China: The Dilemma of International Intervention
January 6, 2016 | 09:00 GMT
- Beijing will continue to restructure its military and sculpt policy to allow it to intervene more easily abroad.
- The risks to personnel and economic interests abroad could force Beijing to use its new capabilities earlier than intended.
- The increasing spread of Chinese operations internationally will make them steadily more vulnerable to terrorism and instability.
Analysis
China's
massive economic expansion since the end of the Cold War has
transformed it from an isolated and impoverished country to a major
actor on the world stage. But growth has introduced vulnerabilities, and
Chinese economic security interests are now scattered far and wide. At
the same time, China has come to see itself as a great power —
and one that deserves a military commensurate with this status.
Protecting its interests abroad and supplementing economic influence
with military influence, however, will require massive changes to the
current system.
Beijing's
2008 defense white paper set the tone for these changes, and each
subsequent year has brought further refinement. In 2016, a new
counterterrorism law lays the legal groundwork to conduct security
operations overseas. Beijing has also continued its restructuring
of the People's Liberation Army. Whereas before, the navy and air force
were both under the command of the ground forces, now there will be
joint command of combat operations. These changes pave the way for
China's military to become more active abroad. China's capabilities are
not yet mature, but they are developing. However, growing international
economic and security challenges mean that China may find itself being
called on to test its overseas capabilities in 2016.
Turning Outward
On
Dec. 27, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
passed the nation's first counterterrorism law. Much attention has been
focused on the law's domestic ramifications, especially in the western region of Xinjiang and
on issues of media freedom and cybersecurity. But the law also sets the
stage for Beijing to become involved in overseas counterterrorism
operations. Article VII stipulates that, with the approval of relevant
countries, state security or military personnel may be sent abroad on
counterterrorism missions. Though China may not be engaged in direct
counterterrorism operations abroad anytime soon, Beijing will now need
only to seek the approval by the State Council or the Central Military
Commission.
Initially,
China will probably send additional investigators, intelligence
collectors and security liaisons abroad as it expands domestic
collections and responds to individual incidents against Chinese
personnel, businesses or activities. But these initial operations will
be significant. As with earlier anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden, China will use its overseas deployments to gather intelligence,
learn best practices from others and gain valuable experience.
The
recent changes to the structure of the Chinese military also provide a
foundation for expanded operations abroad. The People's Liberation Army
ground forces will now have a separate service headquarters, putting an
end to the outdated structure in which the navy and air force were
merely adjuncts to the army in its operations. Now, the ground, air, and
naval branches as well as strategic weapons will each have their own
equal service headquarters, paving the way for a unified command in
military regions or combat zones. Giving the army a singular, separate
command will allow it to focus on its evolving mission, both with the
restructuring of the old army-dominated military area command system and
with its expanding mandate to focus on cross border and overseas
operations, rather than primarily on domestic security and defense.
Although Beijing only formally unveiled these changes recently, these adjustments have been underway for some time. In China's 2008 defense white paper,
which sets the tone for future military adjustments, there was a heavy
focus on what is referred to as "military operations other than war."
These operations include disaster response, search and rescue,
anti-piracy operations, medical operations and even infrastructure
development. These are the military's "green diplomacy" tools, which
China has watched the United States effectively deploy around the globe
to demonstrate its strength and involvement. China has already begun
steps toward establishing such a presence. In 2007, the naval branch of
the People's Liberation Army launched the purpose-built Type 920
Hospital Ship well before it considered sending its own armed forces
overseas. This allowed Beijing to begin to build up its skills in
expeditionary operations while gaining goodwill abroad. It also set a
precedent for local populations to see uniformed Chinese soldiers
without noting it as odd.
The
greater vision laid out in China's 2015 defense white paper makes it
clear that the goal is to fully transform the role of the military,
reorienting each branch toward overseas operations and expanding the
military's role to include the protection of Chinese interests abroad.
