martes, 13 de noviembre de 2018

Globalization, Anti-Globalization and Racism

The Bogus Backlash to Globalization

Resentful Nativists Oppose Free Trade and Immigration—Don’t Appease Them


Backlash appeasers have a number of thoughtful and influential voices on their side. Many are former champions of globalization who worry that it has moved too fast. The Financial Times commentator Edward Luce, for instance, suggested in his 2017 book, The Retreat of Western Liberalism, that by promoting globalization, “the world’s elites have helped provoke what they feared: a populist uprising against the world economy.” To save the liberal project, he argued, we must abandon “the drive to deep globalization.” Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has similarly warned of “a growing suspicion on the part of electorates that globalization is an elite project that primarily benefits elites.”

Other members of this chorus are liberals and left-wingers who have long been critical of free trade and who see Trump’s election as a vindication. In a March article for The American Prospect, the liberal journalist Robert Kuttner claimed that “elites of both parties won the policy debates on trade, but lost the people.” According to Kuttner, “the more that bien pensants double down on globalization, the more defections they invite and the more leaders like Trump we get.” The author John Judis took to The New York Times to criticize the left for ignoring the emotional appeal of nationalism, arguing that low-skilled immigration and China’s unfair trading practices had hurt American workers, helping to “create a new class of angry ‘left-behinds’” who were susceptible to Trump’s message.

These arguments are misguided. They severely overstate both the number of Americans hurt by globalization and the depth of the popular backlash to it. Regarding immigration, it is very hard to find evidence of a single demographic or regional grouping of U.S. citizens that has been harmed. In a 2015 paper, the economists Gaetano Basso and Giovanni Peri looked at 30 years of data on labor market outcomes in the United States and concluded that increases in immigrant labor, both in aggregate and by skill group, either increase native wages and employment or are simply uncorrelated with them. Conversely, Trump’s plan to end work permits for the spouses of H1-B visa holders could cost the U.S. economy $2.1 billion per year, according to the economists Ayoung Kim, Brigitte S. Waldorf, and Natasha T. Duncan.

On trade, there is reasonable analysis suggesting that increased competition arising from imports, for all of its overall benefits, can hurt employment in particular communities and sectors. In an influential series of papers, the economists David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson argued that China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 had a negative impact on local U.S. labor markets exposed to Chinese competition. For at least a full decade after the “China trade shock,” they claimed, these labor markets—many of which had depended on manufacturing—saw higher unemployment, lower wages, and depressed labor force participation rates.

But critics of the studies point out that their conclusions fail to account for a few important facts. First, increased trade with China allowed U.S. firms to import cheaper materials, lowering their own costs and enabling them to expand production; and second, China’s accession to the WTO increased U.S. exports to China, as well as other countries. Looking beyond just China, research by the economists Robert C. Feenstra and Akira Sasahara suggests that between 1995 and 2011, growth in U.S. exports worldwide led to 6.6 million new U.S. jobs, including 1.9 million jobs in manufacturing—more than the jobs lost owing to global import competition. And although an estimated two million U.S. jobs were lost because of competition from Chinese imports over those 15 years, the U.S. economy saw about 1.9 million layoffs and discharges each month during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Manufacturing job losses to China are in the headlines not because they are a major source of terminations but because they make a good story for those who oppose global engagement.

Furthermore, looking only at the production side of the economy ignores the considerable benefits that consumers—particularly poor consumers—derive from cheaper goods. According to a study by Pablo D. Fajgelbaum and Amit K. Khandelwal of the National Bureau of Economic Research, poor people spend more of their income on goods, while the rich spend more on services, which are less tradable; for this reason, if the United States moved to end imports, the poorest ten percent of American consumers would see their buying power decline by 82 percent, compared with a decline of only 50 percent for the median consumer.

Most Americans recognize the economic benefits of trade and migration to the country. Contrary to the backlash thesis, globalization is more popular now than ever before. Since 1992, Gallup has asked if trade is primarily an opportunity for economic growth or a threat to the economy. For 23 years, the proportion suggesting it was primarily an opportunity never rose above 56 percent; in 2017 and 2018, it exceeded 70 percent. And since 1965, Gallup has asked Americans if immigration should be increased, decreased, or kept at the present level. The proportion favoring an increase or sustained rate, at 68 percent, has never been higher, nor has the proportion calling for a decrease (29 percent) ever been lower.


