miércoles, 30 de septiembre de 2015

Republican Obstructionism failed.

 

Resultado de imagen de foto John Boehner

 

The Blackmail Caucus, a.k.a. the Republican Party

 

 
John Boehner was a terrible, very bad, no good speaker of the House. Under his leadership, Republicans pursued an unprecedented strategy of scorched-earth obstructionism, which did immense damage to the economy and undermined America’s credibility around the world.

Still, things could have been worse. And under his successor they almost surely will be worse. Bad as Mr. Boehner was, he was just a symptom of the underlying malady, the madness that has consumed his party.
For me, Mr. Boehner’s defining moment remains what he said and did as House minority leader in early 2009, when a newly inaugurated President Obama was trying to cope with the disastrous recession that began under his predecessor.

There was and is a strong consensus among economists that a temporary period of deficit spending can help mitigate an economic slump. In 2008 a stimulus plan passed Congress with bipartisan support, and the case for a further stimulus in 2009 was overwhelming. But with a Democrat in the White House, Mr. Boehner demanded that policy go in the opposite direction, declaring that “American families are tightening their belts. But they don’t see government tightening its belt.” And he called for government to “go on a diet.”

This was know-nothing economics, and incredibly irresponsible at a time of crisis; not long ago it would have been hard to imagine a major political figure making such a statement. Did Mr. Boehner actually believe what he was saying? Was he just against anything Mr. Obama was for? Or was he engaged in deliberate sabotage, trying to block measures that would help the economy because a bad economy would be good for Republican electoral prospects?

We’ll probably never know for sure, but those remarks set the tone for everything that followed. The Boehner era has been one in which Republicans have accepted no responsibility for helping to govern the country, in which they have opposed anything and everything the president proposes.

What’s more, it has been an era of budget blackmail, in which threats that Republicans will shut down the government or push it into default unless they get their way have become standard operating procedure.
All in all, Republicans during the Boehner era fully justified the characterization offered by the political analysts Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, in their book “It’s Even Worse Than You Think.” Yes, the G.O.P. has become an “insurgent outlier” that is “ideologically extreme” and “unmoved by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science.” And Mr. Boehner did nothing to fight these tendencies. On the contrary, he catered to and fed the extremism.

So why is he out? Basically because the obstructionism failed.

Republicans did manage to put a severe crimp on federal spending, which has grown much more slowly under Mr. Obama than it did under George W. Bush, or for that matter Ronald Reagan. The weakness of spending has, in turn, been a major headwind delaying recovery, probably the single biggest reason it has taken so long to bounce back from the 2007-2009 recession.

But the economy nonetheless did well enough for Mr. Obama to win re-election with a solid majority in 2012, and his victory ensured that his signature policy initiative, health-care reform — enacted before Republicans took control of the House — went into effect on schedule, despite the dozens of votes Mr. Boehner held calling for its repeal. Furthermore, Obamacare is working: the number of uninsured Americans has dropped sharply even as health-care costs seem to have come under control.

In other words, despite all Mr. Boehner’s efforts to bring him down, Mr. Obama is looking more and more like a highly successful president. For the base, which has never considered Mr. Obama legitimate — polling suggests that many Republicans believe that he wasn’t even born here — this is a nightmare. And all too many ambitious Republican politicians are willing to tell the base that it’s Mr. Boehner’s fault, that he just didn’t try blackmail hard enough. 

This is nonsense, of course. In fact, the controversy over Planned Parenthood that probably triggered the Boehner exit — shut down the government in response to obviously doctored videos? — might have been custom-designed to illustrate just how crazy the G.O.P.’s extremists have become, how unrealistic they are about what confrontational politics can accomplish.

But Republican leaders who have encouraged the base to believe all kinds of untrue things are in no position to start preaching political rationality.

Mr. Boehner is quitting because he found himself caught between the limits of the politically possible and a base that lives in its own reality. But don’t cry for (or with) Mr. Boehner; cry for America, which must find a way to live with a G.O.P. gone mad.

LINK:  https://blu169.mail.live.com/?tid=cm9eWAqv1l5RGNhAAkgYib0g2&fid=flinbox 

martes, 29 de septiembre de 2015

O Caos brasileiro - A Folha





Resultado de imagen de caos en brasil




A Folha de Sao Paulo - O AMBIENTE DE NEGÓCIOS NO BRASIL VIVE UM CAOS ABSOLUTO, DIZ BANQUEIRO

O ambiente de negócios no Brasil vive um caos absoluto, diz banqueiro

JOANA CUNHA
 SÃO PAULO 29/09/2015 

O ambiente de negócios vive o caos e os investidores estrangeiros estão perplexos com o governo. O rebaixamento por outras agências de risco é inevitável. A opinião é de um dos principais assessores financeiros do país, Ricardo Lacerda, que, desde que fundou seu banco de investimento, BR Partners, em 2009, fez mais de 90 operações, ultrapassando R$ 70 bilhões. Eleitor de Marina no primeiro turno e de Dilma no segundo, ele admite que errou nas previsões ao dar um voto de confiança à presidente em artigos publicados em 2014. "A presidente e seu círculo mais próximo nunca abriram mão da condução da economia. O objetivo ao aceitar nomear Levy era apenas usar sua credibilidade para recuperar apoio dos mercados”, diz Lacerda, que também tem no currículo a presidência do Goldman Sachs no Brasil e do Citigroup na América Latina.

