martes, 20 de noviembre de 2012

NOTAS SOBRE LA RELACION ENTRE INTELECTUALES Y PERONISMO EN ARGENTINA


PARADOJAS DEL INTELECTUAL PERONISTA

Por Héctor Ricardo Leis  | de LA NACION de Buenos Aires




La figura del intelectual ganó una importancia decisiva en la modernidad. Las principales fuerzas políticas de nuestra época fueron inspiradas por intelectuales. Locke fue un impulsor fundamental del liberalismo, no menos que Marx del socialismo y Burke del conservadurismo. En contraste con lo anterior, existe una corriente política anómala en la que los intelectuales son meros coadyuvantes de la acción. Es el caso de los movimientos fascistas europeos de la primera mitad del siglo XX y de los populismos latinoamericanos que surgieron a partir de la segunda mitad de ese siglo.

Por cierto, hubo intelectuales de renombre que apoyaron a Hitler y Mussolini, que no fueron pocos, pero su influencia, salvo excepciones, fue insignificante. Ellos apoyaban públicamente al movimiento y a su líder, pero no contribuían en la definición de líneas políticas estratégicas. Ni podían: los movimientos no demandan ideas de valor universal sino impulsos concretos para su propio accionar.

Ya en el siglo XIX, Lorenz von Stein (1815-1890) pensó a los movimientos en contraposición dialéctica a la noción de Estado. Según el autor, mientras el Estado es un elemento estático, el movimiento es supuestamente la expresión de las fuerzas dinámicas de la sociedad. El movimiento antagoniza con el Estado aun cuando su líder sea gobierno, lo cual explica por qué éste tiende a reformar la Constitución para aumentar su poder. El líder -conductor, caudillo, führer, duce, etcétera- usa su carisma para personificar y unificar al movimiento. Para sobrevivir, el movimiento precisa vencer batallas y derrotar enemigos, y el líder es quien sabe realizar esas tareas de acuerdo con las circunstancias y posibilidades históricas. No importa que las oportunidades vayan de la derecha para la izquierda o viceversa, las ideas son traídas al campo político sólo para facilitar y justificar la dinámica del movimiento, lo cual implica, lógicamente, una inferiorización del papel de los intelectuales.

El fascismo renació travestido como populismo en gran parte de los países de América latina. Antes de la Segunda Guerra había una creciente hegemonía de las ideas de derecha. La derrota del Eje fue dejando progresivamente ese espacio a las ideas de izquierda. Fue así que en el inicio del siglo XXI surgieron en contexto democrático los regímenes de Chávez, en Venezuela; Correa, en Ecuador; Ortega, en Nicaragua; Morales, en Bolivia, y los Kirchner, en la Argentina. La dinámica de sus líderes y movimientos los aproxima a las experiencias fascistas, pero su signo ideológico es de izquierda. Son regímenes populistas autoritarios que persiguen las libertades públicas, pero por haber surgido en un contexto democrático tuvieron que adaptarse a las circunstancias y moderar sus apetitos. Si no fuera por eso, ahí están los elogios al despotismo castrista para demostrar realmente cuál es la verdadera preferencia de sus dirigentes.

El peronismo es el eslabón perdido de una particular evolución política subterránea de las masas en el siglo XX. Su historia ejemplifica impecablemente la continuidad existente entre el movimientismo de derecha (fascista) y el movimientismo de izquierda (populista). Los analistas tienden a no hacer esta aproximación porque se dejan engañar por el barniz democrático de los actuales populismos. Pero aun siendo regímenes surgidos de elecciones legítimas, no por eso son políticamente menos perversos. Estos movimientos dividen los países en bandos antagónicos a costa del Estado de Derecho, postergando por décadas valiosas una construcción sustentable del Estado, la democracia y la economía.