The paper defined these interests in part as "energy and resources,
strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel
and assets abroad." This will mean a dramatic shift from China's
internally focused model, which fit with China's stated policy of
noninterference, toward one in line with that of the global powers,
which use their military influence abroad as an active tool of national
power. This change has become necessary as international instability and
the expansion of terrorism and piracy now threaten China's
significantly expanded economic and political connections around the
world. This represents an explicit shift in China's rhetoric, away from
simply being one of many responsible stakeholders in the international
system to being a great power with a military commensurate with its
role.
New Urgency
The
challenge for China is that it may have to test these changes sooner
than expected. Iran has already suggested China take a more active role
in resolving security issues in the Middle East. Russia, too, has
welcomed China's new counterterrorism law and suggested it provides a
foundation for more active international cooperation between the two
countries. Beijing also recently launched its massive Belt and Road Initiative
and has struggled to find sufficient security arrangements for land
routes through known trouble spots such as Afghanistan and western
Pakistan. It has also dedicated aircraft carriers to a future role of
securing key maritime routes that fall under Belt and Road. In short, as
China adjusts its legal structure to allow overseas actions and
restructures its forces to be able to carry out such actions, it will be
called upon to use them — perhaps unexpectedly. Already Chinese forces
have increased joint training exercises with countries around the world
and have been gaining experience as part of U.N. peacekeeping
operations, even if rarely in direct combat operations.
This
poses a challenge. Creating the legal framework for overseas military
activities is much simpler than actually carrying out such operations.
Concretely, these will require Beijing to build upon the military's
basic skill sets, transport capacity and logistical structures. More
complex, however, are the political considerations of overseas
involvement. China's slow movement on military reform has been due more
to the fear of global perceptions than to real legal restraints. Beijing
has managed to depict China's emergence economically, politically and
militarily as something peaceful, or at least as non-threatening to its
neighbors. Following the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, China has largely
pursued a noninterference policy with the idea of not showing its
overseas military strength until its economic and political strengths
were solidified. Instead, China has used economic and political tools to
fulfill its interests abroad but largely refrained from direct military
intervention, although it has been an avid arms seller and supplier.
This taboo has steadily eroded, with China first participating in U.N.
and anti-piracy operations and by taking a more assertive role in the
South and East China seas. These regional interventions, in turn, have
provided an incentive for neighboring powers, such as Japan, to actively counterbalance China.
Even
if Beijing decides to make a decisive break with the vision of Deng,
active intervention brings its own risks. First is the question of
whether Chinese troops are prepared to carry out actions abroad. A
significant failure in an operation would prove politically damaging
both at home and among China's peers and partners. Once China takes its
first steps into the arena of international intervention, it will be
nearly impossible to step back without being perceived as weak or
ineffective. This could embolden those opposed to expanded Chinese
interests abroad to move politically or physically against Chinese
assets or personnel. Involvement overseas, particularly in
counterterrorism operations, also places China squarely among the list of potential terrorist targets.
Beijing
is aware of these risks, however, and sees itself as already in the
sights of groups such as the Islamic State, which it fears has direct
links with ethnic Uighurs in western China. Finally, by taking a more
active role, the international perceptions of Beijing may shift, with
China coming to be seen as just another emerging imperial power, eroding
the credibility of its offers of purportedly disinterested assistance.
This, too, can cause new problems with China's economic activities in
Africa, Latin America, and Central and South Asia where such sentiments
can prove strong, leading to grassroots violence against Chinese workers
or the derailing of larger deals.
First
forays are fraught with risk, but despite the dilemmas of emerging as a
world military player, China must do so if it wants to preserve its
economic interests abroad and not be seen as an international laggard.
This may begin in places such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, where China
has a significant economic interest in pipelines and transportation
corridors and sees a direct tie to its Uighur militant issues. China
will likely seek to shape any intervention as within the framework of
international cooperation as opposed to being the protection of Chinese
national interests. But as the United Kingdom, France, Russia and the
United States have seen time and again, once intervention begins, it is a
hard habit to break.