Can Putin Survive?
July 21, 2014.
There
is a general view that Vladimir Putin governs the Russian Federation as
a dictator, that he has defeated and intimidated his opponents and that
he has marshaled a powerful threat to surrounding countries. This is a
reasonable view, but perhaps it should be re-evaluated in the context of
recent events.
Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline
Ukraine
is, of course, the place to start. The country is vital to Russia as a
buffer against the West and as a route for delivering energy to Europe,
which is the foundation of the Russian economy. On Jan. 1, Ukraine's
president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally regarded as favorably
inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and
politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a
Russian puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his
supporters, fundamental Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.
This
was extremely important to Putin. Part of the reason Putin had replaced
Boris Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin's performance during the Kosovo war.
Russia was allied with the Serbs and had not wanted NATO to launch a war
against Serbia. Russian wishes were disregarded. The Russian views
simply didn't matter to the West. Still, when the air war failed to
force Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that
allowed U.S. and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As
part of that settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part
in peacekeeping in Kosovo. But the Russians were never allowed to take
up that role, and Yeltsin proved unable to respond to the insult.
Putin
also replaced Yeltsin because of the disastrous state of the Russian
economy. Though Russia had always been poor, there was a pervasive sense
that it been a force to be reckoned with in international affairs.
Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become even poorer and was now held
in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with both
issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power,
though he said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the
greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. This did not mean he
wanted to resurrect the Soviet Union in its failed form, but rather
that he wanted Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he wanted
to protect and enhance Russian national interests.
The
breaking point came in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004.
Yanukovich was elected president that year under dubious circumstances,
but demonstrators forced him to submit to a second election. He lost,
and a pro-Western government took office. At that time, Putin accused
the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having organized the
demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became
convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation,
sending it the way of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine's importance to
Russia was self-evident. He therefore believed that the CIA organized
the demonstration to put Russia in a dangerous position, and that the
only reason for this was the overarching desire to cripple or destroy
Russia. Following the Kosovo affair, Putin publicly moved from suspicion
to hostility to the West.
The
Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo the Orange Revolution. They
worked to rebuild the Russian military, focus their intelligence
apparatus and use whatever economic influence they had to reshape their
relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn't control Ukraine, they did
not want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe. This was,
of course, not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal
one.
Russia's
invasion of Georgia had more to do with Ukraine than it had to do with
the Caucasus. At the time, the United States was still bogged down in
Iraq and Afghanistan. While Washington had no formal obligation to
Georgia, there were close ties and implicit guarantees. The invasion of
Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to show the region
that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was able
to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region,
and particularly to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or
implicit, had no value. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president of
Ukraine, reversing the Orange Revolution and limiting Western influence
in the country.
Recognizing
the rift that was developing with Russia and the general trend against
the United States in the region, the Obama administration tried to
recreate older models of relationships when Hillary Clinton presented
Putin with a "restart" button in 2009. But Washington wanted to restore
the relationship in place during what Putin regarded as the "bad old
days." He naturally had no interest in such a restart. Instead, he saw
the United States as having adopted a defensive posture, and he intended
to exploit his advantage.
One
place he did so was in Europe, using EU dependence on Russian energy to
grow closer to the Continent, particularly Germany. But his high point
came during the Syrian affair, when the Obama administration threatened
airstrikes after Damascus used chemical weapons only to back off from
its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed Obama's move, proposing a
process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged from the crisis
appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and
feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite
of a weakening economy, this boosted Putin's standing.
The Tide Turns Against Putin
Events
in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have proved devastating to Putin. In
January, Russia dominated Ukraine. By February, Yanukovich had fled the
country and a pro-Western government had taken power. The general
uprising against Kiev that Putin had been expecting in eastern
Ukraine after Yanukovich's ouster never happened. Meanwhile, the Kiev
government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By
July, the Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These
included Crimea, where the Russians had always held overwhelming
military force by virtue of treaty, and a triangle of territory from
Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a small number of insurgents
apparently supported by Russian special operations forces controlled a
dozen or so towns.
If no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin's strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to unravel of its own accord
and to split the United States from Europe by exploiting Russia's
strong trade and energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of the Malaysia Airlines jet
is crucial. If it turns out -- as appears to be the case -- that Russia
supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man
them (since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia
could be held responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means
Moscow's ability to divide the Europeans from the Americans would
decline. Putin then moves from being an effective, sophisticated ruler
who ruthlessly uses power to being a dangerous incompetent supporting a
hopeless insurrection with wholly inappropriate weapons. And the West,
no matter how opposed some countries might be to a split with Putin,
must come to grips with how effective and rational he really is.