¿Qué papel les cupo a los intelectuales en el fascismo y les cabe en el populismo? Un papel trágico, por cierto. Esas experiencias atraen y fascinan a los intelectuales; muchos de ellos se encantaron con los líderes del fascismo y hacen lo mismo ahora con los del populismo, pero su influencia real en la política continúa siendo prácticamente nula. Entre la voluntad del líder y las necesidades del movimiento no existe ningún espacio de mediación para las tradicionales preocupaciones intelectuales con la verdad. Es más: la dinámica movimientista es portadora natural de un sentimiento antiintelectual. No por nada Ignacio B. Anzoátegui (1905-1978), un intelectual que se asumió públicamente como nazi, falangista y peronista, acuñó una frase célebre: "Basta ya de mariconerías ilustradas".

No puede extrañar, entonces, que cuando los antagonismos llegan al interior del peronismo ellos se resuelvan muchas veces a los tiros. Dadas la prolongada y variada historia política e ideológica del peronismo y la ausencia de una tradición intelectual coherente, los diversos grupos del movimiento están imposibilitados de una elaboración más o menos racional de su identidad que les permita evitar la violencia para descubrir quién es más peronista que el otro. El peronismo es un magma que contiene numerosos grupos con intereses diversos, pero igualmente peronistas. Todos luchan por el poder y, aunque busquen cosas diferentes, lo hacen en nombre de la misma identidad. Se matan precisamente por eso: si asumiesen que tienen identidades diferentes se separarían en relativa paz, tal como ocurre habitualmente en los campos de la vida pública y privada.

El intelectual peronista se siente realizado elogiando la relación del líder con las masas, denigrando a la oposición y pidiendo la reforma de la Constitución para garantizar la continuidad del líder y el proyecto en curso. Su destino trágico se verifica en la extraña ceguera para con la realidad, fruto de la soledad ontológica de la función intelectual dentro del movimiento. Al mismo tiempo que puede construir complejas teorías discursivas para justificar el populismo, no consigue observar cosas obvias. Como, por ejemplo, que en su larga vida el peronismo intentó implantar proyectos radicalmente diferentes entre sí que sólo tenían un punto en común: la reforma de la Constitución para la reelección del líder. Fue así con Perón en 1949, con Menem en 1995 y lo mismo quiere hacer ahora Cristina K. Desde una óptica republicana puede argumentarse a favor de los primeros gobiernos de Perón, de Menem y de los Kirchner, rescatando su importancia para la búsqueda de nuevas alternativas de gobernabilidad y de políticas públicas. Pero éste no es el caso de sus segundos gobiernos, que pusieron más en evidencia los apetitos de poder personales antes que las ventajas de sus proyectos políticos. El segundo gobierno de Perón, de 1952, acentuó sus componentes fascistas en vez de atenuarlos, y el segundo mandato de Menem aumentó la corrupción de su modelo neoliberal. El actual segundo mandato de Cristina Kirchner está radicalizando cada vez más su herencia ideológica generacional de una izquierda estatista y autoritaria que anuncia nuevos ciclos de angustia para el país.

La ceguera de los intelectuales peronistas cercanos al oficialismo no les permite siquiera ver una simple manifestación de voluntad ciudadana en defensa de derechos individuales como la del 8-N. Ellos no ven ciudadanos con ideas diferentes sino amenazas al movimiento y a su líder por parte de golpistas y gorilas semejantes a los del drama peronista de los años 50. Pasan por encima así, olímpicamente, los episodios de los años 70, que son los menos resueltos por la memoria argentina. Con relación a esos años, la ceguera parece ser de 360 grados: tanto no consiguen ver la violencia terrorista de la guerrilla peronista contra el Estado, durante los gobiernos democráticos habidos de 1973 a 1976, como la violencia entre peronistas en el mismo período.

La excepción que confirma la regla de la ceguera trágica de este grupo de intelectuales está dada por aquellos pocos que consiguen escapar de los laberintos existenciales del poder, declarando su desacuerdo con las políticas del líder peronista de turno. Con ellos es posible buscar acuerdos y pensar la realidad. Su miopía no es diferente, ni en género o grado, a la del resto de los intelectuales de otras corrientes.
LINK http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1528426-paradojas-del-intelectual-peronista
© LA NACION.

domingo, 18 de noviembre de 2012

“HOBBES our great contemporary” a John Gray´s review of the new Noel Malcolm´s edition of Leviathan




Thomas Hobbes

          Thomas Hobbes, Image Getty.