Folha - O Sr. estava mais otimista em 2014 e votou na presidente. Errou nas previsões?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Fui um dos primeiros empresários a apontar publicamente os erros do ex­-ministro Guido Mantega. Previ a reeleição da presidente Dilma e uma condução mais ortodoxa da política econômica. Mas errei ao achar que a presidente faria isso com convicção, que optaria por um ajuste claro e profundo, que poderia resgatar rapidamente a confiança dos mercados. Hoje está claro que prevalece na cúpula do governo a crença de que existem saídas menos dolorosas para a crise. É justamente essa distância da realidade que aprofunda ainda mais a crise.

Folha - Há risco de o país ser rebaixado por outra agência?


Ricardo Lacerda ­- A menos que haja um comprometimento imediato e claro com um profundo ajuste fiscal, o que já não parece provável, é certo que o Brasil será rebaixado por todas as agências. Seus critérios são similares e há rápida deterioração dos indicadores econômicos. Creio que esse efeito já está em boa parte refletido no preço dos principais ativos brasileiros —mas claro que um rebaixamento em cadeia será muito negativo.

Folha - Como os investidores estrangeiros estão vendo o Brasil?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Há uma enorme perplexidade com a completa inabilidade do governo em propor um caminho viável para sair da crise. O ambiente de negócios vive momento de caos absoluto. O governo perdeu completamente a credibilidade e houve uma paralisação de gastos e investimentos. Os empresários estão com medo de quebrar e os trabalhadores com medo de perder empregos. Esse sentimento negativo reverbera mundo afora e afeta nossa credibilidade junto ao investidor estrangeiro.

Folha - Há quem veja oportunidade nessa crise?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Sim, oportunidades enormes. Muitos bons ativos estão sendo negociados a preço de banana. É muito menos arriscado para um investidor estrangeiro entrar no país hoje, com o dólar a R$ 4 e a Bolsa a 45.000 pontos, do que há três anos, com o dólar a R$ 2 e a Bolsa a 75.000 pontos. Mas para que predomine a visão de que temos oportunidade, é preciso que os preços dos ativos se estabilizem. Entrar no Brasil com dólar a R$ 4 pode ser ótimo negócio, desde que não chegue a R$ 5 ou R$ 6 no curto prazo. Há hoje percepção de que o risco de descontrole da economia é real.

Folha - Até onde vão os juros?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Num ambiente de total falta de credibilidade da política econômica, o único elemento que pode tranquilizar investidores é a taxa de juros. Mantido o cenário atual, eu diria que não só não encerramos o ciclo de aperto monetário, como é provável que ainda seja necessário um novo choque de juros, de mais 200 a 300 pontos base. Os juros futuros mostram isso e podemos ver a Selic próxima a 20% ao ano. Pagaremos caro juros artificialmente baixos por tanto tempo.

Folha - Mudaria algo no ajuste?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Acho que a proposta do governo é absolutamente desconexa. A manobra de enviar ao Congresso um Orçamento com deficit foi desastrada e em seguida o governo não conseguiu articular nenhum raciocínio lógico para defende-­la. Em segundo lugar, o governo pode pedir que a sociedade faça sacrifício, é justo, mas tem que fazer sua parte e mostrar com clareza o que defende. Ele foi eleito para liderar, mostrar caminhos, não para enviar um Orçamento e pedir que se virem para equilibrá-­lo. Acho que a sociedade não aceita mais alta de imposto, o governo terá de cortar mais gastos. Senão, a inflação cortará por ele.

Folha - Como combater a inflação?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- Com política fiscal e monetária sérias. O Brasil não foi o único no mundo a relaxar tais políticas diante da crise de 2008. O erro foi exagerar em estímulos excessivamente de curto prazo e não propor reforma estrutural. O governo não soube a hora de recuar nos incentivos para garantir a saúde das contas. Essa barbeiragem nos levou a uma combinação tóxica de baixo crescimento, explosão da dívida pública e inflação alta. Para reverter, é preciso competência e determinação por parte do governo. Não estamos vendo uma coisa nem outra. O controle da inflação foi a maior conquista social do brasileiro nas últimas décadas e é lamentável que a presidente nunca tenha dado a ele sua devida importância.

Folha - Levy ainda é considerado pelo mercado a tábua de salvação? Ou é hora de deixar a cena?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- A presidente nunca endossou o ministro, nem seu receituário econômico, como o caminho para o país driblar a crise. O resultado é esse: governo com atuação conflitante e sem liderança. O ministro é um profissional sério, acadêmico respeitado, pessoa com espírito patriótico que tenta ajudar seu país. Será lamentável se ele deixar o cargo, mas creio que ninguém mais o vê como tábua de salvação. Para reverter expectativas, a presidente precisará mostrar uma mudança radical e inequívoca de suas próprias convicções.