Meanwhile,
Putin must consider the fate of his predecessors. Nikita Khrushchev
returned from vacation in October 1964 to find himself replaced by his
protege, Leonid Brezhnev, and facing charges of, among other things,
"harebrained scheming." Khrushchev had recently been humiliated in the
Cuban missile crisis. This plus his failure to move the economy forward
after about a decade in power saw his closest colleagues "retire" him. A
massive setback in foreign affairs and economic failures had resulted
in an apparently unassailable figure being deposed.
Russia's economic situation is nowhere near as catastrophic as it was under Khrushchev or Yeltsin, but it has deteriorated substantially recently,
and perhaps more important, has failed to meet expectations. After
recovering from the 2008 crisis, Russia has seen several years of
declining gross domestic product growth rates, and its central bank is
forecasting zero growth this year. Given current pressures, we would
guess the Russian economy will slide into recession sometime in 2014.
The debt levels of regional governments have doubled in the past four
years, and several regions are close to bankruptcy. Moreover, some
metals and mining firms are facing bankruptcy. The Ukrainian crisis has
made things worse. Capital flight from Russia in the first six months
stood at $76 billion, compared to $63 billion for all of 2013. Foreign
direct investment fell 50 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to
the same period in 2013. And all this happened in spite of oil prices
remaining higher than $100 per barrel.
Putin's
popularity at home soared after the successful Sochi Winter Olympics
and after the Western media made him look like the aggressor in Crimea.
He has, after all, built his reputation on being tough and aggressive.
But as the reality of the situation in Ukraine becomes more obvious, the
great victory will be seen as covering a retreat coming at a time of
serious economic problems. For many leaders, the events in Ukraine would
not represent such an immense challenge. But Putin has built his image
on a tough foreign policy, and the economy meant his ratings were not
very high before Ukraine.
Imagining Russia After Putin
In
the sort of regime that Putin has helped craft, the democratic process
may not be the key to understanding what will happen next. Putin has
restored Soviet elements to the structure of the government, even using
the term "Politburo" for his inner Cabinets. These are all men of his
choosing, of course, and so one might assume they would be loyal to him.
But in the Soviet-style Politburo, close colleagues were frequently the
most feared.
The
Politburo model is designed for a leader to build coalitions among
factions. Putin has been very good at doing that, but then he has been
very successful at all the things he has done until now. His ability to
hold things together declines as trust in his abilities declines and
various factions concerned about the consequences of remaining closely
tied to a failing leader start to maneuver. Like Khrushchev, who was
failing in economic and foreign policy, Putin could have his colleagues
remove him.
It
is difficult to know how a succession crisis would play out, given that
the constitutional process of succession exists alongside the informal
government Putin has created. From a democratic standpoint, Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin are as popular
as Putin is, and I suspect they both will become more popular in time.
In a Soviet-style struggle, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov and Security
Council Chief Nicolai Patryushev would be possible contenders. But there
are others. Who, after all, expected the emergence of Mikhail
Gorbachev?
Ultimately,
politicians who miscalculate and mismanage tend not to survive. Putin
miscalculated in Ukraine, failing to anticipate the fall of an ally,
failing to respond effectively and then stumbling badly in trying to
recoup. His management of the economy has not been exemplary of late
either, to say the least. He has colleagues who believe they could do a
better job, and now there are important people in Europe who would be
glad to see him go. He must reverse this tide rapidly, or he may be
replaced.
Putin
is far from finished. But he has governed for 14 years counting the
time Dmitri Medvedev was officially in charge, and that is a long time.
He may well regain his footing, but as things stand at the moment, I
would expect quiet thoughts to be stirring in his colleagues' minds.
Putin himself must be re-examining his options daily. Retreating in the
face of the West and accepting the status quo in Ukraine would be
difficult, given that the Kosovo issue that helped propel him to power
and given what he has said about Ukraine over the years. But the current
situation cannot sustain itself. The wild card in this situation is
that if Putin finds himself in serious political trouble, he might
become more rather than less aggressive. Whether Putin is in real
trouble is not something I can be certain of, but too many things have
gone wrong for him lately for me not to consider the possibility. And as
in any political crisis, more and more extreme options are contemplated
if the situation deteriorates.
Those
who think that Putin is both the most repressive and aggressive Russian
leader imaginable should bear in mind that this is far from the case.
Lenin, for example, was fearsome. But Stalin was much worse. There may
similarly come a time when the world looks at the Putin era as a time of
liberality. For if the struggle by Putin to survive, and by his
challengers to displace him, becomes more intense, the willingness of
all to become more brutal might well increase.
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