Comment la Turquie refuse d´affronter son terrible passé

« Pour les Turcs, reconnaître le génocide est une trahison »

LE MONDE | 22.04.20/ par Gaïdz Minassian

Edhem Eldem enseigne l’histoire à l’université de Bogazici (Istanbul). Il est spécialiste de l’histoire économique et sociale du XIX^e siècle. Membre du comité d’organisation de la conférence de 2005 à Istanbul sur le sort des Arméniens de l’Empire ottoman, il a étudié les massacres d’Istanbul de 1896.

Lire aussi : Génocide des Arméniens : 100 ans d’un drame occulté

 

Que signifie commémorer aujourd’hui en Turquie le centenaire du génocide des Arméniens ?

Pour ceux qui le font – ils sont fort peu nombreux –, il s’agit d’un devoir de mémoire, d’un engagement moral et parfois d’un défi politique. Pour la grande majorité de la population, la question ne se pose même pas puisque le génocide est nié. Le reconnaître et le commémorer équivalent par conséquent à une forme de trahison ou, au mieux, à des errements causés par un endoctrinement étranger. Il faut cependant signaler que la commémoration est désormais possible, alors qu’elle était impensable il y a à peine une décennie.

Sur le temps long de l’histoire de l’Empire ottoman, quelle est la particularité de la relation entre Turcs et Arméniens ?

Je ne suis pas sûr qu’on puisse vraiment parler de Turcs dans un contexte ottoman. C’est une appellation occidentale qui est reprise par le récit national et nationaliste turc qui s’évertue à turquifier le passé ottoman. Cela étant dit, il est vrai que les Arméniens et les musulmans turcophones de l’empire avaient des liens de proximité et de familiarité, telle la langue turque très usitée par les Arméniens. Commun aussi aux « Turcs » et aux Arméniens, un profond ancrage dans le territoire anatolien où bon nombre d’Arméniens sont aussi de simples paysans. Même à Istanbul, le profil de l’Arménien moyen se rapproche beaucoup de celui des musulmans.

L’élite ottomane se plaisait à appeler les Arméniens millet-i sadıka, la « nation fidèle ». Venimeux et cynique compliment qui résume la dimension tragique du sort des Arméniens ottomans. Une population dont l’écrasante majorité ne voulait pas concevoir son avenir en dehors de l’empire, mais qui finit par être accusée de tous les maux d’un système en déliquescence.

Les Lumières ont-elles joué un rôle d’accélérateur des tensions ?

Disons plutôt qu’une certaine forme de modernité, dérivée des transformations politiques et idéologiques de l’Europe, a fortement influencé l’Etat et la société ottomans au XIX^e siècle, notamment à travers l’occidentalisation du système. L’impact de cette modernité a été ambivalent. D’une part, un aspect positif : une forme de rationalisation de la politique, une plus grande intégration avec le monde extérieur, une émancipation progressive de la société et notamment des non-musulmans. D’autre part, le revers de la médaille : l’écart se creuse entre les « modernes » et les autres, entre l’élite et les laissés-pour-compte.

Dans le cas des Arméniens, mais aussi des autres communautés non musulmanes, cette ambivalence est assez visible. Les réformes créent un système qui, sans être constitutionnel ou parlementaire, s’ouvre à un certain degré de participation et de représentation au profit des non-musulmans. Mais le système bloque sur la notion d’égalité entre musulmans et non-musulmans. Le principe de base est l’équité, qui permet de traiter les autres avec justice sans pour autant les considérer comme des égaux.

C’est malheureusement encore comme cela que la société turque fonctionne aujourd’hui. Cela explique que, bien qu’aucun texte ne l’interdise, il est pratiquement impossible à un non-musulman d’accéder à un poste dans l’armée ou dans la fonction publique en dehors des secteurs « secondaires », comme l’université.

Au XIX^e siècle, l’élite et les classes moyennes arméniennes se développent rapidement, mais, si ce développement se traduit par des acquis sociaux, culturels et économiques, les droits politiques ne suivent pas au même train et il en découle des frustrations et des tensions importantes. Celles-ci, combinées avec la montée du nationalisme et la faillite de l’empire, ont fini par créer un mélange explosif.

L’Europe en général et la France en particulier ont exprimé, dès le XIX^e siècle, leur sympathie envers les Arméniens mais aussi leur soutien à l’intégrité de l’Empire ottoman. Pouvait-on concilier ces deux positions ?

Il suffit d’observer l’Europe et le Moyen-Orient aujourd’hui pour voir à quel point la realpolitik et les politiques humanitaires peuvent se retrouver en porte-à-faux. Les Arméniens ottomans ne bénéficiaient d’aucun véritable soutien international au-delà de quelques vœux pieux de réforme prononcés après le congrès de Berlin de 1878 et d’une vague de compassion après que les massacres eurent pris de l’ampleur dans les années 1890.

Considérez-vous que les origines du génocide de 1915 remontent au XIX^e siècle avec les massacres de 1894-1896 ?

Les massacres du règne d’Abdülhamid II [sultan de 1876 à 1909] constituent un tournant décisif. Il s’agit du passage des massacres « à l’ancienne » – localisés, sporadiques – aux massacres « modernes », provoqués, organisés, et de toute évidence commandités par le souverain. Sous Abdülhamid II, le massacre devient l’instrument d’un terrorisme d’Etat dirigé contre toute une communauté. Dès lors, il paraît impossible de ne pas faire un lien entre le caractère particulièrement systématique de cette vague de violence et la politique d’annihilation et de destruction que mettront en place les Jeunes-Turcs.

Lire aussi : Istanbul ou le silence du génocide

 

Vous avez été l’un des artisans de la première conférence sur le génocide des Arméniens organisée sur le sol turc en 2005. Le négationnisme d’Etat est-il indéboulonnable en Turquie ?

Le négationnisme est renforcé par près d’un siècle d’endoctrinement. Au moins trois générations ont grandi dans une sorte de vase clos, nourries d’un discours combinant déni et victimisation. Ce « gel » de l’Histoire rend la confrontation d’autant plus pénible aujourd’hui dans un pays où le nationalisme fait partie de la culture de masse. Un gouvernement osant aller dans ce sens serait assuré d’une perte massive de voix [aux élections]. Pourtant, les choses ont bougé, notamment sous le gouvernement actuel. Un seuil a été franchi après la conférence de 2005 : il est désormais possible de parler et de publier à ce sujet, et le discours officiel s’est transformé pour inclure un brin d’empathie et reconnaître la souffrance de l’autre. Rappelons aussi que certains acteurs politiques, notamment kurdes, parlent ouvertement de reconnaissance du génocide.

