The U.S. and Russia Plan for Conflict
MAY 25, 2016 | 09:00 GMT
Forecast
- Despite genuinely wanting to resolve some of their conflicts, the United States and Russia's mistrust of one another is not going away.
- Both countries will focus on long-term security initiatives as they prepare for an enduring period of hostility.
- Defense programs will center on key security areas, including deployments in Eastern Europe, missile defense and the strategic nuclear balance.
Analysis
Hope
for the best, prepare for the worst. That is the mantra the United
States and Russia are abiding by as they plan for a tense few years
ahead. In critical areas, including the conflicts in Syria andUkraine and
arms control negotiations, both countries would genuinely like to
negotiate viable solutions. Nevertheless, the mistrust between the two
runs deep, and vast differences of opinion and outright conflicts of
interest will continue to undermine efforts to reach a comprehensive
deal. With little hope of a positive outcome, the strategic
decision-makers in Washington and Moscow are cementing their security
positions against each other during this period of significant hostility.
The
critical 2016 Warsaw summit, to be held July 8-9 among NATO members, is
fast approaching. Out of the summit, the United States hopes a clear,
united purpose will emerge for the divided security alliance. The key
challenge for Washington will be to reassure its Eastern European
allies, especially Poland and the Baltic states, that they will be
supported against Russia, an ever-increasing concern now that Moscow has
invested itself militarily in Ukraine. The United States has already
taken measures to bolster forces on NATO's eastern flank, but these forces are currently little more than a symbol of U.S. commitment.
The
next step for Washington, and a key part of its long-term security plan
for Europe, is to enlist greater support from crucial NATO partners for
deployments on the bloc's eastern flank. The United States needs help
from its European allies to carry some of the burden of deployments and
to act as a united front to deter Russia. But as Poland and the Baltic
states call for a permanent deployment of NATO forces, the United States
is having a hard time convincing its partners to deploy significant
rotational forces, much less a permanent garrison, to Russia's doorstep.
Germany in particular has been difficult to convince, since its leaders
hope to renew lucrative business ties with Russia. Moreover, the German
population is generally wary of a confrontation with Russia and the
prospect of sending forces to defend Poland and the Baltic states.
To
bridge the gap between its Western and Eastern European NATO allies,
Washington is pushing for a deployment model that eschews permanent
basing in favor of permanent presence. In what is being called a
heel-to-toe model, the United States is reportedly negotiating the
presence of forces, which will consist of a battalion in each of the
Baltic states plus Poland on a six-month rotation, to be announced in
the Warsaw summit. The United States plans to offer two battalions but
hopes its NATO allies will agree to provide the other two. From
Washington's perspective, a long-term and unified NATO effort on the
alliance's eastern front is the key to deterring further Russian action.
But
what Washington portrays as defensive deployments and reassurance
initiatives looks very different from Moscow's perspective. Given
Russia's history of being invaded from the west, a growing NATO presence
on its frontier is causing concern. Driven by these fears, Russia is
already building up its forces to better position itself against NATO.
Initially,
Russia began transitioning its military to a brigade structure for
greater flexibility in dealing with unrest and insurgency to the south.
But now Moscow has changed its strategy, rapidly restructuring its
military into a division-level force that is focused on high-end
conventional war against a potential enemy like NATO. Last February,
Russia finished reactivating the 1st Guards Tank Army in Russia's
Western Military District, a spearhead force built around heavy armor
and artillery for offensive and defensive operations on the Great
European Plain. Furthermore, Russia is transitioning at least three more
of its brigades into division-sized units close to its western
frontiers.
What Drives the Conflict
Beyond
conventional force deployments, a core variable that drives much of the
conflict between NATO and Russia is the development and deployment of
ballistic missile defense technology. This is epitomized in the debate
over the U.S. initiative to deploy ground-based missile defenses in
Eastern Europe, a program known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
The plan dates back to 2009, and NATO has insisted since its inception
that the initiative is meant to protect Europe from a potential Iranian
missile threat and is thus entirely unrelated to Russia. But Moscow has
vehemently opposed the program, claiming it poses a direct threat to
Russian interests.
Essentially,
the dispute boils down to Russia's concerns over its long-term
strategic security. For all the current focus on Russian military
modernization, Moscow is keenly aware of its overall conventional
military weakness against NATO and a rising China. In response, the
Russians have progressively leaned on their powerful nuclear arsenal as
the ultimate deterrent. In fact, Moscow has explicitly outlined in its
Defense White Papers its willingness to use nuclear weapons against an
existential non-nuclear threat, such as invading armies.
As
the European Phased Adaptive Approach is presently constituted, NATO is
correct that it is far too limited to pose a significant threat to
Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. From Russia's point of view, though,
U.S. investment in ballistic missile technology poses a serious
long-term threat. To fully comprehend Russia's concern, ballistic
missile development has to be conceptualized in conjunction with other
technological developments. In the future, for instance, Russia fears that the United States could field a deadly first-strike capability, in part oriented around hypersonic missiles.
Specifically, an increasingly precise U.S. nuclear arsenal coupled with
a reliable anti-ballistic missile network could enable Washington to
launch a decapitation strike, which would severely damage Russia's
leadership structure and its nuclear arsenal in a first strike. It would
also leave the United States able to intercept and destroy the
surviving missiles that Moscow would launch in retaliation.
These
fears are driving protests in Russia as well as Moscow's defense
spending. Despite its considerable nuclear arsenal, Russia continues to
prioritize its strategic missile force. Last year, the Russians tested
eight intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and in January,
Russian officials announced plans to test 16 ICBMs in 2016, 14 of which
will be entering service in Russia. On the testing schedule are the
recently introduced Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which
had considerable development problems, and other land-based ICBMs, such
as the new SS-X-30 Sarmat. Moscow is counting on these missiles as well
as new deployment tactics to ensure its nuclear arsenal can survive the U.S. anti-ballistic missile network.
Still,
the United States and Russia have a joint desire to reach an
understanding. Their negotiations over Syria imply as much. But given
the high level of mistrust between the United States and some of its key
NATO allies on one hand and Russia on the other, both Moscow and
Washington will continue to invest security against the other. Given the
high-tech missiles, anti-missile developments and the deployment of
troops by both sides, the little Cold War, as it has been called, should be viewed with a long-term perspective, because it is unlikely to end any time soon.