But if the economic benefits of globalization are widely understood, a minority sees it as a cultural threat. This is what explains the supposed backlash. Public opinion surveys from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) suggest that 34 percent of all Americans feel that the growing number of immigrants threatens traditional American values and customs. But only 19 percent of those aged 18 to 29 feel that way, compared with 44 percent of those over the age of 65 and 53 percent of white evangelical Protestants of all ages. Similarly, the political scientists Diana C. Mutz, Edward D. Mansfield, and Eunji Kim found that whites are consistently less supportive of trade deals than are members of other racial groups. They attribute this imbalance to whites’ “heightened sense of national superiority” and ethnocentrism. If markers of economic hardship—such as low education, skills, or wages—determined opinions on trade (or migration), minorities would be the ones opposed. In fact, the reverse is true.

Some evidence does suggest that migration and trade flows may influence communities to vote Republican. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson argue that between 2000 and 2016, areas in which employment was concentrated in the industries that faced the most competition from Chinese imports tended to shift toward the Republicans.

And the economists Anna Maria Mayda, Giovanni Peri, and Walter Steingress analyzed county-level data, finding that between 1990 and 2010, high-skilled immigration to a county decreased the overall share of the Republican vote while low-skilled immigration increased it.

What is considerably harder to see is how such factors could explain Trump’s increased vote share relative to the Republicans’ 2012 presidential candidate, Mitt Romney. Survey evidence suggests the American electorate recognized that the 2016 presidential candidates, Trump and Hillary Clinton, presented them with a clearer choice on trade and migration policy than had Barack Obama and Romney four years earlier. But voters’ exposure to globalization was not related to the size of their swing toward the Republican candidate between 2012 and 2016. Cultural factors were.

The Gallup economists Jonathan T. Rothwell and Pablo Diego-Rosell, for instance, found “no link whatsoever” between greater exposure to trade competition or immigrant workers and greater support for Trump. They did find a particularly large swing to Trump in counties with a high share of old white residents with only a high school education. And Diana Mutz found that people who felt that “the American way of life is threatened,” or who believed whites and men were more oppressed than women or minorities, were significantly more likely to switch to Trump than those who did not. In short, the voters who bought Trump’s rhetoric on trade and migration were those who were culturally attuned to his message.

Indeed, a significant proportion of Republican partisans have decided that white Christian men are the new oppressed. A PRRI survey in February 2017 found that 43 percent of Republicans felt there was a lot of discrimination against whites, and 48 percent thought there was a lot of discrimination against Christians, compared with only 27 percent who thought there was a lot of discrimination against blacks. Given the gap between black and white families in terms of both median income and median wealth, such thinking is delusional. But many whites, Mutz notes, fear that they will soon become a minority within the United States and feel that the country as a whole is losing its global dominance. This sense of lost national status and persecution fueled support for Trump.


When regretful internationalists talk about pausing globalization to save it, the group they cater to is not the “left-behind” but older, bigoted whites who are unreconciled to the cultural changes of recent decades. It would be both ethically repugnant and politically and economically unwise to pander to them.

Politically unwise because theirs is a minority view that is dying; economically suicidal because for all that old white men are delusional about facing discrimination at home, they are absolutely correct regarding the United States’ slipping status as a superpower. That is why it is particularly urgent for the country to lock in fair global regimes while it still has the leverage to do so. This means playing by the rules of the WTO and taking those immigrants who still want to come to the United States. Ironically, immigration is particularly important for aging whites themselves: although non-Hispanic whites will become a minority of the overall population within the next three decades, they will still make up 60 percent of people over the age of 65 in 2050. They will need young immigrant workers to keep Social Security and Medicare solvent. Add to these political and economic motives an ethical one: globalization has been the most powerful force ever for lifting humanity out of destitution.

Globalization has been imperfectly managed, and a new push for fairer global engagement should involve reforms, including better regulation of capital markets, limits on intellectual monopolies such as patents and copyrights, and cooperation on tax havens to ensure that corporations and rich individuals pay their share for public services. Strong international agreements are urgently needed on issues such as climate change and data privacy. And a raft of domestic measures could increase both equality and productivity in the United States: tightening lax controls on market concentration, slashing limits to affordable housing in job-rich areas, reducing the barrier to entry that unnecessary licensing imposes on small businesses, reforming a banking system that bails out irresponsible institutional investors, and doing more to help Americans who lose their jobs, for whatever reason.