Cette historiographie marginale que vous incarnez, à propos de 1915, va-t-elle prendre le pas sur le discours négationniste officiel ?

Le problème est beaucoup plus vaste et profond. L’exploitation et la manipulation de l’histoire à des fins politiques sont à la base de l’idéologie et de la politique turques depuis environ un siècle. Du point de vue de l’historien, le négationnisme officiel rejoint d’une part le mythe kémaliste des années 1930 de « nos ancêtres les Hittites », qui voulait que toutes les populations anatoliennes fussent turques et, d’autre part, les fantaisies néo-ottomanistes du gouvernement actuel, qui prétendent établir une continuité nationale entre le passé ottoman et le présent. C’est ce qui m’a fait écrire récemment qu’il fallait « sauver l’histoire ottomane des Turcs ».

Même si je reconnais de très sérieux progrès pendant ces deux dernières décennies, il me semble que, tant que l’histoire restera otage de la politique et du populisme, la « bonne » histoire aura beaucoup de mal à sortir de cette marginalité. Le véritable défi est de faire de « l’histoire solide » qui puisse se prêter à de la bonne vulgarisation sur ce sujet qui lui échappe encore. Nous n’y sommes pas encore, mais ce que j’observe au sein d’une jeune génération de chercheurs me donne de l’espoir.

Croyez-vous qu’un jour la Turquie reconnaîtra le génocide des Arméniens ?

Ma réponse précédente traduit mon ambivalence à ce sujet.

Gaïdz Minassian

Journaliste au Monde

LINK:  http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/04/22/pour-les-turcs-reconnaitre-le-genocide-est-une-trahison_4620613_3214.htm 

Las tribulaciones de Juan Goytisolo y sus reiteradas incoherencias

No me gustó el discurso de Juan Goytisolo

FERNANDO ARAMBURU | 24/04/2015 

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Juan Goytisolo junto a los Reyes tras recibir el Premio Cervantes. Foto: Sergio Enríquez-Nistal.

Le concedieron el Premio Cervantes a Juan Goytisolo. Bien. Ha escrito, ha trabajado, ha reflexionado, forma parte de nuestra educación llamémosla intelectual. Merece un reconocimiento. Su discurso no me gustó, tampoco las maneras. Pero hay algo peor: la falta de coherencia y, quizá, quizá, de sinceridad.

Un escritor que se define como estepario y después postula la intervención del intelectual en los asuntos de la sociedad incurre en una cruda contradicción. O estás en la estepa o estás en la urbe. Esta contradicción es de naturaleza menor; pero, en el caso de Juan Goytisolo, es una de tantas.

He visto en Twitter el recorte de periódico donde figuraba la pomposa declaración de Goytisolo, formulada a principios de este siglo, según la cual jamás aceptaría el premio que recibió ayer, cosa que estaría dispuesto a asentar por escrito ante un notario. Una bravuconada, como se ve, que no pasó a mayores.

Gusta Goytisolo de repetir, no sin cierta escasez de matices, que el escritor debe intervenir en la realidad. Yo, que también resido en el extranjero, me pregunto cuál es la realidad de un escritor que vive en Marruecos. Y también me pregunto si el referido escritor no podría intervenir en forma crítica en la realidad que lo rodea o que le es físicamente más cercana, en la cual, por cierto, se dispensa un trato vejatorio a las mujeres, a los homosexuales (él, declaradamente, lo es) y no hay libertad de opinión y, al menor desliz, lo espera a uno la cárcel, el látigo y cosas peores.

Es más fácil y menos peligroso indignarse en España y, sobre todo, contra España. Hay quien ha celebrado que Juan Goytisolo "enfadara" (sic) al PP, hazaña humilde donde las haya. ¿Esa es la tarea de un escritor español actual? ¿De un escritor, por añadidura, premiado? ¿Cobrar 125.000 euros (que supongo gravarán en Marruecos) y denunciar los recortes sociales y los desahucios? ¿Dar la mano al Rey con cara de dolor de muelas? ¿Someterse al rito pero hacer como que no, negándole el saludo, no sé, al adversario ideológico en quien recae actualmente la responsabilidad de conceder el premio? Si no das la mano, ¿a qué vas? ¿A protagonizar portadas de prensa y cobrar?

¿Con qué derecho puede un ciudadano condecorarse con el título de cervantino y a continuación señalar con el dedo a los que no merecen dicho honor? ¿Qué convicción permite vincular a Cervantes con Podemos?

Mi conclusión personal: no hay cosa más rancia y conservadora que la queja incesante. Y la queja es queja aunque el quejumbroso la embadurne de pomada contestataria. Estoy con Canetti: quien se queja, expresa que merece más y mejores cosas. Y estoy con Camus: di no a lo que te indigne, te irrite, te parezca injusto, pero no olvides decir a continuación sí, esto es, no olvides contribuir con algún elemento positivo. Si no, ¿qué has aportado? ¿Qué se puede aprender de ti, de tu trabajo, de tu quejumbre?
 


Link  http://www.elcultural.com/noticias/letras/No-me-gusto-el-discurso-de-Juan-Goytisolo/7707

A survey of Southeast Asia Geopolitical Trends

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 21
THE REGION: Geopolitical Overview

Three broad geopolitical trends will bear watching in the months ahead.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119614
monitor@iseas.edu.sg | www.iseas.edu.sg



First, ample supplies and slowing global economic growth will keep oil and commodity prices
relatively low. The longer-term geopolitical implications remain difficult to gauge, but in the short
term low prices should be net positive for Southeast Asia, and the region should be able to keep
inflationary pressures at bay. These positive effects will promote political stability in uncertain
times.
Second, ASEAN’s role will be tempered as developments in other parts of the world continue to
occupy key ASEAN Dialogue Partners. Attention to the region on the part of the United States, the
European Union, Japan and China will not decline abruptly. But the tense situation in the Ukraine,
the unfolding Greek bail-out drama and the ongoing war with the Islamic State will distract the US
and EU from their engagement with ASEAN members, regionally and bilaterally. ASEAN can
expect even lower-key participation at its meetings this year from a Russia that is concerned with
issues closer to home. Instability in international financial markets may also affect the push for
stronger financial integration in the region, depending on how Greece’s debts are resolved.
Strategically, ASEAN continues to face the challenge of reaching agreement with China—and
among its members—on a binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 2

Third, terrorism may strike closer to Asia. The beheading of two Japanese hostages, the first Asian
hostages taken by the Islamic State, came close on the heels of the Charlie Hebdo murders. These
events, followed by further brutal executions, the Copenhagen shootings and the North Carolina
killings, signal to Southeast Asian countries their vulnerability to “violent extremism”, which
ASEAN members have collectively and publicly condemned. The co-existence of multiple ethnic
and religious communities in Southeast Asia requires delicately calibrating responses that do not
add to the conflation of extremism and religion and thus lead to hate speech and crimes.
Key Points: Low commodity prices, international partners’ focus on other parts of the world and
the threat of terrorism will frame Southeast Asia’s place in geopolitics in the months ahead.