Folha ­- O sr. avalia que ele teve boa atuação até agora?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- O mercado esperava que Levy representasse ruptura com a gestão anterior e uma oportunidade de fazer ajuste rápido, que traria de volta a credibilidade. Era minha aposta. Isso não ocorreu, pois a presidente e seu círculo próximo nunca abandonaram suas ideologias nem abriram mão da condução da economia. O objetivo ao aceitar nomear Levy era apenas usar sua credibilidade para recuperar o apoio dos mercados. Acho injusto julgar a atuação dele. Fica a impressão que ele foi sem nunca ter sido.

Folha - Mudar o governo ajuda? Quer impeachment?

Ricardo Lacerda ­- No momento não há motivos técnicos para impeachment. Tudo leva a crer que a presidente é uma pessoa honrada. Mas, evidentemente, o impeachment tem dinâmica política, que já está em curso. A inépcia política da presidente e a relutância em buscar novos caminhos a coloca numa posição cada vez mais delicada. É possível que termine seu mandato, mas há o risco de isso acontecer sem que tenha apoio político ou popular e com economia em frangalhos. ­


O BANQUEIRO E O BANCO Ricardo Lacerda, 47 Sócio­fundador do BR Partners, ex­- presidente do Goldman Sachs no Brasil e do Citigroup na America Latina, mestre em finanças pela Universidade Columbia (EUA)  

domingo, 27 de septiembre de 2015

Talking with Henry Kissinger







The Interview: Henry Kissinger

 

“The National Interest“  
New York, 20.08.2015 

The National Interest’s editor, Jacob Heilbrunn, spoke with Henry Kissinger in early July in New York.

Jacob Heilbrunn: Why is realism today an embattled approach to foreign affairs, or perhaps not as significant as it was when you had figures such as Hans Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, Dean Acheson, then yourself in the 1970s—what has changed?

Henry Kissinger: I don’t think that I have changed my view on this subject very much since the seventies. I have always had an expansive view of national interest, and much of the debate about realism as against idealism is artificial. The way the debate is conventionally presented pits a group that believes in power as the determining element of international politics against idealists who believe that the values of society are decisive. Kennan, Acheson or any of the people you mentioned did not have such a simplistic view. The view of the various realists is that, in an analysis of foreign policy, you have to start with an assessment of the elements that are relevant to the situation. And obviously, values are included as an important element. The real debate is over relative priority and balance.

Heilbrunn: One of the things that struck me in the new biography of you by Niall Ferguson is his quotation from your personal diary from 1964. You suggested rather prophetically that “the Goldwater victory is a new phenomenon in American politics—the triumph of the ideological party in the European sense. No one can predict how it will end because there is no precedent for it.”

Kissinger: At the convention, it seemed to be true to somebody like me, who was most familiar with the politics of the Eastern Establishment. Later in life, I got to know Goldwater and respected him as a man of great moral conviction and integrity.

Heilbrunn: Right, but I was more interested in your interpretation of the ideological force that emerged in ’64.

Kissinger: It was a new ideological force in the Republican Party. Until then, the Eastern Establishment view based on historic models of European history was the dominant view of foreign policy. This new foreign-policy view was more missionary; it emphasized that America had a mission to bring about democracy—if necessary, by the use of force. And it had a kind of intolerance toward opposition. It then became characteristic of both the extreme Right and the extreme Left, and they changed sides occasionally.

Heilbrunn: And they both vehemently attacked the Nixon administration.

Kissinger: Yes.

Heilbrunn: I remember that in your memoirs, you indicate that you were perhaps most astonished to be attacked from the right—

Kissinger: Totally unprepared.

Heilbrunn: —for allegedly appeasing the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: Well, and some, like Norman Podhoretz—who’s a good friend today—attacked me from both the left and the right sequentially.

Heilbrunn: I’d forgotten that he’d managed that feat. In the end, though, détente played a critical role in bringing down the Soviet Union, didn’t it?

Kissinger: That is my view. We viewed détente as a strategy for conducting the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Heilbrunn: I’m amazed that this doesn’t get more attention—in Europe, this is the common view, that détente was essential toward softening up Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and getting over the memory of World War II, whereas in the United States we have a triumphalist view.

Kissinger: Well, you have the view that Reagan started the process with his Evil Empire speech, which, in my opinion, occurred at the point when the Soviet Union was already well on the way to defeat. We were engaged in a long-term struggle, generating many competing analyses. I was on the hard-line side of the analysis. But I stressed also the diplomatic and psychological dimensions. We needed to wage the Cold War from a posture in which we would not be isolated, and in which we would have the best possible basis for conducting unavoidable conflicts. Finally, we had a special obligation to find a way to avoid nuclear conflict, since that risked civilization. We sought a position to be ready to use force when necessary but always in the context of making it clearly demonstrable as a last resort. The neoconservatives took a more absolutist view. Reagan used the span of time that was available to him with considerable tactical skill, although I’m not sure that all of it was preconceived. But its effect was extremely impressive. I think the détente period was an indispensable prelude.

Heilbrunn: The other monumental accomplishment was obviously the opening to China. Do you feel today that—

Kissinger: —Reducing the Soviet role in the Middle East. That was not minor.

Heilbrunn: That’s correct, and saving Israel in the ’73 war with the arms supply.

Kissinger: The two were related.

Heilbrunn: Is China the new Wilhelmine Germany today? Richard Nixon, shortly before he died, told William Safire that it was necessary to create the opening to China, but we may have created a Frankenstein.