But one thing that won’t help is for liberals to legitimize the backlash to globalization. Those who do so are useful patsies for Trump, allowing him to channel racial resentment into tax cuts for the rich. Responding to a group of people who think that white male Christians are discriminated against, or that the rest of the world getting richer is something for Americans to fear rather than celebrate, is admittedly hard. But whatever the reaction to the nativist rage of old white men, it cannot be appeasement.

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miércoles, 7 de noviembre de 2018

Populism against Liberal Democracy in Latin America

Can Latin American Democracy Withstand the Populist Assault?

The region’s democratic systems have been tested by many authoritarian rulers throughout history. But lines of defense against its challengers often do their job.

By Javier Corrales
Mr. Corrales is a specialist in authoritarianism and populism in Latin America.

AMHERST, Mass. — It is common to think of Latin America as the land of no hope for democracy. Since independence, the region has been ravaged by authoritarianism and populism. Brazil’s new president-elect, Jair Bolsonaro, an ex-military macho promising zero tolerance of everything he dislikes, evokes a “here we go again” feeling. Once again, illiberalism seems ascendant, to the detriment of democracy.

But an alternative narrative is that Latin America is actually the land of democratic resilience. Always under attack, democracy does not always prevail, but it does not always die.
In their efforts to stay alive in an inhospitable environment, Latin American democrats have produced survival tactics and innovations. Frequently, these creations have allowed democracy to triumph.

The resilience of democracy in Latin America is impressive. In the current global wave of democracy, which started in the late 1970s, Latin America stands as the region where democracy spread and survived the most. Democracy spread to every country except Cuba and has survived in every country except Venezuela and Nicaragua, and possibly Honduras and Bolivia.

No doubt, during this era, the region has been assaulted by populist presidents who threaten liberal democracy: Market-oriented populists were the trend in the 1990s (Argentina, Mexico, Peru) and socialist populists in the 2000s (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia). But even during those populist waves, many Latin American countries elected rule-respecting presidents, from either the right or the left, or defeated illiberal presidents at the polls.

If democracy has survived the assaults of dictators and populists, it has not been because of waning supply and demand for those offerings. Candidates offering some version of populist authoritarianism are as popular now as ever. Today it’s Mr. Bolsonaro. Twenty years ago it was the Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. And more will come.

Supporters of Jair Bolsonaro in Rio de Janeiro last month.CreditCarl De Souza/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Democracy has survived instead because Latin American societies have learned to bolster the line of defense against democracy’s internal enemies. They’ve done it through institutional innovation.
First, Latin Americans have focused on institutions that regulate entry and exit mechanisms. At the entry level, the most important innovation has been the runoff rule.

Runoff rules have now been adopted by 75 percent of Latin American countries. Cynthia McClintock’s research shows the moderating effects of runoff rules. With a few exceptions, and Brazil’s recent election was one, illiberal presidents seldom manage to emerge from runoff elections. The beauty of second rounds is that they force contenders to bargain with other groups, often moderates, as just happened in Colombia this year. So electoral coalitions are less extreme.

On the exit side, a key barrier has been term limits. They were popularized by Latin America in the 19th century, long before the United States adopted the rule in 1951 with the 22nd amendment. Despite a recent weakening of term limits in Latin America, they still work. Mexico, for instance, with strict term limits since the early 20th century, has not had a classic dictator since. Most Latin American presidents respect term limits, and those who try to circumvent them usually face an uphill battle.

Another key lesson from Latin America is the importance of enhancing the autonomy of courts and social movements — important checks on illiberal presidents. Courts have the legal power to stop illiberal measures, and social movements can block them via resistance.

Ensuring that courts and movements remain detached from presidential influence is therefore vital, and Latin America has improved its scores on both fronts. A new book documents how Latin American countries for the most part have made the process of selecting judges more pluralistic, which makes it less dependent on the president.

Likewise, where social movements have resisted the temptation to be co-opted by presidents, illiberal presidents face barriers. In Ecuador, for instance, one of the most effective checks on the illiberal designs of former President Rafael Correa was the advocacy and resistance stemming from feminist, indigenous and environmental groups that refused to be folded into Mr. Correa’s ruling party.