THE REGION: Economic Overview

Oil prices rose slightly in February after plunging nearly 60 percent between June 2014 and January
2015. According to credit ratings agency Moody’s, such low prices will not boost global growth, as
some expect, largely because of economic woes in the Eurozone, Russia and China. In a bid to
revive the Eurozone economy, the European Central Bank unleashed a €1.1 trillion quantitative
easing plan that will see it inject €60 billion a month into financial markets until September 2016.
Nevertheless, fears of a Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone and the crisis in Ukraine might
frustrate hopes for such a revival. In the United States, a Reuters poll of 82 economists has forecast
a buoyant GDP growth rate of 3.2 percent for 2015. Yet US manufacturing activity grew at its
slowest pace in eleven months in January; and the Institute of Supply Management manufacturing
purchasing managers’ index (PMI) fell from 55.5 in December to 53.5 in the same month.
China’s economy grew just 7.4 percent in 2014 – its lowest rate in 24 years – just missing the
official 7.5 percent target. If this slow growth in China continues, it could stifle Southeast Asia’s
closely linked economies this year. Additionally, China’s official PMI fell to 49.8 in January,
contracting for the first time in over two years, despite the expected business spike before the
Chinese New Year. Its Asian rivals – India and Japan – are faring better. India has surpassed China
as the world’s fastest-growing economy. Using a new methodology, it recorded a GDP growth of
7.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014, compared to China’s 7.3 per cent. Spurred by cheap oil
and a weak yen, Japan seems to be on a trend of modest recovery. Its economy is expected to grow
by an annualized rate of 2.1 percent this quarter. According to Markit/JMMA, Japan’s
manufacturing PMI showed solid growth in January at 52.2, slightly higher than December’s 52.0
reading.

Economic data from Southeast Asia appear mixed. Singapore’s PMI was a disappointing 49.9 in
January, a tepid increase following December’s 49.6 reading. Its economy grew 2.9 per cent in
2014, slightly faster than a previous 2.8 percent estimate, but slower than the 4.4 percent growth
rate achieved in 2013. In Indonesia, the economy grew by 5.02 percent in 2014 – a five-year low –
although a modest rebound in the fourth quarter suggests that the slowdown has bottomed out.

Despite the oil slump, Malaysia’s economy grew by 5.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014,
strengthened by its construction and manufacturing industries. However, private-sector economists
remain pessimistic about the country’s performance in 2015, because of falling palm oil exports and
persistently low oil prices. The Philippines’ economic forecast for 2015 is bright, with the Asian
Development Bank expecting the economy to grow by 6.4 percent.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 4
Real GDP Growth in Southeast Asia and Selected Asian and Developed Economies (year-onyear
percentage changes)

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.
Key Points: The economic prospects for Southeast Asia in the first half of 2015 are uncertain, as
the global effects of Europe’s troubles and the oil slump continue to unfold. Nevertheless, China’s
slowdown is likely to hold the economies of Southeast Asia back because of their strong business
and trade ties to that large neighbouring economy.


ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 5

CAMBODIA

In the next two months, blatant and less obvious repression on the part of the ruling Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP) is likely to dominate Cambodian politics. The party will seek to intimidate the
opposition, its supporters and various land-eviction activists. The opposition Cambodia National
Rescue Party may, out of fear that some of its lawmakers will be prosecuted on charges of
insurrection in the wake of protests over the July 2013 election, adopt a position of restraint.
Refraining from offering strong criticisms of the CPP, it will face mounting frustration among party
activists, victims of land grabs and NGOs. It remains to be seen if foreign donors will respond to the
deterioration of Cambodia’s fledgling democracy.

The CPP’s agenda is likely to include the continued imprisonment of eleven anti-eviction activists
despite rising popular pressure for their release. Keeping these activists behind bars serves to warn
others against mounting protests. At the same time, the government will continue to crack down on
nodes of anti-eviction activism, such as the Buddhist pagodas that are housing activists, including
monks. However, this approach will not address the root causes of anti-government protests. It will,
rather, increase grievances and further undermine the CPP’s legitimacy.

On the economic front, the garment sector may well contract in 2015. Many factories have already
reacted to decreasing orders by reducing overtime shifts. Factory closures and layoffs may begin to
hit the sector. The decline in one of the country’s main economic drivers will significantly affect
overall growth prospects. The garment industry employs some 600,000 workers, contributing some
80 percent of Cambodia’s total exports and representing a third of its GDP.
Key Points: CPP-led political repression will soften opposition to the government, at least
temporarily. Prospects for the garment sector are gloomy.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 6
INDONESIA
In January, parliament passed a law that effectively reinstated the direct popular election of regional
leaders. This victory for the governing coalition was due at least in part to the intense lobbying
efforts of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and current President Joko Widodo
(Jokowi).
Jokowi named Budi Gunawan, former President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s sometime adjutant, as the
sole candidate for parliamentary endorsement as national police chief. This nomination precipitated
a crisis when the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) named Budi a corruption suspect. In
what many believed to be a retaliation, the police then turned on the four members of the KPK.
They arrested one of the agency’s deputy chairman, Bambang Widjojanto, on charges—already
dismissed—of perjury allegedly committed in 2010 and accused KPK chairman Abraham Samad of
violating the agency’s code of ethics by discussing his chances to become Jokowi’s vice president
during last year’s election campaign and of falsifying documents. Deputy chairman Adnan Pandu
Praja has also been accused of mishandling company shares in 2006, while deputy chairman
Zulkarnain is being investigated for receiving bribes in 2009, following allegations made by a
prosecuted swindler. Concerns continue to mount, as the court recently ruled that KPK charges
against Budi Gunawan were unlawful. While Jokowi withdrew Budi’s nomination as police chief,
this conflict involved unprecedented organised attacks on the KPK. It has also highlighted the fact
that networks of corruption remain very powerful in Indonesia.
The revision of the 2015 state budget (RAPBN-P) has shown that the reduction in energy subsidies
has allowed the government to reallocate spending to infrastructure and social protection. However,
the slowdown in global economic growth, the decline in commodity prices and the anticipated end
of quantitative easing in the United States may have negative effects on the domestic economy.
Demand for exports and government revenues may fall, and the rate of inflation may rise. Although
monetary policy remains tight, it is quite possible that the central bank will consider adjustments
during the second quarter, in order to strengthen domestic demand.
Key Points: The conflict between the KPK and the police has tested Jokowi’s decisiveness and
eroded public confidence in him. He needs to prove himself more capable of managing diverse
political interests while pressing forward with his programmes.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 7

