Albania and Serbia Are at Odds Again
April 10, 2015
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Summary
Political
tension in the Western Balkans is running high again. On April 6,
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama cautioned that his country would unify
with Kosovo if the European Union failed to incorporate both countries
into the continental bloc. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic was
quick to respond, accusing Rama of fomenting instability in the region.
Albania
and Serbia have a complex relationship because of ethnic tensions and
overlapping territorial aspirations. Complicating things further,
Albania supported Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence,
while Serbia continues to resist its international recognition. Friction
between Serbia and Albania will persist, but Albania's claims over
Kosovo will remain rhetorical, and a more serious escalation is
unlikely.
Analysis
During
a joint interview with Kosovar Deputy Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, Rama
brought up two options for unification between Albania and Kosovo. The
first would be for both countries to join the European Union. Though
Rama has said this is the option he supports, he mentioned a second
possibility: uniting Albania and Kosovo into one country. Serbia, which
still considers Kosovo a breakaway territory,
rejected the idea. Belgrade does not realistically expect to recover
Kosovo, but it still opposes any move that would unify the two largest
ethnic Albanian communities. On April 8, a European Commission
spokeswoman categorized Rama's statement as "provocative."
Tension between Albania and Serbia is not new. The resurrection of irredentist claims has long been a common feature of politics in the Western Balkans. In a region with such a complex geographic and ethnic landscape, where official borders do not match linguistic or religious ones, most countries hold centuries-old grudges and make territorial claims on others. This situation has often led to violence, with the wars of the 1990s as the most recent example.
Tension between Albania and Serbia is not new. The resurrection of irredentist claims has long been a common feature of politics in the Western Balkans. In a region with such a complex geographic and ethnic landscape, where official borders do not match linguistic or religious ones, most countries hold centuries-old grudges and make territorial claims on others. This situation has often led to violence, with the wars of the 1990s as the most recent example.
A Difficult Relationship
As
the Ottomans expanded their empire from Anatolia to the Balkans in the
14th century, Serbian and Albanian lands progressively fell under
Turkish rule. The immigration of Muslims from elsewhere in the Ottoman
Empire into the Balkans and the conversion of many locals created a
disruptive patchwork of Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim populations.
According to the 2011 census, almost two-thirds of Albania's population
is Muslim. In Serbia, on the other hand, more than four-fifths of the
people follow Eastern Orthodoxy.
When
the Ottoman Empire started to crumble in the early 20th century,
several Balkan states saw the opportunity to repel the Turks and to
acquire territory from their neighbors. The First Balkan War
(1912-1913), which was key for the expulsion of the Ottomans from the
region, also resulted in conflicts among the Balkan states. During the
war, Albania declared independence from the Ottomans but was invaded by
Serbian troops; Belgrade saw the conflict as an opportunity to gain
access to the Adriatic Sea. Although the Treaty of London recognized
Albania's independence in 1913 — and Serbian troops eventually withdrew —
the treaty also introduced territorial adjustments that left almost
half the ethnic Albanian population outside the new country's borders.
Albanian irredentism already existed under Ottoman rule, but the Treaty of London gave it new life. In its current form, it includes claims to regions in neighboring Kosovo and western Macedonia in addition to small areas in southern Serbia, southern Montenegro and northwestern Greece. Notably, some of these claims overlap with nationalist agendas in Serbia, which envisions a "Greater Serbia" covering territories of modern-day Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and, in some of its variants, Albania.
The situation of Albanian
minorities in the former Yugoslavia and later in Serbia has been an
enduring source of conflict between Tirana, the capital of Albania, and
Belgrade. Ethnic Albanians account for 90 percent of the population of
Kosovo, which has traditionally been under Serbian control and whose
political status is particularly contentious. In the 1990s, Tirana
called on the international community to intercede and stop the ethnic
cleansing of Albanians in collapsing Yugoslavia. At the same time,
Belgrade accused Tirana of supporting separatist groups in Kosovo. The
bilateral relationship became strained again in 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Albania subsequently recognized Kosovo's independence, a move that irritated Serbia's leadership.
