The New Triangular Diplomacy: India, China and America at Sea
C. Raja Mohan Nonresident Senior Associate, South Asia Program
As
in the Cold War, so in the current power play between the United States
and China, the rest of Asia will simply not submit itself to the
discipline of a bipolar framework. Asia will actively shape and be
shaped by the emerging strategic dynamic between Washington and Beijing.
Asia
is home to many large states that are wedded to nationalism and
territorial sovereignty, opposed to local ambitions for regional
hegemony,committed to a measure of autonomy from the great powers, and
determined to promote greater economic integration with each other.
These are competing imperatives that do not sit well with each other but
do define the contradictory nature of Asia’s rise.
One of these
important regional powers is India—the third largest economy in Asia,
and the fourth biggest spender on defense in the Indo-Pacific after the
United States, China and Japan.
India’s potential could contribute
significantly to the new balance of power in Asia as recognized by both
Washington and Beijing. U.S. Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, was in
Delhi last June declaring India as a "lynchpin"in the U.S. pivot to Asia.
The Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie was soon knocking at Delhi’s doors, trying to soothe India’s growing concerns about Beijing’s rise. Delhi’s cautious response to America’s Asian pivot
underlines India’s open-ended and deliberative strategy in dealing with
the twists and turns in the U.S. strategy towards China.
India has had a complex and difficult relationship with China
since they became neighbors in the middle of the 20th century. And it
is only over the last decade that Delhi’s ties with the United States
have begun to warm. India has not had a direct conflict
of interest with the United States during the Cold War, but the two have
had deep differences on global and regional issues.
Delhi’s
relations with China have been marred by a host of unresolved bilateral
disputes since they became neighbors in the middle of the 20th century
and an unending competition for regional influence. How this
rivalry moves in the coming years—towards intensification or
mitigation—will have a great impact on the outcomes from the U.S. pivot
to Asia and the construction of a new Asian balance.
In the last
few years, despite growing economic engagement, Sino-Indian political
tensions have not only intensified in the traditional theatre of the
Great Himalayas,but have also spilled over to the maritime spaces of the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
With their growing and globalized
economies, China and India are now dependent on the seas as never before
in their history. Both are building large navies. Naval planners
in Beijing and Delhi would like to project power way beyond their
territorial waters to secure the increasingly dispersed interests of
their nations.
In both capitals, the traditional attachment to the
ideology of‘non-alignment’ is giving way, if slowly, to the recognition
of the need to have the capacity to influence developments far from
their shores.
Naval leaders in both Beijing and Delhi would like
to win access to facilities in critical locations and build special
political relationships that will allow their incipient blue water
navies to operate in far seas.
As their maritime interests expand and their naval footprints overlap, there is new friction between China and India in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The
rise of China and the emergence of India as naval powers has led to
widespread recognition that the two oceans can no longer be seen as
separate theatres but as a single strategic space—the Indo-Pacific.
China’s
main maritime preoccupations are in the Western Pacific—reunifying
Taiwan, defending Chinese territorial claims, and constraining American naval dominance. Yet,
China’s rising maritime profile in the Indian Ocean, from where it
imports a large portion of its energy and mineral resources, is
generating deep concerns in Delhi.
While India’s main interest is
in securing its primacy in the Indian Ocean littoral, its navy is making
frequent forays into the Western Pacific.
Delhi’s deepening
bilateral naval engagement with Vietnam, which is mired in territorial
disputes with China, its support to the principle of freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea, and its frequent joint naval
exercises with Japan and the United States do raise eyebrows in Beijing.
Even
as China and India build up their naval capabilities and step on each
other’s toes in the Indo-Pacific, neither of them is in a position to
supplant the United States as the dominant maritime power in both the
oceans.
The U.S. military rebalance towards Asia
is marked by a profound wariness of China’s growing power and great
enthusiasm to strengthen the partnership with India. This has set in
motion what could be a consequent triangular dynamic in the
Indo-Pacific. Like everyone else in Asia, India wants to benefit
from China’s economic growth but would like to limit the prospects for
Beijing’s dominance of the region.
As the strategic gap between
India and China grows—for China is rising much faster than India—Delhi
can only bridge it through a combination of internal and external
balancing.
An alliance with Washington, then, would seem natural
for Delhi. But India is concerned about the inconstancy of American
policy towards China, the fiscal and political sustainability of the
pivot to Asia in Washington.
Delhi is acutely aware of the dangers
of a potential Sino-U.S. rapprochement that could leave India exposed.
It therefore seeks simultaneous expansion of security cooperation with
the United States while avoiding a needless provocation of Beijing.
China,
clearly, has the upper hand in the current triangular dynamic with
India and the United States. It could accommodate either Delhi or
Washington to limit the depth of a prospective India-U.S. strategic
partnership. Given the current ambiguities in Washington, Beijing
and Delhi, there is much uncertainty surrounding the direction of the
triangular dynamic between them.
One thing, though, is certain.
The emergence of China and India as naval powers and the intersection of
their maritime policies with those of the United States are bound to
churn the security politics of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.