MALAYSIA

The conviction on sodomy charges and resultant five-year prison sentencing of Anwar Ibrahim, the
de facto leader of the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition, followed almost immediately by the death of
Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the spiritual advisor of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), could
further diminish the opposition coalition’s already fraying unity. In the past, when disagreements
and differences—especially between the Islamist PAS and the secular Democratic Action Party
(DAP)—arose, Anwar had acted as the mediator. Also, Nik Aziz was instrumental in preventing
PAS from falling under the control of its ulama faction, which favours aligning the party with the
ruling United Malays National Party (UMNO) to form a “unity government”.

With Nik Aziz’s death, UMNO is likely to step up its efforts to entice the PAS ulama faction to
form such a government. Several PAS leaders in Kelantan have called for a special meeting of the
State Assembly on March 16-19 to amend the Shariah Criminal Code (II) Enactment, Kelantan,
1993. If a vote on the amendment is taken, the amendment will almost certainly be passed
unanimously, with the support of UMNO’s state assemblymen.

This vote will lead the DAP, which is strongly against the implementation of shariah law in
Kelantan, to review its position in the PR. It will consider leaving the opposition coalition. The Parti
Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) will probably remain in some form of coalition with PAS while also
aligning with DAP in a separate alliance. UMNO’s declaration that it will not contest against PAS
in the Cempaka state by-election further shows its strategy to co-opt the pro-unity government
faction in PAS. On the other hand, UMNO will put up a candidate against PKR’s likely candidate
Nurul Huda, Anwar’s second daughter, in the Permatang Pauh parliamentary by-election. She
should clinch a comfortable win.

Prime Minister Najib Razak’s problem with 1Malaysia Development Berhad’s financial distress
will persist, as the company may need a further cash injection of RM3 billion before its financial
year closes on 31 March.

Key Points: PAS’s annual congress, scheduled for June, will witness a major showdown between
the faction that wants to remain in the PR coalition and the faction that wants to align the party with
UMNO. Malaysia may face a downgrade in its credit-rating if it appears unable to tackle its fiscal
deficit and if the Goods and Services Tax, effective from 1 April, causes a significant dip in
consumer spending.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 8


MYANMAR

President Thein Sein’s approval of a law allowing a referendum on constitutional change has
important implications for the elections due in late 2015. However, the details of the referendum are
still unknown, and there has been no mention of the clauses of the constitution that voters will be
asked to consider. Also, while it has been suggested that the referendum will take place in May,
there are doubts as to whether this is logistically possible. If it does not take place before the
elections, slated for October, Aung San Suu Kyi will be out of the running for the post of president.
In the meantime, relations between Myanmar and China are in flux. Last year, the US$20 billion
railroad project to connect Yunnan and the Bay of Bengal was cancelled. The Myitsone dam,
suspended in 2011 by the president, is being revisited and will be the subject of intense negotiations
between Naypyitaw and Beijing. Recently, Burmese authorities also detained 155 Chinese nationals
for illegal logging.

Nevertheless, Chinese FDI dominates investment in Myanmar, and the two governments have
continued with their development plans. They have signed a contract to build rice mills in
Myanmar, complementing a trade agreement that will legalise the shipment of Myanmar rice to
China, previously illegal under Chinese regulations.

Key Points: The proposed referendum brings hope for constitutional change. While the government
will be cautious about its scale and scope, the referendum will offer an excellent opportunity to
gauge the opinions of “ordinary” people in Myanmar. China will continue to dominate Myanmar’s
export sector and foreign direct investment in the country, but Myanmar will try to juggle domestic
concerns and geopolitical strategy. Its government must attend to domestic consumers and its
electoral popularity and to the need to balance China’s influence with that of other countries.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 9.

THE PHILIPPINES

The 25 January massacre of 44 Philippine police officers in a clash with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Moro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Mamasapano
town, Maguindanao province, may have dealt a deathblow to the ongoing peace process between
the former group and the Manila government. The police pursued and succeeded in killing a leading
Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist, the Malaysian known as “Marwan”, in MILF-controlled territory.
This single largest loss of life ever suffered by the Philippine National Police came at a sensitive
period in the peace process. The Senate and House of Representatives are deliberating the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, the law that is to put into legal force the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro signed with great fanfare in March 2014. If the Basic Law is not passed by the end of
the congressional session that ends on 20 March, it is likely to be too late to hold the inaugural
Bangsamoro elections currently scheduled to coincide with the end of President Benigno Aquino’s
single presidential term in May 2016.

The massacre and the recriminations between the government and the MILF that followed it have
seriously delayed these legislative deliberations and eroded political and popular support for the
Basic Law and for the peace process between the government and the MILF. The passage of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law is now much less likely.

Muslim Mindanao has witnessed many peace processes and peace deals, which have offered many
false dawns followed by the resumption of low-intensity conflict in one of the poorest and the most
mineral-rich areas of the Philippines. The 25 January massacre and its continuing political fallout
risk bringing a repetition of this history. The months ahead will determine whether history does
indeed repeat itself.

Key points: The fall-out from the Mamasapano massacre may damage prospects for peace in
Mindanao and thus jeopardize one of the central achievements of the second President Aquino.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 10

SINGAPORE

Singapore has passed a Liquor Control (Supply and Consumption) Bill, which will come into force
in April 2015. It makes alcohol consumption in public areas illegal from 10.30 p.m. to 7.00 a.m. and
bans alcohol sales in retail shops after 10.30 p.m. Additional regulations will apply in two areas
designated Liquor Control Zones. Although a government-commissioned consultation process
indicated support for these measures, there have been concerns about their effect on small
businesses that sell alcohol and on youth and tourists who congregate at certain open areas.

