Hungary Seeks a Multidimensional Foreign Policy
July 18, 2013
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was one of the first European leaders to openly discuss the changes underway in the international system,
contending that Central and Eastern Europe countries would have to
redefine their foreign policies in accordance with those changes. He
highlighted his prognosis at a meeting with Hungarian diplomats Tuesday,
during which he warned of the dangers of Germany and Russia's
rapprochement and defended the importance of greater political and
economic cooperation with the United States.
After
the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest reoriented
its foreign policy toward NATO, which it joined in 1999, and the
European Union, which it joined in 2004. During those years, Hungary
opened up its economy to foreign investment and forged close political,
economic and military ties with the West. But things have since changed
in Europe. The European Union is in the throes of a deep economic and
political crisis, and its survival is in doubt. NATO is not the stalwart
military and political alliance it was during the Cold War.
Orban
reacted to this new environment in two ways. Domestically, his Fidesz
party used its absolute control of the Hungarian parliament to expand
the economic and political influence of the central government. Budapest
weakened the independence of the central bank and the Supreme Court,
nationalized the pension system and applied special taxes to banks and
telecommunications companies.
These
domestic moves corresponded to Hungarian foreign policy. Orban
criticized the austerity measures advocated by Brussels and supported by
Berlin while challenging the European Union's advancement on the
sovereignty of its member states. The government alleges that the bloc
will infringe on Hungarian sovereignty, and Budapest uses this threat to
consolidate power at home...
In
the light of a weakening European Union and a less reliable NATO,
Budapest is reassessing its position in Europe. A more centralized
control of domestic politics and a more independent foreign policy are
key parts of this strategy, as is maintaining tense relations with Brussels without forcing a formal break. Neither Brussels nor Budapest is willing to cut ties. The European Union knows that losing a member would only worsen its political crisis, and Hungary depends on the export markets EU membership affords.
The
second element of Orban's strategy is to incorporate more players into
the game, which involves pursuing a more multidimensional foreign
policy. Between 2011 and 2013, Hungarian and Chinese officials held
several meetings to enhance bilateral trade and technical cooperation.
But while Hungarian exports to China have almost doubled in the past
five years, China is only Hungary's fifteenth most important exports
destination, and Chinese investment in Hungary is not arriving as fast
as expected.
Hungary
is also seeking to improve its relations with Russia and the United
States. In late January, Orban visited Moscow for the first time since
2009, and Russian President Vladimir Putin promised more Russian
investment and cooperation with Hungary. Hungary depends on Russia for two-thirds of its natural gas;
Russia also supplies oil and nuclear fuel to Hungarian power plants.
The Hungarians have not forgotten that only 25 years ago they were
dominated by the Soviet Union, but Moscow has three things Brussels does
not: money, natural resources and a disinterest in whether or not its
partners implement institutional reforms.
Hungary's
relationship with the United States is equally complex. The United
States was vital to Hungary's economic transition in the 1990s; the
Americans lent money and provided technical assistance to promote the
development of Hungary's private sector. Investment by American
companies was also important in the privatization process of state-owned
companies.
However,
as the United States preoccupied itself with the Middle East in the
early 2000s (and then with East Asia), Central Europe ceased to be a
priority for Washington. Since Orban's rise to power, the United States
has joined EU officials in in criticizing the frailty of democratic
institutions and the rule of law in Hungary. But Washington has done
little else to show any significant interest toward the country.
In this context, Orban's statements reveal a trend that could become more pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe.
With a weakening European Union, alignment with Western Europe is no
longer the default foreign policy choice for countries in the region.
Russia is still perceived as a significant geopolitical threat, but
where there once was only fear, now there is also economic opportunity.
If a substantial change of strategy is not to be expected in the medium
term, warmer relations with Moscow are no longer a taboo. More
important, regional countries consider the United States -- and not
necessarily Brussels -- a counterbalance to Russia.
So far Hungary is the most vocal advocate of this strategy, but others, including Poland and Romania could
follow. Budapest's main challenge is to remain attractive to many
different foreign powers with conflicting agendas. Hungary lacks the
strategic relevance of other countries in the region, but Budapest's
position could be strengthened as the region begins to reassess its
policy priorities.