Potential for Social Unrest
Over
the past year, Albania and Serbia have alternated diplomatic gestures
with the usual provocations. In November, Rama visited Vucic in Belgrade
for the first meeting between the two countries' leaders since the late
1940s. However, an incident during an October soccer match between
Albania and Serbia clouded the talks. The game was suspended after a
small drone flew over the stadium carrying a "Greater Albania" flag,
triggering an exchange of harsh words.
But despite intermittent
tensions, the borders of the Western Balkans are unlikely to change
anytime soon. For most Albanians, the idea of a Greater Albania has
symbolic meaning linked to a broader sense of Albanian identity and
solidarity with ethnic Albanians in the region. Most Albanian
governments have used the idea of a Greater Albania for political
reasons, but little to no concrete action has resulted from the
rhetoric.
More important, Tirana's main allies oppose any of its territorial claims. Albania is a NATO member aspiring to join the European Union and is unlikely to make any moves that could seriously destabilize the region. Opinion polls show that EU accession is popular among Albanians, a factor that will continue to deter Tirana from making any unilateral moves to unify with Kosovo. Additionally, with Kosovo suffering through dire economic conditions, Tirana cannot afford to unify with a region facing high unemployment and poor economic prospects.
More important, Tirana's main allies oppose any of its territorial claims. Albania is a NATO member aspiring to join the European Union and is unlikely to make any moves that could seriously destabilize the region. Opinion polls show that EU accession is popular among Albanians, a factor that will continue to deter Tirana from making any unilateral moves to unify with Kosovo. Additionally, with Kosovo suffering through dire economic conditions, Tirana cannot afford to unify with a region facing high unemployment and poor economic prospects.
Serbia's case is similar. For political
reasons, Belgrade cannot officially recognize Kosovo's independence.
The Serbian government also understands, however, that it will not
recover the lost territory anytime soon. In addition, the European Union
considers the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo a
crucial part of Belgrade's accession to the continental bloc. As a
result, the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations primarily focus on the status of the Serbian minorities living in northern Kosovo.
However,
Albania's relations with Kosovo could generate problems in the future.
Albania is an ethnically homogeneous country, particularly when compared
with neighboring Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though Albania is
familiar with domestic political instability, ethnic-fueled tensions are
rare. But volatility in Kosovo poses a risk to Albania for several
reasons. First, the conflict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic
Serbians in Kosovo creates friction between Tirana and other regional
players, most notably Serbia. Second, poor living conditions in Kosovo
will force Albania to absorb increasing numbers of unemployed Kosovars
over the long term. According to World Bank data, over 14 percent of
Albanians live below the poverty line, creating the conditions for
potential social unrest in Albania.
Pressuring the European Union
Though
Rama's statements were mostly meant for a domestic audience, the
Albanian government is using the idea of unification with Kosovo to
pressure the European Union to speed up the accession process. Albania
applied for EU membership in 2009,
and the country formally became a candidate in 2014. Over the past
decade, Tirana introduced several reforms to attract foreign investment,
liberalize the economy and qualify for EU membership. The European
Union is still demanding more reforms, however, especially with regard
to corruption and organized crime.
More important, the European Union is currently suffering from "enlargement fatigue."
After incorporating 12 new members between 2004 and 2007, the bloc has
lost its appetite for new membership. The economic crisis has also led
to a political crisis that complicates the accession of new countries.
Croatia joined the European Union in 2013 but will be the last country
to do so for a long time. Albania and Serbia are unlikely to join this
decade. Kosovo, in the meantime, has long demanded visa-free access to
the continental bloc. It was after seeing progress in negotiations drag
that Tirana and Pristina threatened to pursue bilateral unification.
The
overall popularity of EU accession within the Albanian establishment
explains why Tirana will apply political pressure on the bloc without
necessarily acting on the government's strong statements. However,
Albania's negotiations with Brussels will drag out over many years, and a
lack of progress could endanger this balance and lead to more regional
instability.