An incident during a Hindu Thaipusam festival procession has awakened questions of religious
expression in the country. Three men were stopped from illegally playing drums at the procession.
This incident sparked a debate over why religious music was banned in the first place and why
Thaipusam could not be reinstated as a public holiday, as it was designated until 1968. Officials
explained that it was necessary to maintain peace and orderliness during the procession and that
each religious group had public holidays recognizing its faith. Race and religion remain highly
sensitive topics in Singapore, but public debate on the management of diversity has increased; the
government tried to engage the country’s Hindus in explaining its position during the recent debate
over Thaipusam.

The Aljunied-Hougang-Punggol East Town Council (AHEPTC), under the management of the
opposition Worker’s Party, was lambasted for poor management and accounting lapses, following
an audit conducted by the Auditor-General’s Office. This adds further pressure on opposition
parties to manage their activities and responsibilities well and to show themselves worthy
contenders in the general elections to be held before January 2017. The prime minister
acknowledged in an interview the public desire for alternative views and said that parliament would
not be composed exclusively of PAP MPs. But he cautioned that opposition members should be
competent enough both to act as a check on the government and to manage operations on the
ground, implicitly referring to the AHEPTC case.

The Prevent of Corruption Act is being reviewed and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
will be increase its manpower by twenty percent, as the government commits itself to internal and
external checks and balances and seeks to prevent lapses.

ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 11
Key Points: Discussions of racial and religious differences in Singapore society have become more
open, and the role of opposition parties in national life will continue to become clearer.

THAILAND

During the tenth and eleventh full months of its rule, Thailand’s National Council for Peace and
Order (NCPO) junta is unlikely to lift martial law, which it considers fundamental to its control of
the country pending the promulgation of a new constitution. Surveillance of the Internet will
continue and perhaps intensify. Abuses of legal and human rights in conflicts over land and natural
resources are likely to mount. Mid-March will see the courts decide whether criminal proceedings
against former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in connection with her government’s rice
policies are to go ahead. While isolated and small, anti-dictatorship protests on the part of students
will continue to break out sporadically.

Whether they gain momentum and, if so, how the government of General Prayuth Chan-ocha reacts
to them will merit attention. So, too, will increasingly open rifts within the Buddhist Sangha, a
reflection of the depth of Thailand’s current ideological and institutional crisis.
The junta-appointed Constitution Drafting Committee may complete work on its Chitty-Chitty-
Bang-Bang charter in April. It remains to be seen whether convoluted provisions on parties,
candidates, campaigning and elections will come under criticism for their unworkable and antidemocratic nature.

Anticipated provisions mandating processes of “reconciliation” and “reform”
will serve either as means to check the will of Thai voters, as devices for continued military
domination of politics, as the basis of utopian fantasies of clean government or as some
combination of the three.

On the economic front, consumers’ willingness to put aside concerns about household debt and to
spend, along with the export sector and the pump-priming effects of government disbursements,
bear watching. These indicators will determine whether Thailand is on course to grow at the rate of
between 3.5 and 4.5 percent forecast for 2015 by the National Economic and Social Development
Board. Popular dissatisfaction over pocket-book issues in urban areas counts as the junta’s greatest
worry.

NCPO plans for infrastructure spending have emerged as an arena of Sino-Japanese competition for
influence in Thailand. And its efforts to induce foreign governments to restrict the activities of
Thais overseas accused of lèse majesté will continue to come to naught.
Key Points: Praetorian rule and repression will deepen. Details of the draft constitution will make
ever clearer the future for Thailand envisaged by the NCPO junta. The risk of urban discontent over
pocket-book issues remains that junta’s most significant vulnerability.








ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 12

VIETNAM

Mystery and intrigue may be keywords for 2015. It will be the last year before the next national
party congress of Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), held every five years to set political and
economic directions and to fill positions at the top of the political system. The year before a
congress is typically characterized by jostling for power among members of the political elite, as
well as the occasional revelation—orchestrated by rival factions to damage their opponents—of
corruption scandals. It also brings an even more than usually restrictive environment for activists
and critics of the state. Competition this year may be more cutthroat, and the opportunity for major
changes greater than ever, as 10 of 16 Politburo members are set to retire.

The Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the VCP in January held an unprecedented vote of
confidence in Politburo members. Domestic media were able to acknowledge that the vote took
place, but no results were made public. The blog “Chân dung Quyền lực” posted unconfirmed
results showing that both Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng and his rival President Trương Tấn
Sang scored the most “high confidence” votes, but that blog is rumoured to be operated by allies of
the prime minister. Furthermore, as with re-instated confidence votes in the National Assembly, the
impetus for the vote, its conduct and the significance of voting criteria remain unclear.
While the economy grew by 6.78 percent in the last quarter of 2014, the government’s intention to
tackle the troubled state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector is a matter of doubt. Hanoi plans to equitize
532 SOEs before the end of 2015, but in 2014 it managed to equitize only 143 of the more than 400
ISEAS MONITOR | A BI-MONTHLY SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA | ISSUE : 2015 No. 2 13

INDICADORES ECONOMICOS

Si no visualiza correctamente este mensaje haga clic aquí Este mensaje ha sido enviado por El Economista en nombre de Corporativo GBM

eBook Indicadores Económicos por Iván Barona En esta entrega analizaremos los principales Indicadores Económicos de Estados Unidos. Conoceremos su relevancia y las características que los hacen una herramienta vital, no sólo para los inversionistas sino para todos los agentes económicos. Descarga el ebook GRATIS Algunas características que debemos tener en cuenta para la interpretación de los mismos están: • Exactitud • Inmediatez • Ciclo Económico • Predictibilidad • Grado de Interés. Entre las grandes divisiones que abarcan los reportes económicos que estudiaremos están: • Empleo • Gasto y Confianza • Producción e Inventarios • Vivienda y Construcción • Reserva Federal • Comercio Internacional y Precios • Productividad y Salarios. ¡Esperamos que sea de utilidad y que mejore tus estrategias de inversión! Descarga el ebook GRATIS             www.gbmhomebroker.com

Recuerde que este boletín es un servicio gratuito de El Economista, fue enviado a dajabosa01@hotmail.com si desea Des-Suscribirse favor de ir a: DES-SUSCRIBIRSE

La reprise économique donne quelques signes de s´affirmer dans les économies les plus développées.

Le Japon en excédent commercial pour la première fois en trois ans

Le Monde.fr avec AFP/ 22.04.2015

L'économie japonaise a repris des couleurs en mars, a annoncé le ministère des finances, mercredi 22 avril. Pour la première fois depuis 2012, le pays a en effet enregistré un solde commercial positif, porté par la chute des prix du pétrole et la vigueur des exportations.

