FROM
A Tortured Policy Toward Russia
By Ian Bremmer
March 26, 2014
The
United States has once again twisted itself into a rhetorical pretzel.
As when it threatened military action against Syria if a “red line” was
crossed, the Obama administration’s rhetoric about Russia and Ukraine
goes far beyond what it will be willing and able to enforce.
Earlier
this month, President Obama warned that America would “isolate Russia”
if it grabbed more land, and yesterday, he suggested that more sanctions
were possible. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry said the Group
of 7 nations were “prepared to go to the hilt” in order to isolate
Russia.
But
Washington’s rhetoric is dangerously excessive, for three main reasons:
Ukraine is far more important to Vladimir V. Putin than it is to
America; it will be hard for the United States and Europe to make good
on their threats of crippling sanctions; and other countries could
ultimately defang them.
First,
the United States needs to see the Ukraine crisis from Russia’s
viewpoint. Threats from America and Europe will never be the determining
factor in Mr. Putin’s decision making. Ukraine is Russia’s single
biggest national security issue beyond its borders, and Mr. Putin’s
policy, including whether to seize more of Ukraine, will be informed
overwhelmingly by national security interests, not near-term economics.
Furthermore,
Russia has provided Ukraine with some $200-$300 billion in natural gas
subsidies since 1991. With an anti-Russian government in Ukraine, Moscow
is likely to stop these subsidies, lifting a major economic burden just
as the West tries to squeeze it financially.
Second,
if Russia pushes farther into Ukraine, America’s attempt at tougher
Iran-style sanctions, coordinated with allies, will ultimately fail.
Indeed, if Mr. Putin pursues a broader military campaign, a similarly
robust response from both America and Europe is unlikely.
Russia’s
energy exports, its commercial power and its sheer size make the costs
of ignoring it prohibitively high for Europe. Despite the Group of 7’s
recent exclusion of Russia, the Europeans don’t want to go to extremes.
The Ukrainian ambassador to the European Union called the current
sanctions a “mosquito bite”;
and even these modest actions have left many European powers feeling
skittish. Britain and France have been very cautious, the Austrians and
Cypriots even more so. (Austria buys more than half of its gas from
Russia; Cyprus has huge Russian banking exposure.)
And
finally, even if America seeks stringent sanctions against Russia,
other nations will ignore them and offset any damage they cause. India
absolutely refuses to treat Russia like a rogue state. More important,
China will not observe such sanctions.
The
fundamental problem is that the Obama administration doesn’t want to
bear the costs associated with an active foreign policy. That’s
understandable. A December Pew poll revealed the lowest level of public
support for an active American foreign policy since 1964.
This
domestic pressure was on display in Syria. Mr. Obama’s error was not
that he backed away from military action and accepted Russia’s proposal
to rid Syria of chemical weapons. The mistake was that he drew a red
line that would have been more costly to back up than the United States
was willing to tolerate. America lost credibility internationally for
failing to make good on its threat.
Unfortunately, the Obama administration is repeating this mistake in Ukraine.
When Russia proceeded with the annexation of Crimea, the United States
and Europe responded with punitive measures that had some economic
impact. But they did not by any means “go to the hilt.” Instead, the
Americans and Europeans drew an even deeper line in the sand, issuing
empty threats of sweeping sanctions if Russia tried to grab more
territory in Ukraine.
Such sharp rhetoric from the West could push Mr. Putin to be even more
aggressive. That’s because he does not believe that the West would ever
treat Russia like Iran and implement robust sanctions that would cut off
vast areas of Russia’s economy from the West. As Mr. Putin recently
explained, in a globalized world “it’s possible to damage each other —
but this would be mutual damage.”
“Isolating
Russia” as if it were Iran or North Korea isn’t a threat America can
feasibly make good on. Just because Mr. Putin is acting like the leader
of a rogue state, his country cannot be considered as such. Russia
boasts the world’s eighth-largest economy. Given the exposure of
American corporations to Russia, there would be serious pushback from
the private sector if Mr. Obama tried to relegate Russia to rogue-state
status. The Obama administration needs to preach what it will ultimately
practice. Otherwise Washington’s credibility will erode further as it
walks back its words.
A
more hard-line response is not the answer. Mr. Obama was right to rule
out the military option; diplomacy is America’s only viable path
forward.
But
Washington needs to anticipate a Russian response from a Russian
perspective. In a major speech on Wednesday, Mr. Obama hinted that
further sanctions would be implemented if Russia maintained its present
course. That is a mistake. Russia will not back down, and such talk will
only ratchet up tensions.
The
Obama administration should focus on supporting Kiev rather than
punishing Moscow. That means using its leverage with Europe to ensure
that this support sticks, and that Ukraine’s new government does nothing
to provoke an extreme response. This will require an acknowledgment of
Russia’s core interests and America’s limitations — and an end to empty
threats.
Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and a global research professor at New York University.