In some ways the supreme modern political thinker and without doubt the greatest ever to write in English, Thomas Hobbes did not spend all his time pondering questions of authority and sovereignty. For much of the last two decades of his life, this timid and yet combative man, who died in 1679 at the age of 91, devoted himself to trying to do something never achieved before or since – squaring the circle.
Part of a controversy with a long-standing foe, the mathematician and clergyman John Wallis, it was an ambition that suited Hobbes’s turn of mind. Fearful and cautious in his everyday dealings, Hobbes was also an intrepid rationalist with an unwavering confidence in the power of reason – especially his own – to resolve immemorial human dilemmas. Writing about his dispute with Wallis, Hobbes declared, “Either I alone am mad, or I alone am not mad. No third option can be maintained, unless (as perchance may seem to some) we are all mad.”
What Hobbes admired about mathematics was the certainty it seemed to offer. Mathematical theorems were demonstrable and irrefutable, and so – he believed –were the principles of politics. In a passage cited by Noel Malcolm in the introduction to his definitive new edition of Leviathan, Hobbes argued that in governing human beings, experience was less important than understanding these basic principles: “The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetic and Geometry; not (as in Tennis-play) on Practise only; which rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.”
For Machiavelli, writing over a century earlier, politics was best understood through the study of history. In contrast, for Hobbes, government was a deductive science, moving from unshakeable axioms to inexorable conclusions. Anyone who grasped the elements of this science could apply it in concrete political situations but no one was as well equipped as Hobbes himself. As Malcolm puts it, “The point of his abstract political theory was to generate counsel on how sovereign power might best be maintained – counsel which the author of that theory was best qualified to give.”
Hobbes is celebrated for his dark view of human nature but what is most striking about him is his belief that the problems of politics can – at least in principle – be easily solved. Lacking trust in one another, human beings find themselves in a “state of nature” – a condition of ruthless rivalry in which neither industry nor any of the civilised arts can flourish. But to Hobbes the way out from this predicament seemed clear. All that was needed was that his book would be read and its lessons implemented by an intelligent ruler: “I recover some hope,” he wrote, “that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a  sovereign, who will consider it himself . . . and by the exercise of entire Sovereignty . . . convert this Truth of Speculation into the Utility of Practice”.
Hobbes’s combination of pessimism about human nature with a sublime confidence that the human condition can be greatly improved if only power will listen to reason helps place him in a distinct phase of modern thought – that of the early European Enlightenment. Contrary to a popular stereotype, Enlightenment thinkers are by no means always optimists about the future. Modern-day partisans of enlightenment may like to think of history as a saga of continuing progress culminating in their own unrivalled wisdom, but Hobbes was fully aware that the moral and political gains of one generation are very often lost by the next. What he never doubted was the existence of a rational method that could deliver human beings from the worst kinds of conflict. By contracting to create a sovereign with authority to do whatever is needed to ensure peace, humankind could escape life in the state of nature – “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” – and enjoy the amenities of “commodious living”.
Because he had no interest in liberty or democracy as ends in themselves, Hobbes can be seen as the greatest exponent of enlightened despotism. Contrary to silly chatter about “liberal Enlightenment values”, the Enlightenment has always included a highly influential current of authoritarian thinking – a current that includes later thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and Auguste Comte, along with political leaders such as Lenin and Ataturk. Hobbes belongs in this current but it is part of his greatness as a thinker that he can also be viewed as the founder of liberalism. His best 20th-century interpreters – the Marxist C B Macpherson, Leo Strauss (intellectual mentor of the American neocons) and the sceptical conservative Michael Oakeshott, acknowledged that Hobbes, more than any other thinker, was the progenitor of the most fundamental tenet of modern liberalism – the belief that there is no natural or divine right to rule. The idea of Hobbes as a liberal seems puzzling only as long as you cling to the historically parochial notion that liberal values are essentially to do with a human right to freedom. For Hobbes, government existed only to protect its subjects, but for that very reason rulers were not bound to respect any of the freedoms we now think of as integral to liberalism. A Hobbesian sovereign could legitimately curb freedoms of belief and expression as long as doing so was necessary to keep the peace.
Liberals today may be shocked that Hobbes rejects any ideal of universal freedom but it is when his thought undermines the consoling faith of bien pensants that Hobbes is most illuminating. Right-thinking liberals are aghast whenever large numbers of people support authoritarian regimes, invariably trying to explain the fact away by reference to electoral corruption. If the majority in post-communist Russia seem unconcerned with Putin’s assaults on freedom, that can only be because democracy is underdeveloped. The possibility that, with all his murky authoritarianism, Putin may be more liberal than much of the population is not considered. Taking for granted that human beings will always need safety before they want freedom, Hobbes had no need of such evasions.
For Hobbes, the state exists to promote peace, not virtue or human salvation. This view of government leaves room for a great deal of freedom, for it precludes rulers using their power to promote any vision of truth or goodness at the expense of the security of the subject. For the very same reason, it also blocks governments from acting as evangelists for freedom. At a time when governments have led us into a state of perpetual war for the sake of nebulous ideals of universal emancipation, this insight of Hobbes’s could not be more relevant.
Where Hobbes went wrong was in thinking that peace could be achieved by applying an infallible method of the kind he believed existed in geometry. Here he was attempting the political equivalent of squaring the circle. Unlike Machiavelli, who understood that state-building depends as much on fortuna – the intractable contingencies of history – as it does on the skills of the ruler, Hobbes was possessed by the cardinal illusion of Enlightenment thinking. Believing that the dilemmas of ethics and politics are in principle always soluble if only human beings apply reason, he screened out from his view of things all those human passions that did not fit into his theory. Religious enthusiasm, suicidal heroism and the practice of violence for its own sake were all forms of madness, which an intelligent ruler – guided by Hobbes’s principles – could outwit and overcome. Imprisoned and tortured when fortune turned against him and he fell out of favour with the Medici, Machiavelli would have smiled at this fantasy of rationalism.
Not taking sides on controversial issues in the interpretation of Hobbes’s thought, Malcolm’s edition of Leviathan aims to present the masterpiece as faithfully as possible. The result – a product of many years of labour – is an astonishing achievement of the highest scholarship. We have never before had so accurate and so richly annotated a version of the text, and it is unlikely that there will ever be another that can match this edition. If there is a drawback, it is the price – £195 for the three-volume set – which puts it beyond the reach of most people and also of many libraries. In a regress that would not have surprised Hobbes, we seem to be reverting to a situation in which scholarship is accessible only to the rich, who have no interest in it.