A third lesson from Latin America is information maximization. Almost every Latin American country has expanded the number of watchdogs, or as they are often called, observatories. The obsession with observation started with electoral observation in the 1980s, but now covers a variety of public concerns: homicides, police activity, government-business relations, social policy, gender and sexuality. Argentina has even developed observatories of government economists, so that when the populist president Cristina Fernández instructed her officials to doctor economic figures, everyone found out about it.

Finally, some Latin American countries have taken to heart the very liberal principle that in a democracy, the winner shouldn’t win that much, and the loser shouldn’t lose that much. The most obvious example involves gender.

Women are one of the world’s most underrepresented groups in politics. But in Latin America, they have expanded their presence in legislatures, mostly after adopting quota systems mandating parties to nominate more women. More representation of women is no panacea, but it is a significant victory in a region where machismo is a frequent fuel of authoritarianism.

None of these lines of defense against illiberalism is foolproof. Runoff elections fail to deliver moderation if extremist candidates do well in the first round, as happened in Brazil. And crime and corruption remain Latin America’s foremost pollution, always choking democratic institutions and fueling demand for hard-liners like Mr. Bolsonaro.

Presidents still try tricks to weaken exit rules and undermine courts and social movements. States and nonstate actors have learned to use traditional and new media to counter fact-based reporting. 

Political winners, even when they lose ground, always find ways to silence losers. And more inclusion can lead to more fragmentation of the opposition, which lowers the chances of blocking illiberal presidents.

Mr. Bolsonaro is likely to exploit these vulnerabilities. Brazilian democrats should not relax — they will need to reinforce their lines of defense and invent new ones.

Nonetheless, there is reason for optimism. Authoritarian populism is a recurrent threat in Latin America, and now in advanced democracies too. Democratic survival is never guaranteed. Countries often come close to falling prey to autocrats. But many times, these episodes become “near misses” rather than full crashes. Latin America continues to be a region where illiberalism often meets its match.

Javier Corrales, a professor of political science at Amherst College, is author of “Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America.”


lunes, 5 de noviembre de 2018


Resultado de imagen para foto obama

Midterms: dans la dernière ligne droite, un duel entre Obama et Trump

A la veille des élections de mi-mandat qui détermineront la majorité au Congrès jusqu’en 2020, Donald Trump et Barack Obama se sont affrontés par meetings de campagne interposés.
Mardi 6 novembre, les 435 sièges de la Chambre des représentants seront renouvelés pour deux ans et 35 des 100 sièges du Sénat le seront pour six ans. Chambre et Sénat sont actuellement à majorité républicaine. Trente-six des 50 gouverneurs d’Etat seront aussi élus.

Les démocrates ont fait campagne sur la défense du système de santé réformé sous Barack Obama, mais parient aussi sur le rejet de Donald Trump. Ils le qualifient ouvertement de menteur et de catalyseur des violences racistes et antisémites qui ont endeuillé le pays. Ils comptent sur les voix d’électeurs de zones périurbaines et de républicains modérés regrettant leur vote de 2016.

De son côté, Donald Trump a multiplié les déplacements. A chaque étape, il a visiblement savouré ses retrouvailles avec ceux qui l’ont porté au pouvoir, qui sont venus par milliers l’écouter, pour des discours durant parfois près d’une heure et demie.

Confiant, Donald Trump a assumé la tête de la campagne républicaine, s’érigeant comme le garant de la bonne santé économique des Etats-Unis et comme le rempart contre l’immigration clandestine et les « caravanes » de migrants d’Amérique centrale qui traversent actuellement le Mexique vers la frontière états-unienne.

Historiquement, le parti au pouvoir ressort rarement vainqueur des élections de mi-mandat. George W. Bush, en 2002, a fait récemment exception, après les attentats du 11-Septembre.
Le avec AFP et Reuters


Disquisiciones sobre errancias presidenciales


Resultado de imagen para foto amlo

Salvador Camarena

Una pregunta recorre México: cómo habremos de lidiar –prensa, ONG, empresarios, iglesia y, por supuesto, políticos– con Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 

Justo la semana pasada reproduje aquí la recomendación de Alberto Barrera Tyszka, periodista venezolano que en junio invitaba a los mexicanos a “no engancharse mediáticamente en un juego narcisista con el nuevo presidente, a no poner a girar al país a su alrededor”. 