Kissinger: A country that has had three thousand years of dominating its region can be said to have an inherent reality. The alternative would have been to keep China permanently subdued in collusion with the Soviet Union, and therefore making the Soviet Union—already an advanced nuclear country—the dominant country of Eurasia with American connivance. But China inherently presents a fundamental challenge to American strategy.

Heilbrunn: And do you think they’re pushing for a more Sinocentric world, or can they be integrated into some sort of Westphalian framework, as you outlined in your most recent book, World Order?

Kissinger: That’s the challenge. That’s the open question. It’s our task. We’re not good at it, because we don’t understand their history and culture. I think that their basic thinking is Sinocentric. But it may produce consequences that are global in impact. Therefore, the challenge of China is a much subtler problem than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet problem was largely strategic. This is a cultural issue: Can two civilizations that do not, at least as yet, think alike come to a coexistence formula that produces world order?

Heilbrunn: How greatly do you rate the chances of a real Sino-Russian rapprochement?

Kissinger: It’s not in either of their natures, I think—

Heilbrunn: Because the Russians clearly would like to create a much closer relationship.

Kissinger: But partly because we’ve given them no choice.

Heilbrunn: How do you think the United States can extricate itself from the Ukraine impasse—the United States and Europe, obviously?

Kissinger: The issue is not to extricate the United States from the Ukrainian impasse but to solve it in a way conducive to international order. A number of things need to be recognized. One, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia will always have a special character in the Russian mind. It can never be limited to a relationship of two traditional sovereign states, not from the Russian point of view, maybe not even from Ukraine’s. So, what happens in Ukraine cannot be put into a simple formula of applying principles that worked in Western Europe, not that close to Stalingrad and Moscow. In that context, one has to analyze how the Ukraine crisis occurred. It is not conceivable that Putin spends sixty billion euros on turning a summer resort into a winter Olympic village in order to start a military crisis the week after a concluding ceremony that depicted Russia as a part of Western civilization.
So then, one has to ask: How did that happen? I saw Putin at the end of November 2013. He raised a lot of issues; Ukraine he listed at the end as an economic problem that Russia would handle via tariffs and oil prices. The first mistake was the inadvertent conduct of the European Union. They did not understand the implications of some of their own conditions. Ukrainian domestic politics made it look impossible for Yanukovych to accept the EU terms and be reelected or for Russia to view them as purely economic. So the Ukrainian president rejected the EU terms. The Europeans panicked, and Putin became overconfident. He perceived the deadlock as a great opportunity to implement immediately what had heretofore been his long-range goal. He offered fifteen billion dollars to draw Ukraine into his Eurasian Union. In all of this, America was passive. There was no significant political discussion with Russia or the EU of what was in the making. Each side acted sort of rationally based on its misconception of the other, while Ukraine slid into the Maidan uprising right in the middle of what Putin had spent ten years building as a recognition of Russia’s status. No doubt in Moscow this looked as if the West was exploiting what had been conceived as a Russian festival to move Ukraine out of the Russian orbit. Then Putin started acting like a Russian czar—like Nicholas I over a century ago. I am not excusing the tactics, only setting them in context.

Heilbrunn: Another country that’s obviously taken a lead role in Europe is Germany—on Ukraine, on Greece—

Kissinger: They don’t really seek that role. The paradox is that seventy years after having defeated German claims to dominating Europe, the victors are now pleading, largely for economic reasons, with Germany to lead Europe. Germany can and should play an important role in the construction of European and international order. But it is not the ideal principal negotiating partner about the security of Europe on a border that is two hundred miles from Stalingrad. The United States has put forward no concept of its own except that Russia will one day join the world community by some automatic act of conversion. Germany’s role is significant, but an American contribution to Ukrainian diplomacy is essential to put the issue into a global context.

Heilbrunn: Is that absence a mistake, then?

Kissinger: If we treat Russia seriously as a great power, we need at an early stage to determine whether their concerns can be reconciled with our necessities. We should explore the possibilities of a status of nonmilitary grouping on the territory between Russia and the existing frontiers of NATO.
The West hesitates to take on the economic recovery of Greece; it’s surely not going to take on Ukraine as a unilateral project. So one should at least examine the possibility of some cooperation between the West and Russia in a militarily nonaligned Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis is turning into a tragedy because it is confusing the long-range interests of global order with the immediate need of restoring Ukrainian identity. I favor an independent Ukraine in its existing borders. I have advocated it from the start of the post-Soviet period. When you read now that Muslim units are fighting on behalf of Ukraine, then the sense of proportion has been lost.

Heilbrunn: That’s a disaster, obviously.

Kissinger: To me, yes. It means that breaking Russia has become an objective; the long-range purpose should be to integrate it.

Heilbrunn: But we have witnessed a return, at least in Washington, DC, of neoconservatives and liberal hawks who are determined to break the back of the Russian government.

Kissinger: Until they face the consequences. The trouble with America’s wars since the end of the Second World War has been the failure to relate strategy to what is possible domestically. The five wars we’ve fought since the end of World War II were all started with great enthusiasm. But the hawks did not prevail at the end. At the end, they were in a minority. We should not engage in international conflicts if, at the beginning, we cannot describe an end, and if we’re not willing to sustain the effort needed to achieve that end.