John Gray is the New Statesman’s lead book reviewer. His latest book is “The Immortalization Commission: the Strange Quest to Cheat Death” (Penguin, £9.99) “Leviathan” by Thomas Hobbes, edited in three volumes by Noel Malcolm, is published by Oxford University Press (£195).

Original link from the “New Stateman”,

martes, 13 de noviembre de 2012

BRÉSIL: DIRCEU CONDAMNÉ A 11 ANS DE PRISON

L'ex-chef de cabinet de Lula condamné à près de 11 ans de prison pour corruption

Matériel extrait de Le Monde.fr/AFP 



Chef de cabinet de Lula de 2003 à 2005, José Dirceu (à droite) a été condamné lundi 12 novembre par la Cour suprême à dix ans et dix mois de prison pour corruption.

L'ex-bras droit de l'ancien président brésilien Lula da Silva (2003-2010), José Dirceu, a été condamné lundi 12 novembre par la Cour Suprême à dix ans et dix mois de prison pour corruption dans ce qui constitue un étrange dévéloppement du scandale éclaté en 2005. Ancien chef de cabinet du président Lula de 2003 à 2005, M. Dirceu, 66 ans, est accusé d´avoir dirigé un vaste système d'achats de votes de députés au Parlement par le très "révolutionnaire" Parti des travailleurs (PT, gauche), lors du premier mandat de Lula.


"L´ÉMINENCE GRISE" DE LULA

La corruption de la classe politique brésilienne n ´est une nouveauté pour personne. Meme si les scandales ont été généralement étouffés (on se souviendra, surtout, du cas du président Collor de Mello), les brésiliens savent parfaitemente que les procedures irrégulières, illégales et immorales font partir du jour le jour de la politique dans ce pays.