Luego de la cancelación del aeropuerto, decisión que encendió un debate en el que el único que parece estar disfrutando el momento es López Obrador, cito ahora el texto “Las cinco reglas de Trump para gobernar al mundo”, del periodista estadounidense Daniel Greenfield. Aquí una traducción de algunos fragmentos: 

“Hay cinco reglas sencillas para comprender al presidente Trump. Definen cómo ha vivido su vida hasta ahora.
1. Actúa, no reacciones.
Trump odia reaccionar, le encanta tomar la iniciativa y obligar a otros, rivales, competidores, grupos de medios o dictadores extranjeros, a reaccionar ante él. Esa es la esencia de su estrategia y lo domina como pocos.
Cuando el británico Boris Johnson dijo entre dientes que había un “método en su locura”, a eso se refería. El método es convertirse en la fuerza impulsora en un conflicto que está escalando. En vez de reaccionar a los ataques, Trump obliga a sus atacantes a reaccionar ante él. (…) 
A diferencia de gobiernos anteriores, Trump no está satisfecho con el statu quo. Y eso significa que él prueba muchas cosas. Eso nos lleva a la Regla 2. 
2. Intenta todo.
Sus críticos se han burlado de las fallidas aventuras de negocios de Trump. Pero no es posible tener éxito sin intentar y fracasar.
Trump se siente cómodo con el fracaso. Sabe que si uno está dispuesto a tocar a 100 puertas, en una podría hacer una venta. Su enfoque hacia la política es intentar muchos enfoques y políticas diferentes para obtener un triunfo. (…) 

3. El caos es poder.
La mayoría de la gente quiere minimizar el caos. (…) Trump, sin embargo, prospera en el caos. En vez de tratar de controlar el caos, lo genera, causando incertidumbre y luego ofreciendo una sensación de seguridad a cambio de un buen acuerdo. (…)
Trump lo intenta todo (Regla 2) y hace escalar los enfrentamientos (Regla 1), de modo que sus oponentes no tengan manera de contrarrestarlo, excepto escalando la confrontación y creando más caos. Y luego Trump los obliga a negociar, probando que él puede funcionar en una situación caótica e incierta mejor que ellos. 

4. Nunca muestres tus cartas.
Los políticos convencionales tienen una ventana estrecha de puntos de agenda. Son muy claros sobre lo que quieren, lo que no quieren, lo que están dispuestos a hacer y a qué están dispuestos a renunciar para conseguirlo.
Trump siempre ha sido ambiguo. Si se analizan sus frases, se pueden interpretar en tres formas diferentes. Cada afirmación eventualmente descubre una contradicción. Eso es confusión. Confusión táctica. 

5. No temas a ser el malo.
Una de las mayores fortalezas de Trump es que no tiene miedo de ser el pendenciero, el duro y el patán. Puede adular a Kim Jong-un, a Trudeau y a cualquier otro líder. O insultarlos”. 

Hasta aquí Greenfield. Si alguien creyó que yo dije que para entender a AMLO hay que entender a Trump, entonces lo hice muy mal. Lo que aquí intenté, intento, es recordar que, más allá de la descalificación o de señalar que lo que hace es una locura, hay otras formas de intentar descifrar a un mandatario aparentemente irracional.
Y que a veces, cuando uno cree que está erosionando a un personaje con fundamentadas críticas sobre esa supuesta irracionalidad, en los hechos sólo está haciéndolo más fuerte y siguiendo su guion. No sé, es viernes, piénsenlo. Buen fin de semana.

México sopesa con angustia los rasgos de un futuro imprevisible

Resultado de imagen para foto amlo

México: Escenarios sobre el sexenio 2018-2024

Eduardo Sojo
Mèxico, 1/11/2018

A medida que se acerca el primero de diciembre son más frecuentes las conversaciones que tienen como base los escenarios para el siguiente sexenio. Cada quien tiene sus propias hipótesis sobre el comportamiento que tendrá en materia económica el presidente López Obrador, muchos ven el panorama muy negro después de lo que pasó con la decisión del NAIM. 

