RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD
WE WILL TRY TO EXPLORE NEW SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NEW ACADEMIC ANALYSIS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CYCLE OF "WARS OF RELIGION", THIS TIME, IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD.
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Three to Tango
July 8, 2013 From the “Indian Express”.
Summary
Iran threatens to disrupt an otherwise warming relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Exactly
one year ago, the Indian media speculated about the rapprochement
between New Delhi and Riyadh after the Saudis handed over a key figure
(carrying a Pakistani passport) to the Union government: Abu Jundal, the
man who was allegedly on the phone with the LeT terrorists during the
Mumbai attacks of November 2008. In 2010, Manmohan Singh had signed the
"Riyadh Declaration" during a most successful visit: India and Saudi
Arabia committed themselves to sharing information on terrorist
activities and signed an extradition treaty — indeed, in addition to
Jundal, the Saudis have extradited two other alleged members of the
Indian Mujahideen, A. Rayees and Fasih Mehmood, in October 2012. This
year, in January, A.K. Antony paid his first visit to his opposite
number in the Saudi government. Pakistani authorities were very nervous
about these developments, which went on a par with an increasing mutual
dependence in the domain of energy, since India has become the
fourth-largest customer of the Saudis for oil (after Iran lost ground on
the Indian list because of sanctions).
But that was before the
comeback of Nawaz Sharif, at a time when Pakistan was ruled by a PPP
government the Saudis disliked openly. As early as October 2008, a few
weeks after the election of Asif Zardari as president, the deputy chief
of mission of Pakistan in Riyadh told his opposite number of the
American embassy that the Saudi government would not help Pakistan
(which eventually got only $300 million of aid in 2008) and would be
"waiting for the Zardari government to fall" (US embassy cable dated
October 16, 2008 revealed by WikiLeaks). The Saudis had no confidence in
Zardari, who, they suspected, was a Shia (ibid April 9, 2009).
As
a result, they cultivated their relationship with the army (thanks to
which Islamabad got $700 million of aid in 2009 at the Pakistan donors'
conference in Japan) and, in parallel, they prepared for the comeback of
Nawaz Sharif. Here, one needs to realise that, since the 1970s, as the
Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir, once said, Saudis "are not
observers in Pakistan, we are participants". Indeed, Riyadh keeps
interceding and mediating not only between the US and Islamabad but also
between the Pakistani army and the civilians, as evident from its role
in the "Memogate".
Sharif has been close to the Saudis for years.
Some rumours attribute this proximity to his personal religious
affiliation by suggesting that he belongs to the Ahl-e-Hadith, the
school of thought that has the most obvious affinities with Wahhabism.
But there are other, more obvious, explanations. First, Nawaz has been a
creature of Zia-ul-Haq, the man who promoted the rapprochement between
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia even more than Z.A. Bhutto (who initiated the
process though). In the 1980s, Zia armed and trained the mujahideen
fighting the Soviets with the financial support of the Saudis (and the
US) and launched an Islamisation policy that was implicitly directed
against the Shias at a time when Khomeini intended to export the Iranian
Revolution.
Not only was Sharif initiated into politics in those
critical circumstances, but when he was prime minister in the 1990s, he
cultivated his good relations with the Saudis. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Benazir Bhutto and "her" chief of army staff, Mirza Aslam
Beg, had somewhat irritated the Saudis, first, by refusing to withdraw
the Shia soldiers from the soil of Saudi Arabia where up to 20,000 of
them had been stationed so far (as a result, the total number of troops
was drastically reduced) and, two, by refusing to take part in the Gulf
War against Iraq. Nawaz restored good relations with the Saudis during
his second term. While A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb, had
dealt with the Iranians — who were already eager to become nuclear — in
the 1980s, Nawaz turned to the Saudis. In 1998, Riyadh assured Islamabad
that Pakistan would get the support of Saudi Arabia if its nuclear test
resulted in international sanctions. According to Abdul Sattar, foreign
minister of Pakistan from 1999 to 2002, the Saudis provided 100,000
barrels of oil daily on a deferred payment basis — this assistance
amounting to $500 million a year was converted into a grant after five
years. In exchange, Nawaz invited then Saudi defence minister, Prince
Sultan bin Abdulaziz, to tour secret nuclear facilities in May 1999 —
they visited (together with A.Q. Khan) the Kahuta uranium enrichment
plant and an adjacent factory where the Ghauri missile is assembled.
Four
months later, Sharif was deposed by Pervez Musharraf. The Saudis (along
with the Americans) interceded in his favour and he went into exile —
with his whole family — in Jeddah. The seven years Sharif spent in Saudi
Arabia reinforced the links he was already cultivating with the ruling
dynasty. Not only do rumours (again propagated by US embassy cables)
mention that his daughter got married to a grandson of King Fahd
(probably before he died in 2005), but Sharif was "favoured with
reserved prayer space in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina". He also
received authorisation — and some financial support — to start a
business in Jeddah.
The Saudis were naturally instrumental in
helping the Sharifs to return to Pakistan in 2007 when Musharraf
appeared to be on his way out. The PML-N lost in 2008, but won an
overwhelming majority five years later, and Sharif is now fully in
command. How will he deal with his Saudi patrons?
While several
Pakistani organisations, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, raise money
primarily in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh expects a clear anti-terrorist policy
from Islamabad. That was probably the message the Saudis wanted to
convey when they extradited Abu Jundal to India. Nawaz should be in a
position to deliver on that front. The fact that he wants to negotiate
with the Afghan Taliban should also be to the liking of the Saudis (who,
along with Pakistan and the UAE, were the only ones to recognise the
Taliban regime in Kabul in 1996).
The main bone of contention may
be Iran, the main rival of Saudi Arabia in the region. The energy crisis
in Pakistan is such that, in his "national energy policy" that has just
been finalised, Sharif has announced that Pakistan will have to import
1,000 MW of electricity from Iran (as much as from India, by the way).
The Saudis may object, saying that Pakistan should help to isolate Iran,
and offer an alternative energy package. But Pakistan may resist this
kind of pressure, and may even continue to promote the idea of an
Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline in order to maintain a channel of
communication with an important neighbour (especially at a time when the
border province of Balochistan is in turmoil) — and also in order to
balance one country against another. Pakistan has already played that
game in the past with larger powers — the former USSR, the US and China.
It can play it between Iran and Saudi Arabia today in an interesting
context — the closer to the bomb Iran is, the more Saudi Arabia needs
Pakistan. Islamabad, eventually, may be asked by Riyadh to install some
of its missiles (possibly with nuclear warheads) on its soil in order to
resist the Iranian threat. And such a deployment will not be for free.
We knew that Pakistan was a geopolitical rentier state because of its
position between Afghanistan (of American interest) and India (of
Chinese interest). Now, it may also be a rentier state because of its
border with Iran (of Saudi interest).
This article originally appeared in the Indian Express.