C´est cela que rend très surprenante, et dans un certain sens spèciale, cette décision de la Cour Supreme. "La responsabilité de l'accusé est très haute. Il a profité de sa position de dirigeant aussi bien au sein du Parti des travailleurs [au pouvoir] qu'au sein du gouvernement fédéral" pour commettre des délits de corruption, a souligné le rapporteur de ce procès entamé début août.

Tout-puissant à l'époque des faits qui lui sont reprochés, M. Dirceu, avocat, économiste, ex-leader étudiant, ex-communiste et ex-guérillero, faisait alors figure de premier ministre et d'"éminence grise" de Lula.

Principal accusé politique du plus vaste procès anticorruption jamais organisé par la Cour suprême du Brésil, M. Dirceu a également été condamné à payer une amende de 350 000 dollars. L'affaire dite du "mensalao" (grosse mensualité) avait failli coûter sa réélection à Lula en 2006, même s'il a été mis hors de cause par la justice.

La Cour suprême du Brésil a reconnu coupables de "corruption active", mercredi 10 octobre, trois des hommes les plus proches de l'ancien président Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva – son chef de cabinet, José Dirceu ; l'ex-président de son parti (Parti des travailleurs, PT) José Genoino et l'ex-trésorier du PT Delubio Soares. Il leur est reproché d'avoir participé à un vaste système d'achats de vote au Parlement par le Parti des travailleurs lors des premières années de gouvernement de "Lula" (2003-2010). Les condamnations ne seront connues qu'à la fin du procès, qui peut durer encore des semaines.

L´ argent aurait été "blanchi" par l'intermédiaire des deux agences de publicité de l'homme d'affaires Marcos Valerio, considéré comme le "maître d'œuvre" du système et retransmises des comptes de la Banco Rural avant d'être récupérées par de nombreux députés. Près de 101 millions de reals (40 millions d'euros) seraient passés entre les mains de Marcos Valerio, selon le procureur. Le montant total des retraits par les élus aurait été, lui, évalué à 55 millions de reals. Avec des virements de plus de 30 000 reals. Un véhicule blindé aurait même été loué dans la ville de Belo Horizonte pour transporter 650 000 reals dans des sacs de voyage remplis de billets de banque. 

S'ensuivit, pendant plusieurs jours, un défilé ininterrompu devant La Cour d'une quarantaine d' "honorables" avocats, dont Marcio Thomaz Bastos, l'ancien Garde des Sceaux du premier gouvernement Lula (2003-2007). Quatre défenseurs étaient même venus en jet privé de Sao Paulo, acte interprété comme une démonstration de force. Tous ont nié les faits, réaffirmant l'innocence de leurs clients.

Seule une poignée d'avocats ont admis l'existence d'un financement public et privé des campagnes électorales par un système appelé la "caixa dois", la caisse noire du gouvernement Lula et du PT constituée par des fonds non déclarés et non imposés, une pratique illégale, mais utilisée alors par tous les grands partis. Des agissements "immoraux", ont-ils reconnu, mais d'ores et déjà prescrits, (ce n´est pas un hasard que le procès ait tardé tellement à démarrer)  puisqu'ils remontent à plus de cinq ans, le délai de prescription pour ce type de délit électoral.

José Dirceu – 66 ans, ancien bras droit de M. da Silva et principal accusé politique de ce procès qui a commencé  au début d'août – est considéré par le rapporteur du procès comme le chef de ce système. M. Dirceu avait été obligé de démissionner en 2005, quand le scandale de corruption avait éclaté, mais il a toujours nié avoir versé des pots-de-vin aux parlementaires. José Genoino, un ancien guérillero de 66 ans, et Delubio Soares sont les deux autres principaux accusés politiques de ce procès qui fait la "une" des médias au Brésil.

Les juges ont statué que tous trois distribuaient de l'argent à des parlementaires par le biais du publicitaire Marcos Valerio dans le but de recueillir illicitement le soutien d'autres partis politiques pour soutenir la coalition du gouvernement fédéral conduite par le président Lula de Silva. M. Valerio a été lui aussi reconnu coupable de corruption. Sur les trente-sept accusés dans cette affaire du "mensalao", vingt-deux ont déjà été reconnus coupables.