Para tratar de estudiar de manera sistemática lo que podría suceder en el futuro, científicos se han dedicado a construir modelos en los cuales pueden dibujar las trayectorias de distintas variables a partir de diferentes supuestos. No se trata en general de pronósticos sino del desarrollo de escenarios para el análisis de política pública. Jonathan Heath, recientemente propuesto como subgobernador del Banco de México (una excelente decisión) dedicó buena parte de su vida profesional a la construcción de modelos econométricos a partir de los cuales presentaba escenarios sobre la posible evolución de la economía mexicana. 

Además de esos modelos cuantitativos, los expertos en prospectiva frecuentemente construyen historias a partir de la construcción de escenarios exploratorios que puedan tener cierta probabilidad de ocurrencia. Como lo ha expresado Richard Wells “El uso de escenarios para identificar estrategias hacia el futuro permite abandonar el pensamiento tradicional acerca de que éste será una continuación del presente. Los escenarios presentan realidades potenciales, diversas y futuras; cuestionan las zonas de confort; abren la mente a posibilidades divergentes y son una base para el análisis y la discusión en los procesos de toma de decisiones.” 

Aunque no soy un experto en perspectiva y normalmente estos escenarios se construyen con horizontes temporales muy largos, en este y artículos posteriores voy a plantear cuatro escenarios para el próximo sexenio en aspectos económicos dependiendo del tipo de políticas públicas que se lleven a cabo, en un ambiente internacional con tendencia a deteriorarse. Los ejes sobre los que construí estas breves historias son dos: el manejo de las finanzas públicas y la evolución de la economía a nivel mundial, especialmente la de Estados Unidos. 

Primer escenario: El poder es como el violín. Tomo como título de este escenario la frase que utilizo David Konzevik en Brasil a propósito del gobierno de Lula da Silva, “El poder es como el violín, se toma con la izquierda, pero se toca con la derecha”. 

En este escenario el presidente López Obrador, ya en el poder, se da cuenta de las bondades de las políticas de mercado para impulsar el desarrollo del país, les da continuidad e incluso va más allá, impulsando una reforma fiscal basada en el IVA. El asunto del aeropuerto en Texcoco resultó excepcional. El escenario internacional es malo, pero no catastrófico. 

Segundo escenario: No les voy a fallar. El título de este escenario está basado en la frase que ha utilizado frecuentemente el Presidente Electo, tanto en campaña como en el período de transición, cuando se le cuestiona sobre la dificultad o inviabilidad de llevar a cabo sus propuestas. 

En este escenario, los cambios iniciados al inicio del sexenio relacionados en el manejo de la administración pública, la forma de tomar decisiones y las prioridades del gasto público continúan una vez en el poder para cumplir las promesas de campaña. Ante la imposibilidad de hacerlo con los recursos fiscales existentes, se recurre a incrementar la deuda bajo la consideración de que ahora sí se van a invertir bien los recursos. En el escenario internacional se acumulan los factores de riesgo pero no se da un efecto contagio para la economía mexicana. 

Tercer escenario: Inercial. Este escenario muestra la tensión entre lo que el presidente López Obrador hubiera querido hacer y lo que tuvo que hacer; continúan las políticas económicas instrumentadas en los últimos años y los cambios resultan más retóricos que reales, salvo por la austeridad y la forma de tomar decisiones como en el caso del aeropuerto. 

Aunque en el discurso continúa el mismo mensaje que dió recientemente el Presidente Electo: “No es más de lo mismo, no es simulación o gatopardismo. Transformar no es ejecutar o ‘dar el violín’, instrumento que se toma con la izquierda y se toca con la derecha. No y no, lo nuestro es auténtico y será distinto”; en la práctica se respetan los principios fundamentales del modelo seguido en el país en las últimas décadas. El escenario internacional se complica. 

Cuarto escenario: Sálvese quien pueda. El título de este escenario está basado en un escenario desarrollado por Richard Wells de Lexington Group, en el que describe una situación en la cual hay un colapso del comercio global con el consecuente impacto en la economía mexicana dada su dependencia del comercio exterior. 

Salvo que en este caso se combina con un mal manejo de la economía por parte del gobierno del presidente López Obrador, lo que ocasiona una caída en la producción y en el empleo similar a la de 2008-2009, pero con peores consecuencias.