Heilbrunn: But we seem to recapitulate this over and over again.

Kissinger: Because we refuse to learn from experience. Because it’s essentially done by an ahistorical people. In schools now, they don’t teach history anymore as a sequence of events. They deal with it in terms of themes without context.

Heilbrunn: So they’ve stripped it of all context.

Kissinger: Of what used to be context—they put it in an entirely new context.

Heilbrunn: The kind of book you wrote—your first book, for example—would never pass muster in political science today because it’s not filled with abstract theories. It actually tells a narrative lesson.

Kissinger: That’s why I get attacked from the left and the right—because I don’t fit either of their categories.

Heilbrunn: Speaking of history, what is your assessment of Germany’s role in Europe right now? Are we back to a new German problem, where southern Europe views them as an occupying power, and in Germany itself there are hints of nationalism—I wouldn’t say that it’s an efflorescence.

Kissinger: Well, there are hints. Some groups in Germany, in the group below fifty, sometimes act as if the country that once sought to shape Europe by force now claims the right to reshape it by absolute moral judgment. It’s unfair to tempt Germany into such a role. It’s easy domestic politics for the countries of southern Europe to blame the Germans rather than themselves. What is the German sin in Greece? The Germans are saying that what is put forward as a bailout perpetuates irresponsibility. They are seeking to define a responsible process of recovery. Considering that their history has made inflation such a nightmare to Germans, I have sympathy for their position. Germany has never in its national history starting in 1871 had to run an international system. From 1871 to 1890, Bismarck conducted a spectacular tour de force that was not sustainable. You can’t have a great policy if it requires a genius in every generation. But from 1890 to the end of the Second World War—nearly a century—Germany was embattled in its perception of the world around it. Britain and France have much more experience in multilateral diplomacy. So I have sympathy for the German dilemma. They can help, they may be decisive in helping, but they need a bigger, more global framework, which we need to contribute.

Heilbrunn: The Atlanticist generation in Germany and the approach it embodied have largely disappeared.

Kissinger: That’s a pity.

Heilbrunn: The younger CDU [Christian Democratic Union] politicians that I’ve met are not that interested in the United States, which is a dramatic shift, since the whole Adenauer policy was based on Westbindung.

Kissinger: It’s partly their fault and partly our fault.

Heilbrunn: I saw Robert McFarlane recently, who worked for you, and in the Reagan administration. He said to me, “The last strategic thinker as an American president was Richard Nixon.” Is that true?

Kissinger: I think that’s right. He had substantial strategic vision. At the end of the first volume of my memoirs, White House Years, I wrote that the question is: What would have happened if the establishment that Nixon both admired and feared had shown him some love? Would he have retreated further into the wilderness of his resentments, or would such an act have liberated him? I leave it open.

Heilbrunn: Do you trace many of the problems in American foreign policy back to Vietnam, to that shattering of foreign-policy consensus?

Kissinger: I think Vietnam was the pretext. It made the protest legitimate. Because after all, you had student demonstrations in the Netherlands, which had no Vietnam, and in France.

Heilbrunn: Nixon was clearly somebody who had a tremendous amount of foreign-policy experience before he became president in 1969.

Kissinger: And he was thoughtful, and his psychological attitude made him unwilling to deal with too many people, so he had to think and read—he couldn’t push a button and get a Google answer—and travel. He was not threatened personally when he traveled abroad, so he was at ease in many conversations with foreign leaders. For all of these reasons, he thought deeply about foreign affairs.

Heilbrunn: He must have learned a lot from Eisenhower, too, I assume.

Kissinger: Well, like everything with Nixon, it was always a good combination of resentment and admiration, so nothing was ever unambiguous.

Heilbrunn: Do you think that Barack Obama is a realist—he’s reluctant to get involved in Ukraine, for example—or do you think that’s overdone?

Kissinger: Well, on the prudential level he’s a realist. But his vision is more ideological than strategic.

Heilbrunn: Thank you for the interview.

Una apuesta china al desarrollo de infraestructura

AIIB logo.jpeg



Un nuevo banco multilateral para relanzar la inversión en infraestructuras en Asia
Jorge Dajani González
ARI 45/2015 - 17/9/2015

Tema

 

El establecimiento del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras (BAII) se enfrenta a retos muy importantes en los próximos meses. Su puesta en marcha también ofrece nuevas oportunidades para relanzar las relaciones económicas y comerciales de Europa y Asia así como para las empresas de infraestructuras más internacionalizadas.

 

Resumen

 

El anuncio por parte de China, a finales de 2013, de una iniciativa para crear un nuevo banco multilateral para la inversión en infraestructuras en los países menos desarrollados de Asia supuso una sorpresa para muchos, pues alteraba el statu quo del sistema institucional de bancos multilaterales vigente desde la Conferencia de Bretton Woods. Sin embargo, tras un año de intensas negociaciones entre los más de 50 países fundadores, las dudas iniciales sobre su gobernanza, viabilidad y oportunidad se han ido despejando. Los principales bancos multilaterales de desarrollo ya colaboran activamente en el proceso de creación de este nuevo banco que se espera que comience a operar en la primera mitad de 2016. Se estima que podría contar con una cartera de proyectos superior a los 30.000 millones de euros tras sus primeros cinco años de operaciones.