Ce qui est absolument surprenant se sont deux choses qui seraient inexplicables dans n´importe quel pays ayant un parcours démocratique porteur d´une éthique politique minimale. 

La première chose c´est que tout le monde sait parfaitement que le président Lula da Silva était á la tete du schèma de corruption, qu´en 2005 la Justice a été arretèe, soudouyée, menácée ou carrément achetée pour ssaucer la tète de Lula qui s´est payé le luxe de se faire élire une nouvelle fois président, et, en plus, il a imposée sa candidate, Dilma Rousseff, actuelle présidente au nom du Parti des Travailleurs. "Le président n'était pas suffisamment simple d'esprit pour que s'opèrent, sous sa barbe, des transactions de cet acabit sans qu'il n'en sache rien, affirme-t-il lors de sa plaidoirie. Non seulement il savait, mais il a également commandité et dirigé l'enchaînement des événements" déclarera sans succès l´un des rares politiciens qui paraissent dire une fraction de la vérité. Il est vrai que Roberto Jefferson n´appartient pas á la gauche et ses multiples ramifications. Même si cette nouvelle présidente a pris quelques mesures contre quelques cas de corruption, il n´est pas moins vrai qu´elle continue à être à la tête d´un gouvernement fondamentalement marqué par les agissements corrompus de son fondateur.

Mais la deuxième chose qui est incomprehensible pour les analystes des systèmes politiques moyennement développés, c´est que Le Parti des Travailleurs, toujours au pouvoir avec l'actuelle présidente Dilma Rousseff, n'a pas véritablement souffert de l'onde médiatique du procès fleuve mené par la plus haute instance judiciaire du pays, alors que se déroulent actuellement les élections municipales. S'il éprouve des difficultés dans certaines grandes villes, le PT a progressé de 14 % par rapport à 2008 au premier tour, alors que la popularité de Mme Rousseff est de 77 %.  Soit, la conclusion qu íl est possible d´extraire ( mais pas forcément la seule), c´est que le citoyen brésilien trouve que la corruption du monde de la politique fait partie de "la normalité" et, en aucun cas, il sera disposé a punir, électorale et politiquement, un candidat corrompu.

Par les temps qui courrrent il est de bon ton mettre le Brésil comme un modèle de pays émergent. Si l´on pense que la même chose arrive avec la Chine, Dieu nous livre de l ínfluence grandissant de ces nouveaux pays







miércoles, 7 de noviembre de 2012

From The New Yorker: "Into the Storm"

