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Summary
While France's military intervention has
severely deteriorated jihadist militants' capability to establish
sanctuary in northern Mali, militant activity continues throughout the
Sahel region. The insecurity in vast areas of southern Libya, which
originally contributed to the emergency in Mali, still provides a
potential staging area or safe haven to several internationalist militant organizations. Militants
also continue to move freely across national borders in the Sahel, into
countries with weak governments such as Libya, Mauritania, Niger and
Tunisia, posing a threat throughout the region -- including to several
French energy and diplomatic assets.
Analysis
Jihadist
militants' reach throughout the region is not a new challenge to
France; they have been present in the area for a long time, conducting
operations such as kidnapping foreigners or smuggling. However, France
in recent years has become alarmed by the newly observed capability of
militants to establish bases -- specifically in northern Mali -- and
threaten national sovereignty. Militants obtained these capabilities by
exploiting the fall of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's regime,
which resulted in the spread of weapons and fighters throughout the
region, as well as the Tuaregs' struggle for autonomy and the
resulting March 2012 coup in Mali.
France's
decision to intervene in Mali has brought about several changes in the
militancy situation in the Sahel region. Though militants are no longer
able to establish sanctuary in northern Mali, many of the groups that
were active there have now appeared in neighboring countries,
showing that they were able to decline combat with the French and flee
into the rest of the Sahel while maintaining their ability to conduct
remote attacks. Regional support for intervention operations, especially
in the form of Niger's and Chad's military presence in Mali, has also
brought more countries of the Sahel into direct confrontation with the
militant groups that exist throughout the region.
Recent attacks against French assets, such as the French Embassy in Tripoli, the uranium mining facility in Arlit, Niger,
and multiple attacks on French forces in Mali, have shown that France's
actions against jihadist militants have increased the threat to French
assets and civilians in the Sahel. There have been fears of operations
in Mali leading to militant attacks within France, but so far this has
failed to materialize; the biggest concern seems to be the threats
within the Sahel, both against French interests and other countries in
the region.
France
has addressed these threats by allocating financial resources to
improve the security of its diplomatic assets across northern Africa and
the Middle East and by readjusting its military strategy in Africa.
Though France was previously in the process of closing permanent
bases in Africa and moving troops to other regions, the military
intervention in Mali has shown the benefits of having forward
deployments and access to regional logistical nodes to support
operations. France has already declared that it will continue to base troops in Africa, including a permanent presence of 1,000 soldiers in Mali, for quick deployment in the case of emerging threats.
France
has also been a proponent of increasing the capabilities of regional
security forces. An EU Training Mission is already working with the
Malian army and Malian troops are operating in close cooperation with
French military forces, with the goal of increasing Bamako's ability to
defeat jihadist militants in future confrontations.
Southern
Libya is the next major risk area, because militants that have fled
Mali can move freely through this territory without interference from
the weak government in Tripoli or its security forces. Because of
this, France has offered to cooperate with Tripoli on issues such as
border security in an attempt to limit militants' mobility and contain
the threat to a specific region. But even if such a project
is successful, it is impossible to completely secure such vast borders
that run through rough and complex terrain.
The
problem for Libya in dealing with the regional militant threat is that
the central government has little effective control beyond Tripoli and
must operate through relationships with willing local communities and
armed groups throughout Libya. This presents a dynamic similar to that
of northern Mali, where al Qaeda has manipulated local communities to
gain refuge. A NATO initiative is exploring the possibility of training
Libyan security forces, which could increase the country's overall
internal security capabilities and limit militant operations.
France
has also worked with Niger and Chad to improve border
security. This cooperation is in both countries' national interests,
since their direct confrontation with militants in Mali has increased
the threat of militant attacks against them, as shown by the attack on
military barracks in Agadez, Niger. However, Algeria, which has the
largest military and security forces in the region, has opposed the
French intervention from the beginning, even though it also suffered
losses from regional militants during the hostage crisis at the Ain Amenas gas facility.
Algiers' aloofness and history of mixed relations with its former
colonizer make it difficult for Paris to cooperate with Algerian
security prerogatives in the region.
The
French intervention in Mali -- which in the eyes of French strategists
is necessary to avoid an imminent threat -- has achieved local success
in northern Mali but has not rectified the issues that led to the
emergency in the first place. The French presence in northern Mali has
also triggered a migration of militants throughout the region, where
more French interests are present. Because of this, France will be
forced to continue its involvement in regional security to safeguard its
economic and diplomatic activities.
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