 

Análisis

 

El proyecto de creación del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras (BAII) se enmarca en la denominada Iniciativa One Belt-One Road, cuyo objetivo es favorecer el desarrollo de los países e interconexiones entre Asia y Europa. Esta iniciativa incluye a los países que tradicionalmente formaban la Ruta de la Seda, desde China y Asia Central y Occidental hasta Oriente Medio y Europa. El BAII, no obstante, no se limita a estos países sino que incluye en su ámbito de operaciones también al resto de países asiáticos y de Oceanía. Incluso abre la puerta a la posibilidad de financiar proyectos fuera de sus zonas de operaciones siempre que pueda ser de utilidad en el cumplimiento de sus objetivos.

En definitiva, se trata de promover una mayor integración económica y comercial entre unos países que generan más de la mitad del PIB mundial y contienen tres cuartas partes de las reservas energéticas del planeta.

Las necesidades de financiación de infraestructuras en Asia se cifran en más de 750.000 millones de dólares anuales1 y ello supone una inversión anual de más del 4% de su PIB. Para contextualizar esta cifra baste recordar que el volumen de préstamos que realiza anualmente el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo se estima en 14.000 millones de dólares. Existe, en definitiva, un amplio margen para impulsar la financiación multilateral de infraestructuras en Asia e incluso para incorporar a nuevos actores. De lo contrario, una parte muy relevante de dichos proyectos de infraestructuras tendrían que recurrir a financiación exclusivamente nacional o privada, con el mayor coste que ello supone, o simplemente no se podrán acometer, con el consecuente impacto negativo en el crecimiento, la productividad y el empleo.2

En este contexto es en el que surge la iniciativa de crear el BAII, a propuesta del presidente de China, Xi Jin Ping, con el objeto de financiar proyectos de infraestructura a gran escala. Desde sus inicios se ha insistido en la necesidad de que el banco trabajase conjuntamente con las demás instituciones financieras multilaterales ya existentes. Se trata de una iniciativa incluyente y ello ha permitido desde el principio contar con un amplio apoyo de la comunidad internacional, tanto de instituciones multilaterales como de la mayor parte de países europeos.

Los potenciales miembros fundadores son aquellos países que firmaron el Memorando de Entendimiento o aquellos que, como España y los principales países europeos, remitieron su solicitud de convertirse en miembros fundadores antes del 31 de marzo de 2015.

Tras cinco rondas negociadoras, el 29 de junio de 2015 se firmó el Convenio Constitutivo del BAII en Pekín, donde estará situada la sede del banco, si bien podrá establecer agencias u oficinas en otros países. Actualmente, 57 países (véase la Figura 1) tienen el carácter de potenciales miembros fundadores, que se convertirán en miembros de pleno derecho una vez el Banco quede formalmente constituido, previsiblemente a finales de 2015. Entre las ausencias más importantes destacan las de EEUU, Japón y Canadá.

El capital autorizado del Banco asciende a 100.000 millones de dólares estadounidenses. Este capital se divide en acciones desembolsadas, el 20%, y en acciones exigibles no desembolsadas, el restante 80%. Los países cuentan con un plazo de cinco años para realizar el pago del 20% del capital pagadero desembolsable.

El capital suscrito por los países regionales de Asia y Oceanía no puede ser inferior al 75% del capital total suscrito. Por tanto, de los 100.000 millones de dólares del capital autorizado se ha distribuido un 75% entre países regionales y un 25% entre países no regionales, y luego se han repartido las respectivas cantidades entre los países de cada grupo utilizando una fórmula basada en indicadores asociados al PIB (60% del PIB a precios de mercado; 40% del PIB en paridad de poder adquisitivo).




Figura 1. Capital y poder de voto

El banco contará con una Junta de Gobernadores, que ostentará todos los poderes del banco, y un Directorio, que gestionará las funciones que haya delegado en él la Junta de Gobernadores. El Directorio estará compuesto por 12 directores que, a su vez, podrán estar asistidos cada uno por dos directores alternos. La composición del Directorio será la siguiente:
  1. Nueve directores serán elegidos por los gobernadores que representen a los miembros regionales de Asia y Oceanía.
  2. Tres directores por los gobernadores que representen a los miembros no regionales.
El Directorio tendrá carácter de no residente, es decir, los directores y directores alternos no residirán en Pekín ni recibirán sus retribuciones salariales del banco, sino que se trasladarán a las reuniones en las fechas convocadas. Este carácter de no residente, similar al sistema utilizado por el Banco Europeo de Inversiones, y el reducido número de directores introduce un esquema de funcionamiento novedoso, consecuente con los principios del BAII: Lean, Green and Clean.

Se prevé que el número total de profesionales empleados en el Banco no supere las 600 personas. Se exigirá el máximo grado de transparencia, publicando por ejemplo todas las actas y resoluciones de la Junta de Gobernadores. Igualmente se ha optado por las mejores prácticas en materia de ética corporativa, mediante la elaboración de dos códigos de conducta que fijarán claramente los estándares éticos y conflictos de intereses aplicables tanto a los miembros del Directorio, como al equipo directivo y personal del banco. El banco tendrá un presidente elegido por la Junta de Gobernadores que tendrá la nacionalidad de un país miembro regional; su mandato será de cinco años y podrá optar a la reelección sólo una vez. En la sexta reunión negociadora que tuvo lugar en Tbilisi el pasado 24 de agosto se eligió como presidente electo a Jin Li Qun, con amplia experiencia directiva previa tanto en el Banco Mundial como en el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo.