En mars, les achats de pétrole ont plongé de 51 % et ceux de produits pétroliers de 38 %. La facture de gaz naturel liquéfié s'est également réduite (– 12 %). Au total, les importations ont reculé de 14,5 % en valeur sur la période.

Dans le même temps, les exportations ont progressé de 8,5 % à 6 927 milliards de yens, portées par les machines diverses, les semi-conducteurs et les automobiles. Elles ont également bénéficié de l'affaiblissement du yen, qui gonfle mécaniquement les recettes encaissées à l'étranger une fois converties en devise nippone. Ce résultat positif à 228 milliards de yens (1,8 milliard d'euros) est bien meilleur que les attentes des économistes, qui anticipaient un excédent de seulement 45 milliards de yens.

Bonne nouvelle pour Abe

Ce premier excédent mensuel en près de trois ans est une bonne nouvelle pour le premier ministre, Shinzo Abe, et le gouverneur de la banque centrale, Haruhiko Kuroda, une semaine après un rapport encourageant du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) qui projette une croissance de 1 % cette année. Depuis deux ans, les deux hommes tentent, en vain, d'anéantir la déflation et de relancer une économie fragilisée par le passage à une TVA de 8 % (contre 5 % auparavant) l'an passé.

L'extrême fragilité de l'économie nippone est héritée de la catastrophe de Fukushima en 2011 quand, pour la première fois en trente et un ans, l'ensemble des réacteurs nucléaires japonais avaient été arrêtés, obligeant le Japon à augmenter considérablement ses achats d'hydrocarbures pour faire tourner les centrales thermiques.

En savoir plus sur 

http://www.lemonde.fr/japon/article/2015/04/22/le-japon-en-excedent-commercial-pour-la-premiere-fois-en-trois-ans_4620257_1492975.html#Y4heKD8eFLsa8R5R.99

La explosión de la corrupción en Chile

Chile y la corrupción política

Infolatam
Madrid, 19 abril 2015
Por Carlos Malamud

No es mucho pedir

Según el Latinobarómetro 2013, la última edición disponible, la corrupción ocupaba el tercer lugar junto a la economía (6% de los encuestados) entre los problemas más importantes de la región, detrás de la seguridad pública (24%) y el desempleo (16%). Entonces, las repercusiones de la corrupción todavía no habían alcanzado su magnitud actual, a tal punto que sólo en Costa Rica (con un 20% de las opiniones) era considerado el principal problema nacional.

Las variaciones de un país a otro son enormes. Detrás de Costa Rica está Honduras con un 11%, acompañado por Brasil y Colombia, donde un 10% de los encuestados creía que era el principal problema. Chile, con un honroso 1%, cerraba la lista. Será interesante conocer los datos de 2014, medidos en el último trimestre, para ver cómo han evolucionado tras el agravamiento de la situación.

El Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción (IPC) de Transparencia Internacional muestra no sólo el lugar de cada país, sobre 175, sino también la ubicación relativa de América Latina, bastante rezagada en la clasificación, especialmente si se la compara con los países más desarrollados. Sólo tres países latinoamericanos superan los 50 puntos, mientras la gran mayoría tiene menos de 40, un claro suspenso (100 equivale a ausencia de corrupción y 0 a corrupción absoluta).

Los países con menor percepción de corrupción son Chile y Uruguay que ocupan el lugar 21º con 73 puntos. Siguen Costa Rica, 47º, 54; Cuba, 63º, 46; y Brasil, 69º, 43. Por debajo de 40 puntos están El Salvador, 80º, 39; Perú, 85º, 38; Colombia y Panamá, 94º, 37; Bolivia y México, 103º, 35; Argentina, 107º, 34; Ecuador, 110, 33º; Guatemala y República Dominicana, 115º, 32; Honduras, 126º, 29; Nicaragua, 133º, 28; Paraguay, 150º, 24; y cierra la lista Venezuela, 161º, 19.

En el caso concreto de Chile, tanto el Latinobarómetro como el IPC de Transparencia Internacional muestran claramente el estado de la opinión pública al respecto. Hasta entonces, para una amplia mayoría de chilenos la corrupción no había sido un problema preocupante. En líneas generales, con las debidas excepciones y a diferencia de la mayor parte de sus vecinos, creían en la solvencia y la palabra de sus políticos y empresarios.

Sin embargo, el estallido del llamado “caso Penta” los sumió en lo que terminaría siendo una verdadera pesadilla. Fue tal su gravedad que enseguida los medios comenzaron a hablar del mayor escándalo de corrupción de la historia chilena. Lo que se inició como un caso claro de evasión de impuestos por parte de un holding empresarial se convirtió en octubre de 2014 en un escándalo político de dimensiones incalculables que afectó a la derechista UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente), acusada de haber financiado sus campañas con dinero de Penta.

Desde las filas oficialistas se cargaron las tintas en la denuncia de algo que pensaban no podía afectarlos. El presidente del Partido Socialista (PS), Osvaldo Andrade, señaló: “Me causa extrañeza que se produzca tanta sorpresa por estas cosas. Hace muchos años que el grupo Penta y la UDI son fácilmente confundibles”. 

Esto era así hasta que otro escándalo, conocido como Caval, golpeó de lleno a la presidente Bachelet, al afectar directamente a su hijo y su nuera, acusados de enriquecerse en operaciones inmobiliarias gracias al manejo de información privilegiada y tráfico de influencias.

Pero esto no fue todo. Por si faltaban sorpresas, finalmente detonó un nuevo escándalo de financiación política, el SQM o Soquimich, donde se veían involucrados el yerno de Augusto Pinochet y políticos del oficialismo, otrora enfrentados en la lucha antidictatorial. Estaban, pues, todos los ingredientes servidos para que el prestigio de los políticos se desplomara, comenzando por la presidente, que cayó al 31% de aprobación a fines de marzo pasado.

Pese a no estar implicada directamente en ningún caso, la escasa aprobación de Bachelet es una de las más bajas de la reciente etapa democrática chilena, sólo superada por Sebastián Piñera. Según una encuesta de Plaza Pública, el 60% de los chilenos desaprueba la forma como Bachelet conduce su gobierno, el 70% cree que en Chile hay mucha corrupción, especialmente en los partidos políticos (76%), en el Congreso (67%), en las grandes empresas privadas (60%) y en el Gobierno (57%).

Prácticamente toda la clase política chilena se ha visto sumida en el desconcierto. De este modo no logra articular las respuestas adecuadas para enfrentar la corrupción, un fenómeno que va más allá de la financiación de los partidos y las campañas electorales. La presidente ha creado una comisión de notables para afrontar el problema e impulsa una reforma constitucional para endurecer las penas contra los delitos vinculados a la corrupción, aunque de momento sin resultados apreciables que convenzan a una opinión pública totalmente descreída.

