International Crisis Group
Oct 26 2015
UN Security Council Reform Now: Start With the G20!
By Celso Amorim,
Brazil's former Foreign Minister of External Relations
As
the UN marks its 70th anniversary, the crucial question of Security
Council reform remains neglected, despite a number of UN-focused
initiatives launched, both by think-tanks and other private
institutions, as well as by the UN Member States and its secretariat.
This, despite the fact that the Security Council and its reform has been
the object of heated and, by and large, fruitless debate for at least
twenty years. Now, on the occasion of the UN’s 70th anniversary, the
upcoming G20 meeting — and the G20 themselves — should be leveraged to
gain real traction for reform efforts and ensure a broader group of
voices, reflecting today’s world, are heard.
I
was personally involved in the debate surrounding UN Security Council
reform at different phases and from different angles: in New York as
Brazil’s permanent representative to the UN during the nineties, as
foreign minister of Brazil for the better part of the first decade of
this millennium, and as member of more than one commission and/or panel
of experts.
As
time has passed, my initial optimism has somewhat faded. Not so my
sense of urgency, though. As a government official of one of the
“natural candidates” to permanent membership, my opinions may be
considered as biased, a contention I would not try to deny. The same is
true, of course, of the proponents of positions opposed to mine.
Seventy years is a lot of time, even from the perspective of history.
Leaving aside recent events
(always hard to judge), let us consider other historical events and
timeframes. In the nineteenth century, less than seven decades elapsed
between the Congress of Vienna and the war between France and Prussia,
which marked the rise of Germany. Less than seven decades lie between
the abolition of serfdom in Russia and the Bolshevik Revolution! How
quickly and substantially the world around us can change, yet we
absurdly cling to a system of peace and security based on realities
which have inexorably altered.
Apart
from the considerations of legitimacy and justice — often raised in
this regard, and with serious merit — other aspects must be considered.
Not least the efficacy of the Security Council itself, which very
frequently is torn apart or deadlocked by opposing views among permanent
members. With the risk of sounding too simplistic, the “Western” view
of world affairs, encouraging of liberal democracy, can on occasion be
supported to the point of being willing to impose it by force (whether
this is a genuine reason for intervention is beside the point); a
countering “Eastern” view, places greater value on respect for national
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.
To
a large extent, this dichotomy has been responsible for the paralysis
of the Security Council in relation to major issues such as the conflict
in Syria.
Equally
important: this dichotomy was directly or indirectly invoked to justify
unilateral action in situations like those in Iraq and Kosovo. But
there is, I would argue, a “third” view, which is the one of countries
like India, Brazil and South Africa (we could add a few others). These
nations place great value on the principle of democratic governance and
respect for human rights; at the same time, as developing nations, they
are sensitive to considerations of non-interference in internal affairs.
Based
on experience, I would claim that these countries (not by chance
members of the IBSA tripartite dialogue forum) could often provide a
bridge between these opposite stances and help, through dialogue, to
find consensus on some thorny issues. Brazil played precisely this role
in 1999, when it chaired a UN Security Council panel on Iraq. As a
result of its work, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) replaced the previously existing UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) with new, less intrusive methods. Under the
chairmanship of Hans Blix, this new structure could have prevented the
disastrous bombing and invasion of Iraq, were it not for supervening
events, especially 9/11 and the so-called “war on terror”.
Situations
such as the ones in Syria and Libya could have been better dealt with
if the Security Council could count, among its permanent members,
countries of the developing world whose positions carry weight and
leadership.
At the same time,
it is impossible to ignore the growth in influence of countries like
Germany and Japan, whose contribution (financial and otherwise) may be
invaluable to the Security Council’s decision-making process and the
implementation of its decisions.
Apart
from the number, geographical provenance and relative weight of the
UN’s member states, there is another aspect of the changing world
reality that makes reform of this UN body both necessary and urgent. The
very concept of what we mean by “peace and security” — and therefore
what falls within the UN Security Council’s mandate — has changed over
the last decades.
Internal,
rather than international, conflicts have increasingly become the main
object of the Security Council’s decisions; at the same time, other
themes such as migration, climate change and even diseases like Ebola
have been brought to the Council’s attention.
The
distinction between socio-economic matters and security ones has become
blurred, at least partly due to a desire to make the international
public opinion focus on these subjects. Whatever the reason, once the
Security Council “becomes seized” of a certain matter, one cannot
exclude that it will act in accordance with the powers conceded to it by
the UN Charter. As the Security Council’s role and scope grows, so does
the importance of ensuring its representativeness and thereby its
legitimacy .
Of course, reforming the Security Council is not an easy task
It involves, among other
things, an amendment to the UN Charter with all the accompanying
complexities, such as the need for ratification by two thirds of the
members, including the five permanent ones. Many member states support
the view that some kind of consensus (or general agreement) is necessary
for approval of a General Assembly resolution on reform. But it is
unlikely this will be obtained, as the unending debate on the subject
has shown. Rather, a change in the Security Council composition, with
new permanent members, initially at least, might involve some kind of
“co-optation” of the sort that brought about the G20.
Maybe
one step in that direction would be to empower the G20 itself to deal
with peace and security matters (including meetings of foreign ministers
in preparation to the summits), while preserving the ultimate formal
power of the Security Council.
To
some extent, this would allow the world to replicate, with the
participation of developing nations, the process which took place in the
nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. Bringing peace and security
issues into the G20 forum for discussion would allow a greater variety
of opinions — representative of different world views — to be heard on
important issues, from the internal conflicts in the Democratic Republic
of Congo to the question of Palestine. For such a proposal to work, the
composition of the G20 would also require some adjustment, in
particular to improve the representation of Africa.
In
the event, formal reform of the UN Security Council — the only one
legally empowered to authorise coercive measures — will have to come.
Pending this, the world should be allowed to get accustomed to seeing
international peace and security, in its ever expanding scope, formally
safeguarded by a broader group that better reflects the realities of the
world we now live in.