El número total de votos de cada miembro será la suma de sus votos ordinarios o básicos,3 sus votos por acción suscrita y, en el caso de los miembros fundadores, los 600 votos que les corresponden en calidad de tales.

La Figura 1 presenta un cálculo aproximado del voto que corresponderá a cada país teniendo en cuenta las cantidades que los países han indicado que aceptan suscribir, sin incluir los votos ordinarios o básicos ni los votos asociados al carácter de miembro fundador. El Convenio define tres posibles mayorías a los efectos de aprobar las decisiones en la Junta de Gobernadores:
  1. El caso más frecuente será por mayoría de votos emitidos.
  2. Por mayoría especial en la Junta de Gobernadores, consistente en la mayoría del número total de gobernadores que represente al menos una mayoría del número total de votos de los miembros. Entre las decisiones que pueden ser adoptadas por esta mayoría se encuentran la aceptación de nuevos miembros, la emisión de acciones a un valor que no sea a la par y la constitución de entidades filiales.
  3. Por mayoría cualificada en la Junta de Gobernadores se entenderá el voto favorable de dos tercios del número total de gobernadores, que represente al menos tres cuartos del número total de votos de los miembros. Entre las decisiones que deben ser adoptadas por esta mayoría se encuentran la de que el porcentaje del capital suscrito por los países regionales sea inferior al 75% del capital total suscrito, la composición del Directorio Ejecutivo, modificar el carácter no residente del Directorio Ejecutivo, la elección del presidente del banco y su cese; la suspensión de la condición de miembro de un país y la modificación del convenio.
La regla de mayoría cualificada supone de facto la posibilidad de que un país con más del 25% del capital, como es el caso de China, pudiera ejercer su derecho a veto en una serie de decisiones tipificadas en los estatutos. En otras instituciones financieras internacionales dicho poder de veto se rebaja hasta un umbral del 15%.

Uno de los aspectos más delicados para el BAII es disipar dudas sobre las políticas de salvaguarda que tiene previsto exigir a los proyectos para garantizar unos estándares mínimos de protección social y medioambiental. En este punto los trabajos están muy avanzados para la elaboración y adopción de unos códigos basados en las mejores prácticas internacionales. Tres son los principales campos de actuación: (1) análisis de impacto social y medioambiental de cualquier operación, teniendo en cuenta especialmente la protección de colectivos vulnerables, mujeres y niños, así como la lucha contra el cambio climático y la contaminación; (2) minimizar los desplazamientos no deseados de la población y asegurar que se ofrecen siempre alternativas beneficiosas para los grupos de población más afectados; y (3) proteger la identidad, dignidad y derechos de las poblaciones indígenas que deben participar activamente en el diseño de los proyectos cuando se vean afectadas de alguna forma.

En materia de política de compras públicas los trabajos también están muy adelantados e introducen novedades relevantes. A título de ejemplo, la política de compras no introduce restricciones geográficas, de forma que cualquier proveedor puede participar en igualdad de condiciones en licitaciones de bienes, obras o servicios. Los principios básicos serán los de transparencia y Value for Money, que supone que el BAII debe obtener los máximos beneficios con los recursos disponibles. Ello incluye, por supuesto, los principios de eficiencia y adopción de las políticas de compras nacionales siempre que cumplan con los requisitos mínimos exigidos por el banco.

En la fase inicial (2016-2018), probablemente las inversiones del banco se concentrarán en los sectores prioritarios: transporte, energía y agua. Una vez que el banco esté completamente organizado los proyectos podrán ampliarse a protección del medio ambiente, desarrollo urbano, tecnologías de la información y telecomunicaciones, infraestructura rural y desarrollo agrícola.

La política de inversiones del BAII tiene previsto cubrir todo el espectro de modalidades de financiación: préstamos directos, participaciones en el capital de instituciones o empresas, avales, fondos especiales, asistencia técnica y cualquier otro tipo de modalidad de financiación que determine la Junta de Gobernadores.

Todo parece indicar que las primeras operaciones serán cofinanciadas con otros bancos multilaterales de desarrollo y, probablemente, sean operaciones de gran volumen. Una vez que el banco cuente con todos los recursos humanos necesarios, comenzará a liderar proyectos de financiación de menor tamaño así como operaciones con el sector privado.

En última instancia, el BAII tendrá capacidad de apalancar financiación por un máximo de 2,5 veces su capital suscrito, por lo que la cantidad máxima podría ascender a 250.000 millones de dólares. Desde un punto de vista práctico se estima que al final del quinto año de operaciones la cartera del BAII podría superar los 30.000 millones de euros.

Desde el punto de vista de su financiación en los mercados de capitales, la operativa será muy similar a la que realizan los demás bancos multilaterales de desarrollo, con la ventaja de que presumiblemente contará con un rating de máxima calidad, lo que reducirá sustancialmente el coste de la financiación para los países prestatarios. En este sentido, la agencia Moody’s ha emitido en el mes de agosto un comunicado considerando que el BAII es credit positive para las economías emergentes que participan en él.