Pero, como apunta Carlos Huneeus, el problema es mucho más complejo y tiene que ver con la forma en que los partidos de la Concertación se plantearon la reconstrucción de la democracia tras el fin de la dictadura de Pinochet y cómo trataron a los grandes empresarios. A esto se añade un hecho decisivo y es que un país como Chile, con sus aspiraciones modernizadoras, no puede seguir funcionando con una Constitución heredada de la dictadura , pese a las reformas introducidas. Para ello hace falta un amplio consenso político y parlamentario, huyendo de falsas salidas como la de convocar una Asamblea Constituyente. Esto último requiere asumir claramente los problemas sociales del momento. Como bien señala Huneeus: “La clase dirigente tiene que entender que el problema son ellos y no la sociedad”.

Bachelet lanza reforma que dispone pérdida de cargos públicos por corrupción

Link Original:   http://www.infolatam.com/2015/04/19/chile-y-la-corrupcion-politica/

The Balkans again...?

Albania and Serbia Are at Odds Again

April 10, 2015

Summary

 

Political tension in the Western Balkans is running high again. On April 6, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama cautioned that his country would unify with Kosovo if the European Union failed to incorporate both countries into the continental bloc. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic was quick to respond, accusing Rama of fomenting instability in the region.

Albania and Serbia have a complex relationship because of ethnic tensions and overlapping territorial aspirations. Complicating things further, Albania supported Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence, while Serbia continues to resist its international recognition. Friction between Serbia and Albania will persist, but Albania's claims over Kosovo will remain rhetorical, and a more serious escalation is unlikely.

Analysis

 

During a joint interview with Kosovar Deputy Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, Rama brought up two options for unification between Albania and Kosovo. The first would be for both countries to join the European Union. Though Rama has said this is the option he supports, he mentioned a second possibility: uniting Albania and Kosovo into one country. Serbia, which still considers Kosovo a breakaway territory, rejected the idea. Belgrade does not realistically expect to recover Kosovo, but it still opposes any move that would unify the two largest ethnic Albanian communities. On April 8, a European Commission spokeswoman categorized Rama's statement as "provocative."

Tension between Albania and Serbia is not new. The resurrection of irredentist claims has long been a common feature of politics in the Western Balkans. In a region with such a complex geographic and ethnic landscape, where official borders do not match linguistic or religious ones, most countries hold centuries-old grudges and make territorial claims on others. This situation has often led to violence, with the wars of the 1990s as the most recent example.

A Difficult Relationship

 

As the Ottomans expanded their empire from Anatolia to the Balkans in the 14th century, Serbian and Albanian lands progressively fell under Turkish rule. The immigration of Muslims from elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire into the Balkans and the conversion of many locals created a disruptive patchwork of Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim populations. According to the 2011 census, almost two-thirds of Albania's population is Muslim. In Serbia, on the other hand, more than four-fifths of the people follow Eastern Orthodoxy.

 

When the Ottoman Empire started to crumble in the early 20th century, several Balkan states saw the opportunity to repel the Turks and to acquire territory from their neighbors. The First Balkan War (1912-1913), which was key for the expulsion of the Ottomans from the region, also resulted in conflicts among the Balkan states. During the war, Albania declared independence from the Ottomans but was invaded by Serbian troops; Belgrade saw the conflict as an opportunity to gain access to the Adriatic Sea. Although the Treaty of London recognized Albania's independence in 1913 — and Serbian troops eventually withdrew — the treaty also introduced territorial adjustments that left almost half the ethnic Albanian population outside the new country's borders.

Albanian irredentism already existed under Ottoman rule, but the Treaty of London gave it new life. In its current form, it includes claims to regions in neighboring Kosovo and western Macedonia in addition to small areas in southern Serbia, southern Montenegro and northwestern Greece. Notably, some of these claims overlap with nationalist agendas in Serbia, which envisions a "Greater Serbia" covering territories of modern-day Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and, in some of its variants, Albania.

 

The situation of Albanian minorities in the former Yugoslavia and later in Serbia has been an enduring source of conflict between Tirana, the capital of Albania, and Belgrade. Ethnic Albanians account for 90 percent of the population of Kosovo, which has traditionally been under Serbian control and whose political status is particularly contentious. In the 1990s, Tirana called on the international community to intercede and stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in collapsing Yugoslavia. At the same time, Belgrade accused Tirana of supporting separatist groups in Kosovo. The bilateral relationship became strained again in 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Albania subsequently recognized Kosovo's independence, a move that irritated Serbia's leadership.

 

Potential for Social Unrest

Over the past year, Albania and Serbia have alternated diplomatic gestures with the usual provocations. In November, Rama visited Vucic in Belgrade for the first meeting between the two countries' leaders since the late 1940s. However, an incident during an October soccer match between Albania and Serbia clouded the talks. The game was suspended after a small drone flew over the stadium carrying a "Greater Albania" flag, triggering an exchange of harsh words.

 

But despite intermittent tensions, the borders of the Western Balkans are unlikely to change anytime soon. For most Albanians, the idea of a Greater Albania has symbolic meaning linked to a broader sense of Albanian identity and solidarity with ethnic Albanians in the region. Most Albanian governments have used the idea of a Greater Albania for political reasons, but little to no concrete action has resulted from the rhetoric.

More important, Tirana's main allies oppose any of its territorial claims. Albania is a NATO member aspiring to join the European Union and is unlikely to make any moves that could seriously destabilize the region. Opinion polls show that EU accession is popular among Albanians, a factor that will continue to deter Tirana from making any unilateral moves to unify with Kosovo. Additionally, with Kosovo suffering through dire economic conditions, Tirana cannot afford to unify with a region facing high unemployment and poor economic prospects.
 

Serbia's case is similar. For political reasons, Belgrade cannot officially recognize Kosovo's independence. The Serbian government also understands, however, that it will not recover the lost territory anytime soon. In addition, the European Union considers the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo a crucial part of Belgrade's accession to the continental bloc. As a result, the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations primarily focus on the status of the Serbian minorities living in northern Kosovo.

 

However, Albania's relations with Kosovo could generate problems in the future. Albania is an ethnically homogeneous country, particularly when compared with neighboring Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though Albania is familiar with domestic political instability, ethnic-fueled tensions are rare. But volatility in Kosovo poses a risk to Albania for several reasons. First, the conflict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbians in Kosovo creates friction between Tirana and other regional players, most notably Serbia. Second, poor living conditions in Kosovo will force Albania to absorb increasing numbers of unemployed Kosovars over the long term. According to World Bank data, over 14 percent of Albanians live below the poverty line, creating the conditions for potential social unrest in Albania.

