his abasement of US democracy. His proposal to ban Muslim immigrants, Frankel notes, “would be struck down even by a right-wing Supreme Court.”
There is also the constraint of constitutionally protected citizen action, already seen in well-attended anti-Trump demonstrations held around the country in the days since the election. Protests are likely to continue, suggests IE Business School’s Lucy Marcus, in the wake of “a surge in hate crimes, including an alarming number of incidents being reported at schools and on college campuses.” If Trump “hopes to be anything remotely close to a responsible leader,” Marcus says, “he must move urgently to address the deep divisions that he so enthusiastically fueled during his campaign.” Equally important, “community leaders must not allow their constituents to be manipulated or goaded into behavior that risks dangerous knock-on effects.”
The long-term challenge posed by Trump, however, is to find the means to decouple white identity politics, in which the Republican Party has become deeply invested, from economic grievance. As Mueller argues, members of “today’s Trumpenproletariat are not forever lost to democracy, as Clinton suggested when she called them ‘irredeemable.’” Mueller quotes George Orwell: “If you want to make an enemy of a man, tell him that his ills are incurable.” Instead, anti-populists must “focus on new ways to appeal to the interests of Trump supporters, while resolutely defending the rights of minorities who feel threatened by Trump’s agenda.”
Skidelsky agrees: “it is economics, not culture,” he says, “that strikes at the heart of legitimacy.” In other words, “it is when the rewards of economic progress accrue mainly to the already wealthy that the disjunction between minority and majority cultural values becomes seriously destabilizing.”
Trump ruthlessly exploited that disjunction, and, in doing so, “obviously made a successful claim to represent people,” says Mueller. “But representation is never simply a mechanical response to pre-existing demands,” he notes. Instead, “claims to represent citizens also shape their self-conception,” which is why it is now “crucial to move that self-conception away from white identity politics and back to the realm of interests.”
Whatever happens, Americans should be mindful of what they have lost – perhaps forever – by electing Trump. His victory has “deeply undermined the soft power the US used to enjoy,” says Shashi Tharoor, chairman of the Indian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, by bringing “to the fore tendencies the world never used to associate with the US – resentment and xenophobia, hostility to immigrants and refugees, pessimism and selfishness.” In the world’s eyes, “fear has trumped hope as the currency of American politics,” laments Tharoor. And in the world’s eyes, “America will never be the same again.”