Into the Storm

by November 12, 2012


God—or, at least, various of His acts and intentions, as some perceive them—has been at the center of more than a few storms this autumn, and He has not always heeded the ritual calls of politicians to bless America. Nor has He been noticeably attentive to what one suspects are their most fervent prayers, regardless of whether their affiliation is Republican or Democratic—although, to quote a prominent pol who held office during an epoch of even greater polarization than ours, “the prayers of both could not be answered.” Anyway, Mr. Lincoln added, “the Almighty has His own purposes.”
That He does. In His own inscrutable, scrupulously bipartisan fashion, the Lord has kept Himself, and us, busy all fall. The political season’s first hurricane, Isaac, forced the Republicans to forgo the opening day of their National Convention, in Tampa. A week later, in Charlotte, Isaac’s meteorological hangover frustrated the Democrats’ plans for a spectacular outdoor finale to their Convention: no stadium like four years ago, no fireworks, no fake pagan temple. (That last touch was just asking for trouble.) As the campaign gathered speed, a variety of professionals offered conflicting interpretations of what theology requires. Cardinals stressed the perils of obliging health insurance to cover contraception; nuns emphasized the Gospels’ concern for the poor and powerless. Pentecostal pastors anathematized same-sex marriages as contrary to God’s law; mainstream ministers pointedly performed them as consonant with God’s love. An Indiana senatorial nominee said that when a rapist impregnates his victim “it is something that God intended to happen.” In the first television debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, the President performed so poorly that he blew his painstakingly constructed lead in the polls—an error so otherwise unaccountable that divine (or, possibly, satanic) intervention seemed as good an explanation as any. And then came Hurricane Sandy.
The largest tropical storm system in the recorded history of the Atlantic Basin was still an abstract swirl on the weather maps of American television when the flood of speculation about how it would affect the political fortunes of the Presidential contenders began to crest. It would hurt Obama, because it would interfere with early voting, which his organization was better positioned to exploit. It would hurt Romney, because power outages would limit the reach of the blitz of TV attack ads that pro-Republican Super PACs had planned for the campaign’s final week. It would hurt Obama, because its lingering aftereffects would depress Election Day turnout, especially among the poor, the frail, and the immobile. It would hurt Romney, because it would remind voters of the last Republican Administration’s catastrophic mishandling of Hurricane Katrina. It would hurt Obama, because low-information voters blame the incumbent executive for bad weather. It would help Obama, because it would enable him to “look Presidential.”
The storm came and, for one night, wiped away all such chatter. It came to the megacity at dusk, deceptively and unequally. If you were in an apartment in upper Manhattan, there was the whistle of wind, the swaying of trees, the patter of rain—nothing more, not even thunder and lightning. But in the lowlands, near the seashores, the harbors, the bays, the Sound, the river: apocalypse. The very ocean rose, tsunami-like, relentless, terrifying, bringing devastation by flood and wind and wind-whipped fire, and, for some ten million people in a swath a thousand miles wide and encompassing sixteen states, darkness and dread. By the weekend, the material damage was reckoned at fifty billion dollars, the human damage at a hundred dead, thousands homeless, and untold numbers of lives and livelihoods upended. The losses put Sandy second to Katrina in its destructive power. But its implications for the future, its intimations of what may be in store for us all, are far more dire.
“The nine most terrifying words in the English language are ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’ ” Ronald Reagan used that line many times, and he could always rely on getting a hearty laugh. Well, this week the government is very much here, and it is helping. The public employees whom 9/11 taught us to call “first responders”—the firefighters, cops, and sanitation workers—were here from the start. But this time the state authorities were ready. And, yes, the national government—“Washington,” that hated entity—was ready, too, and it has responded, on a vast scale and just as quickly.
On Wednesday, a pair of representatives of both levels of government, Governor Chris Christie, of New Jersey, and President Obama, together inspected the ruined coast of Christie’s state. Christie is a Republican, and not just any Republican: he was the keynote speaker at the Convention and has been one of Romney’s most valued campaign surrogates. A week before the storm, Christie had derided Obama as “blindly walking around the White House, looking for a clue.” But, if once the President was blind, the Governor seemed to suggest, now he can see—and the Governor, in turn, now saw the President differently. “Obama’s extraordinary leadership,” Christie said, was “outstanding,” “excellent,” “wonderful.” When a Fox News host asked him if he might make a similar tour with Romney, his reply was curt. “I have no idea, nor am I the least bit concerned or interested,” he said. “If you think right now I give a damn about Presidential politics, then you don’t know me.”
Another public official, equally preoccupied with the storm, decided that he did give a damn about Presidential politics. Michael Bloomberg—three-term mayor of New York, ex-Democrat, ex-Republican, now a man without a party but not without a pulpit—is the nation’s most prominent high-information swing voter. On November 1st, he declared that he will be casting his vote for Obama. The storm, he wrote, “has brought the stakes of Tuesday’s Presidential election into sharp relief.” Even though, “like so many other independents, I have found the past four years to be, in a word, disappointing,” the stakes, in the Mayor’s view, are high, and the two nominees and their parties “offer different visions of where they want to lead America”—on education, on marriage equality, on the direction of the Supreme Court, and, above all, on the warming of the earth and the rising of the seas that, virtually all scientists agree, are the work not of Providence but of people, and were factors in Sandy’s severity and in the likelihood of many more such catastrophes to come. One party “sees climate change as an urgent problem that threatens our planet,” the Mayor wrote. “One does not.” On November 6th, we will learn which will be entrusted with the power of the Presidency. Meanwhile, the oddsmakers have their odds, the pollsters their percentages, the pundits their hunches. What the voters will decree, in their wisdom or their folly, God only knows. 
ILLUSTRATION: Tom Bachtell