 

Pressuring the European Union

Though Rama's statements were mostly meant for a domestic audience, the Albanian government is using the idea of unification with Kosovo to pressure the European Union to speed up the accession process. Albania applied for EU membership in 2009, and the country formally became a candidate in 2014. Over the past decade, Tirana introduced several reforms to attract foreign investment, liberalize the economy and qualify for EU membership. The European Union is still demanding more reforms, however, especially with regard to corruption and organized crime.

 

More important, the European Union is currently suffering from "enlargement fatigue." After incorporating 12 new members between 2004 and 2007, the bloc has lost its appetite for new membership. The economic crisis has also led to a political crisis that complicates the accession of new countries. Croatia joined the European Union in 2013 but will be the last country to do so for a long time. Albania and Serbia are unlikely to join this decade. Kosovo, in the meantime, has long demanded visa-free access to the continental bloc. It was after seeing progress in negotiations drag that Tirana and Pristina threatened to pursue bilateral unification.

 

The overall popularity of EU accession within the Albanian establishment explains why Tirana will apply political pressure on the bloc without necessarily acting on the government's strong statements. However, Albania's negotiations with Brussels will drag out over many years, and a lack of progress could endanger this balance and lead to more regional instability.

What is really happening in Eastern Ukrania ?

Views of the Ukrainian Cease-Fire Diverge

April 13, 2015.-

Analysis

Ukraine began the week by renewing accusations that Russia-backed separatists have escalated attacks in eastern Ukraine significantly. According to Ukrainian officials, cease-fire violations in the Donetsk and Shyrokyne areas over the weekend were more intense than they had been in the past few weeks.

The second Minsk agreement was never fully implemented in eastern Ukraine; some weaponry that should have been withdrawn is still being used, Russian forces are still present, and cease-fire violations occur regularly. Nevertheless, a baseline pattern of activity had established itself. The events reported along the demarcation line in the past few days are not out of pattern. However, Ukraine had a particular interest in showing that Russia is unwilling to cooperate in the implementation of the full cease-fire agreement ahead of a foreign ministers' meeting as the peace process evolves.

Meanwhile, the United States has been making preparations for a controversial training operation in western Ukraine, with U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade forces stationed in Italy scheduled to begin training the Ukrainian national guard by April 20. Over the weekend, the first U.S. paratroopers and their equipment were deployed to the western Ukrainian city of Lviv; approximately 50 members of the brigade's support battalion rode in a convoy through Eastern Europe toward Ukraine to prepare for the trainers' actual deployment. The Russian government has raised little controversy over the arrival of the support forces and made few references to it.

That Russia did not use the arrival of the U.S. troops as occasion to launch accusations at NATO and Washington speaks to Moscow's immediate interests in Ukraine. Though Russian leaders have criticized NATO's growing presence in Eastern Europe, Moscow has indicated it is willing to allow the situation in eastern Ukraine to calm down. Moreover, though it is not necessarily going to great lengths to fully implement the second Minsk agreement, Moscow has kept activities in eastern Ukraine at a low enough level to avoid sparking a Ukrainian military reaction or compelling European countries to boost sanctions against Russia. Because Russia's economic challenges and the logistical difficulties of launching a wider campaign preclude significant escalation, the Kremlin's strategy is to keep the separatist regions as leverage in negotiations with Kiev.

However, even within NATO, some countries have shown markedly conciliatory positions regarding the fighting in eastern Ukraine. This divergence has highlighted the persistent political rift among NATO members about their strategies regarding Russia. Gen. Christophe Gomart, the head of France's military intelligence, said at a hearing in the country's parliament on March 25 that contrary to NATO reports, French military intelligence believes that Russia never deployed the logistics that would have indicated preparations for an invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, ahead of an April 13 meeting of the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier emphasized that progress has been made in withdrawing heavy weapons from eastern Ukraine.

On the other hand, NATO — as well as officials from Ukraine, the United States, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — has continued publicly emphasizing that Russia is rotating personnel into eastern Ukraine. On April 12, an anonymous NATO official told German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that Russia is supplying troops and weapons in eastern Ukraine. The next day, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine reported renewed intense fighting around the city of Donetsk and east of Mariupol.

These differences in rhetoric have been developing for months. For Western European governments, especially Germany, mediating a de-escalation in Ukraine and working toward establishing a stable security environment in the region — as well as normalizing economic relationships with Moscow — is desirable. However, for the largely U.S.-dominated NATO, the priority is boosting defenses along the alliance's eastern edge and providing a deterrent to additional Russian moves without provoking Russian military actions. These competing imperatives are driving a wedge between the allies.

The political divergence among NATO members is also demonstrated by their significantly different defense spending patterns. The main Western European defense spenders, including France and Germany, have all been slashing their budgets in the face of economic hardships, but the Eastern European NATO members (particularly the Baltics and Poland) have been spending more as they perceive an increased risk from Russia. These spending differences are in line with an already visible division: The strategic depth between NATO's Western European members and Russia minimizes their perception of a threat, so their investments in military capabilities are mostly for the benefit of the Eastern European "security consumers" within NATO.

This dynamic explains why the United State has chosen to boost bilateral relationships with Eastern European NATO members, especially Poland and Romania. NATO as a whole does not necessarily share the U.S. interest of establishing a new security paradigm in Eastern Europe, so Washington has sought bilateral cooperation with those Eastern European countries. Operation Atlantic Resolve is a significant example of this activity; it has resulted in more than a brigade's worth of troops being permanently rotated through Eastern Europe. The prospect of forward deploying heavy equipment for these forces in Eastern Europe, which would facilitate both exercises and potential deployments, also addresses Eastern European NATO members' requests for more direct military support.

As low-level fighting continues in eastern Ukraine and as negotiations over the implementation of some parts of the Minsk agreement remain largely deadlocked, diverging imperatives and strategic goals will further fragment the Western coalition. Although countries like Germany and the United States supported the Maidan movement that toppled former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's government, the Western Europeans' perception of the conflict in Ukraine differs from those in Eastern Europe. While Western European states work to de-escalate tensions and reach some kind of stability in the region, the United States will continue boosting its bilateral defense ties in Eastern Europe and building a regional alliance that could prevent Moscow from making further military moves in the Russian periphery.