La movilización de financiación privada para la cofinanciación de este tipo de proyectos, por su carácter de bienes públicos, de gran tamaño, plazos amplios y sin liquidez, puede ser compleja. No obstante, existe en estos momentos un número importante de fondos, tanto fondos privados de infraestructuras como fondos de pensiones y fondos soberanos, con un creciente interés en participar en este tipo de operaciones a largo plazo. El BAII puede, además, introducir un plus de seguridad jurídica, capacidad de gestión y seguimiento de riesgos que haga más atractivo a los actores privados la participación en estos proyectos.

España está desempeñando desde el inicio un papel activo en la creación de este nuevo banco, del que es miembro fundador y uno de los seis mayores accionistas no regionales. Ello no sólo es el reflejo del compromiso del gobierno español con el sistema multilateral de financiación internacional para favorecer el desarrollo de las economías menos avanzadas sino que supone, también, una apuesta decidida por incrementar los lazos económicos y comerciales con Asia y ofrecer nuevas oportunidades de negocio a las empresas españolas más internacionalizadas, especialmente a las más directamente relacionadas con la construcción y gestión de infraestructuras.

España contará con una aportación inicial al capital autorizado de 1.761,53 millones de dólares, lo que le otorga un porcentaje de voto cercano al 1,8%, muy superior al que actualmente cuenta en el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo.

Otro aspecto de gran importancia consiste en las oportunidades de negocio que se van a crear para las empresas españolas de infraestructuras: nuevos proyectos en el mercado asiático, probablemente el de mayor potencial a nivel mundial, contando con el apoyo que supone la inversión respaldada por un organismo financiero internacional como el BAII. Teniendo en cuenta que las empresas españolas vienen ocupando en los últimos años la segunda posición en contratos obtenidos por empresas no regionales en bancos análogos como el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, y considerando la posición de prestigio internacional con la que cuentan las principales empresas españolas de infraestructuras, la consecución de un porcentaje del 3%-5% de los contratos totales parece realista.

 

Conclusiones

La creación y puesta en marcha de una institución multilateral siempre es una tarea compleja, y cuando el plazo que las partes se han fijado para crearla no supera el año el reto es aún mayor. Sin embargo, el BAII cuenta con dos aspectos clave que juegan a su favor: (1) tiene un amplio apoyo político de la comunidad internacional que se ha traducido en un capital suscrito de 100.000 millones de dólares; y (2) puede adoptar desde el principio las mejores prácticas de los bancos multilaterales de desarrollo, evitando así incurrir en algunos de los errores pasados.

Desde el principio, la estrategia del BAII se ha basado en el concepto de Lean, Clean and Green, con el objetivo de que el banco sea eficiente, ágil, ético y respetuoso con el medio ambiente y los derechos sociales. En este sentido, uno de los grandes retos será compatibilizar la creciente demanda por parte de los países prestatarios de una gestión más ágil de las operaciones de financiación con unos requisitos de máxima calidad en términos de políticas de gestión de riesgos y máximo respeto con los estándares de protección medioambiental y social.

Otros retos de calado serán el de consolidar una gobernanza corporativa de vanguardia y generar cuanto antes una cartera inicial de proyectos que le permita ir completando su estructura corporativa con profesionales del máximo prestigio internacional. Las bases están sentadas y los próximos 12 meses serán clave para medir el éxito de esta iniciativa.

Jorge Dajani González
Director general de Análisis Macroeconómico y Economía Internacional

Referencias

Asia Development Bank Institute (2009), Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2015), “Articles of Agreement of AIIB”.
Canning, D., y P. Pedroni (2008), “Infrastructure, Long-run Economic Growth and Causality Tests for Cointegrated Panels”, The Manchester School, nº 76, pp. 504–527.
Fung, K.C., A. Garcia-Herrero y F. Ng (2008), Foreign Direct Investment in Cross-Border Infrastructure Projects, ADBI, Tokio.
Kuroda, H., M. Kawai y R. Nangia (2007), “Infrastructure and Regional Cooperation”, ADBI Discussion Paper, nº 76, Tokio.

1Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia”, Instituto del Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, 2009.
2 El análisis del impacto de las infraestructuras sobre el crecimiento económico y la productividad cuenta con una larga tradición en la literatura económica desde el modelo inicial de crecimiento endógeno de Robert Barro en 1990 hasta los más recientes análisis, como el modelo de Canning y Pedroni, que incorpora además los efectos beneficiosos de las infraestructuras para la equidad de renta.
3 Los votos ordinarios o básicos de cada miembro responderán al número de votos que resulte de distribuir por igual entre todos los países el 12% de la suma agregada de los votos ordinarios o básicos, los votos por acción y los votos de los miembros fundadores de todos los miembros. Esta medida tiene un carácter reequilibrador a favor de los países de menor tamaño y se encuentra ligeramente por debajo del porcentaje utilizado en otros bancos análogos.


Link Original: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_es/Zonas_es/ARI45-2015-DajaniGonzalez-Nuevo-banco-multilateral-relanzar-inversion-infraestructuras-Asia